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and extreme events

Preface
“ I can calculate the motions of the heavenly bodies,but not the madness of people.”
Isaac Newton
Human behaviour exhibits extremes of many different kinds. An
extreme is only extreme in relation to a set of expectations. Behaviour
can only be studied in relation to an environment; it is always an
interaction. This work examines extreme events that emerge as global
consequences of local interactions contrary to intuitive expectations.
The first research topic covers hand-eye coordination during tasks
such as balancing a stick on a finger tip. The second topic covers
speculative trading. These two paradigms may appear completely
unrelated. They share, however, certain properties, which allow them
to be studied using similar methods. In both cases, subjects have an
incentive to use observable information about the world to their ad-
vantage. Large, unexpected fluctuations in the behavioural dynamics,
quantified by balancing errors and logarithmic price changes, pose
presumably undesirable risks. Nevertheless, extreme fluctuations that
are orders of magnitude larger than the typically observed ones occur
repeatedly, even though the probability that they occur at all would
be negligible if they were Gaussian (i.e. normally) distributed. Their
statistics resemble natural catastrophes.
A well-known example for an extreme economic event is the South
Sea Bubble. Over the course of 1719, the price per share of the South
Sea Company stock rose from about £100 to £1,000 and fell back to
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almost where it started [Gar90]. Motivated by a successful trade, Isaac
Newton bought a larger number of shares near the peak of the bubble
and lost £20,000. After the loss, Newton made the statement quoted
above and never wanted to hear about the South Seas again [PA05].
Many others were also financially devastated by the bubble burst. But
was it all madness? After all, Hoare’s Bank, which suspected that the
stock was overvalued, was able to trade highly profitably throughout
the bubble [TV04].
Rather than despair, like Newton, we here investigate whether
the apparent madness of people can be better understood with the
help of modern scientific tools adopted from nonlinear dynamics,
statistical physics, neuroscience, control- and information theory. We
pay particular attention to the distributions and correlations of extreme
events. The significance of such statistics in general is two-fold. First,
they are important for risk assessment, especially since costs are often
dominated by the most extreme events [Sor04]. Second, since the
latter in many cases represent crises or catastrophes, it may be tempting
to create credible-sounding post-hoc narratives around them [BP95].
Thereby, rare and extreme observations are perceived as disconnected
from more typical ones even though they may share common causes.
The statistics of extreme events reveal common underlying structures
that might be difficult to observe directly and only become apparent
when they lose their balance.
An important related concept is power-law scaling, which reflects a
scale invariant (e.g. self-similar) structure of the respective quantity.
Different scales, therefore, cannot be understood in isolation. Exam-
ples for power-law distributed event magnitudes include earthquake
energies, forest fire areas, and several types of avalanches including
those in neuronal activity [Sor04, BP03]. Power laws for the probabil-
ities of large events and for long-range spatial or temporal correlations
are commonly associated with the so-called critical phenomena. They
typically stem from the divergence of a characteristic length or of the
susceptibility to perturbations, for example in systems at the boundary
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of order and disorder. There are, however, also other mechanisms, in-
cluding certain multiplicative noise processes, that can lead to similar
effects [Sor04].
To identify the specific mechanisms in any particular system, it is
therefore necessary to consider meaningful model structures in the
respective context. For this reason, considerable parts of this work are
devoted to the existing literature on the twomain topics: humanmotor
control and financial economics. Yet the new contributions begin
with the introduction of minimalistic models, where fundamental
effects emerge generically, without detailed parameter tuning or even
completely independent of parameters. Features are then added or
varied carefully step by step, to account for empirical findings while
still maintaining a detailed understanding of the model dynamics.
Furthermore, behavioural experiments were performed to motivate
model assumptions and to test predictions.
Nevertheless, the mechanisms for extreme events presented through-
out this work all turn out to follow an overreaching principle, which
fits surprisingly well with many existing findings in the respective
fields–some of which were previously thought to contradict each other.
It is found, seemingly paradoxically, that locally minimising fluctu-
ations can increase a dynamical system’s sensitivity to unpredictable
perturbations and thereby facilitate global catastrophes. Just like the
methods used throughout this work were adopted frommany different
fields of research, this mechanism for extreme events may be relevant
in fields of research outside of the present scope. Concrete examples
for this conjecture are presented in the final discussion.
Thesis structure
The following chapters are grouped into four parts. The structure was
planned such that this work can–but doesn’t have to–be read from
cover to cover. Readers interested only in certain chapters should
nevertheless also read the final conclusions in part IV.
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In Part I, complex systems, critical phenomena, and important
statistical methods are introduced very briefly. The next two parts
constitute the majority of this work. Balancing tasks are discussed in
Part II and speculative markets in part III. Each of these two main
parts features an introduction to the existing literature in the field,
and more detailed investigations of preexisting models that are most
closely related to this work. After the respective main results, which are
motivated and previewed in slightly more detail below, each of these
two parts includes a detailed discussion from the perspective of the
respective field. Finally, in part IV, the main results are summarised
more concisely and discussed from a more general point of view.
We try to explain results as generally understandably as possible,
particularly in the introduction and discussion chapters, and in the
introductions to each chapter. For the detailed results, however, we
assume basic knowledge of higher mathematics, such as probabilities.
Some sections also require more advanced knowledge in special fields.
In part I, the most important methods for data analysis in the later
parts are explained. Furthermore, complexity, criticality, extreme
events, self-similarity in time and space, as well as processes generating
such phenomena are introduced briefly.
Balancing tasks
In our everyday lives, we may experience that it is currently impossible
to build machines which come even close to human high-level skills
like reason. However, even abilities that are often taken for granted
can pose unsolved engineering problems. For example, many human
(and animal) motor skills are still very difficult or even impossible
to replicate in robots. Yet, this remarkable performance is achieved
despite unreliable sensors, slow nerve conduction, and muscles which
are outperformed by artificial actuators [Hun92]. Therefore, one may
argue that the Central Nervous System (CNS) employs motor control
strategies which are vastly superior to current engineered solutions.
Like in the famous quote “skate where the puck’s going, not where
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it’s been”(Wayne Gretzky), the CNS’s success often lies in the ability
to predict impending dynamics. This presumably involves the use
of internal models for body and environment (see e.g. [FW11], and
chapter 5)–a concept which also aligns well with the sensation of stable
percept of the world. Yet humans sometimes appear to perceive and
memorise only minimal information about their environment (see
sec. 9.6.4). A better understanding of the mental representations of
the world can be expected to eventually contribute to solving many
problems in philosophy, medicine, and engineering.
Since the actual internal representations in a living brain cannot
be read out directly1, simple movement- and object manipulation
tasks are important paradigms to investigate motor control behaviour.
Movements typically exhibit highly stereotyped patterns across repeti-
tions and across subjects [WG00]. These regularities are commonly
attributed to a high degree of optimisation in the aforementioned in-
ternal representations. However, movements also show a high degree
of variability even between repeated trials where conditions are kept
as constant as possible [FSW08]. In the past, this variability has been
attributed to mostly physiological noise sources that affect movement
execution, but this stance has been questioned in a few more recent
publications (e.g. [CAS06], see chapter 5 for more details).
In Part II, we investigate movement variability in the a classic–and
perhaps the most fundamental–control problem: the inverted pen-
dulum. Several solutions exist in control theory, but humans exhibit
surprising and hitherto unexplained dynamics, including extreme
events that follow spatio-temporal scaling laws. The deviations from
perfect stability when balancing a stick on a fingertip or performing
similar virtual tasks indicate amounts of multiplicative noise that vastly
1Current electrophysiological- and imaging techniques can only measure small (and
distinct) fractions of the neuronal activity at any point in time. Furthermore,
despite much progress over the last century, the neuronal code remains mostly
undeciphered as of this writing.
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exceed plausible execution noise. We here focus on virtual balancing
tasks.
It was argued before that the CNS may add parametric (i.e. multi-
plicative) noise to prolong escape times in inherently unstable balanc-
ing scenarios [CM02]. This model, however, has several shortcomings,
especially with respect to reproducing the fluctuations during virtual
balancing with a low task difficulty. It is also inconsistent with the
more mainstream literature on motor control in other experimental
paradigms (see sec. 7.1 for a summary and chap. 6 for more details).
In chapter 7, a model will be introduced where parametric noise
arises from the rapid online estimation of parameters which are used in
the controller’s internal representation of the task. This parsimonious
model can–in contrast to previous ones–reproduce the experimental
findings in much detail. The models makes concrete predictions,
which will be tested in chapter 8. Furthermore, the results demonstrate
for the first time that balancing behaviour in the same task changes
qualitatively after training depending on how subjects are rewarded.
The findings imply that the CNS uses a highly adaptive representa-
tion of the control problem and efficiently extracts local trends from
observations only as needed. This is consistent with much of the
literature outlined above, but also adds substantial new insights.
Speculative Markets
Markets play an important role in the life of most humans. Well-
functioning markets facilitate trade and enable the decentralised, self-
organised distribution and allocation of resources in a society. In
mainstream economics and many other economic theories, markets
are characterised as structures that transform information about the
traded goods into prices. The latter serve as signals for the coordination
of the economy.
Financial markets are particularly well suited for scientific study
for several reasons, including many participants and a relatively high
degree of transparency. This is also reflected in the great amount of
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available–though not always free–data, which facilitates the compar-
ison of theory and reality. The difficulty to perform experiments in
financial markets notwithstanding, the amount and quality of empiri-
cal data on financial markets has attracted many researchers also from
outside of economics, including the natural sciences.2 An introduction
to the field is found in chapter 10.
Financial markets are often described as “informationally efficient”
such that predictable price changes are eliminated by traders exploiting
them, leaving only residual unpredictable fluctuations. This classical
view of markets operating close to an equilibrium is challenged by
extreme price fluctuations which occur far more frequently than can
be accounted for by external news. Criticism has been raised from
several directions, which will be discussed in more detail in chapter 10.
It was supposed, for example, that excessive price fluctuations emerge
because markets are inefficient and irrational, which is often blamed
onmarket psychology. Proponents of market efficiency, however, stress
its theoretical virtues and empirical evidence for some of its aspects or
implications. So far, no consensus has been reached. A major problem
in this discussion is that efficiency cannot be directly tested empirically,
but only in joint hypotheses.
Physicists have been particularly interested in the statistics of price
changes (log returns), which exhibit scaling relations resembling those
for critical phenomena (see above). These so-called “stylised facts”
are remarkably stable over time and across very different markets
(sec. 10.3). How such large-scale collective dynamics can emerge from
the interactions within a market is commonly studied using multi-
agent models. It was argued, that the “stylised facts” emerge from the
complexity of many interacting elements, possibly at a phase transition.
We will discuss several prominent multi-agent models, all of which
exhibit specific market failures that give rise to large fluctuations, in
section 10.7.
2Note, however, that bidirectional exchange between economics and the natural
sciences has existed for centuries. Some examples given in [FSS05, TML08].
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In the following chapters, it will be shown that information effi-
ciency itself can be a force that drives markets towards states of extreme
susceptibility. We will thereby disclose rigorous links between the
“stylised facts” and market efficiency with respect to self-generated
information. We will further clarify several aspects of different means
of adaptation and information generation in multi-agent models.
In chapter 11, a parsimonious trading model will be introduced
where collective information efficiency emerges via self-organisation.
The perfect balance of trading strategies, however, becomes extremely
susceptible to perturbations. The model quantitatively reproduces the
aforementioned “stylised facts” of real log returns.
In chapter 12, we will investigate group experiments with real
subjects. The “seesaw game” will be introduced, which maps many
results of the preceding chapters in a mathematically precise way
to a particularly simple and very illustrative game. Furthermore, the
elimination of predictable short-term price changes is shown to induce
bubbles. The experimental results can be captured in a simple and
analytically tractable model. If one allows for a nonlinear pricing rule
that matches demand and supply, the prices become highly volatile
during bubbles.
In chapter 13, an extended seesaw game is introduced which exhibits
realistic price dynamics even for moderately sized groups. It can, as of
this writing, be played online at seesaw.neuro.uni-bremen.de. Thanks
to coverage in newspapers, on the radio, and online, results were
obtained for a large number of subjects.
Taken together, the findings show how the consequences of infor-
mation efficiency can change completely when the self-interaction of
the market is taken into account.
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Part I.
Introduction to noise and
scaling in complex and
critical systems

1. What is complexity?
“ If you try and take a cat apart to see how it works,the first thing you have on your hands
is a nonworking cat.”
Douglas Adams
Many of the greatest breakthroughs in science were made possible by
identifying phenomena on different scales which have little influence
on each other and, therefore, can be treated independently. This is
especially apparent in systems that can be completely understood by
dividing them into smaller parts and understanding of each part. The
kinetic theory of gases, for example, reduces the absolute temperature
of a gas to the average kinetic energy of the molecules of which the gas
is composed. The basic interaction of two adjacent water molecules is
the same whether the molecules are in an ocean or a bucket.
There are, however, systems whose properties emerge from the inter-
action of their parts, often over many different scales, in a way which
cannot be understood from the properties of the isolated parts alone.
A wide range of systems from diverse disciplines that fit under this
definition–or similar ones–are called “complex systems”. A system
whose dynamical behavior changes depending on external influences
is often called called a “complex adaptive system”. These systems “com-
pute in the broadest sense by transforming information received from
the environment into actions on it” [Sch01]. The most prominent
example is the brain. Complex systems often exhibit metastable states
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where a small change in conditions can cause a major change in the
systems dynamics.
One of the difficulties in understanding complex systems lies in the
interaction between processes happening on many different levels. For
example, a DNA molecule is a carrier of meaningful biological infor-
mation only in the environment of a cell where the genes are expressed.
The differentiation of a cell into a specialised type, defined by its pat-
tern of gene expression, depends on the cell’s environment within an
organism. The whole organism, however, consists of cells. Therefore,
the properties of the parts of this system are not independent of the
whole. Similarly, a species’ success depends on an ecosystem of other
species and further factors that may be affected by them. Individual
behaviour in socioeconomic systems depends on the collective behav-
ior of others, for example on states and markets. Complex feedback
loops between different scales are also found in the climate system.
A well-understood complex phenomenon in physics, which has
been applied also to systems in many other fields, is criticality. A
critical state is characterised by a cascade of correlations across all
scales in the system. It is extremely susceptible to disturbances: even
small perturbations can have large consequences throughout the whole
system. Critical systems typically exhibit self-similar structures. Self-
organised criticality is considered to be one of the mechanisms for
complexity.
A striking property of complex and critical systems is large-scale
collective behaviors. They may provide insights into the underlying
structures that may be difficult to observe directly. In the following,
we will discuss the statistics of extreme events, which often defy the
more commonly known properties of Gaussian distributions. Since
the following chapters are concerned with the analysis of time series,
measures of temporal correlations are also introduced. Then, critical
phenomena are explained briefly, as well as intermittent systems that
exhibit complex dynamics from low-dimensional mechanisms. A
comprehensive introduction to these topics can be found in [Sor04].
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2. Extreme events
What is the probability that someone is twice your height? Unless
you are a small child or exhibit an extreme case of dwarfism, that
probability is essentially zero. In contrast, there is a good chance that
someone is twice, or even a hundred times richer than you unless
you happen to be among the few richest people in the world. In the
following we will introduce quantitative measures of such extreme
distributions.
2.1. General measures of distribution shapes
The shape of any distribution, for example the probability distribu-
tion of a random variable x, can be characterised by its moments
E(xn),n = 1,2, . . . , or by the following closely related named
measures. The mean is the (raw) first moment (i.e. n = 1). It is
the most well-known measure of central tendency. The variance
Var(x)=E((x−E(x))2) is the central second moment and measures
deviations from the mean. A Gaussian distribution is completely
characterised by its mean and its width, quantified by its standard
deviation Std(x)=pVar(x).
Higher moments are usually standardised, yielding dimensionless
measures which are invariant under any linear change of scale. The
third standardised moment is the skewness, which measures asymme-
try. The kurtosis is the fourth standardised moment
Kurt(x)=
E
((
x−E(x))4)
E
((
x−E(x))2)2 . (2.1)
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Sometimes, the same symbol is used for the excess kurtosis, which
equals to Kurt(x)−3 in the above notation. The kurtosis measures the
mass of the distribution tail, in other words, how much influence rare,
large events have on the variance of distribution. It is therefore going
to be an important measure in the following chapters. The kurtosis of
a Gaussian distribution is three. In other words, a kurtosis above three,
that is, a positive excess kurtosis, characterises distributions that are
more heavy-tailed (leptokurtic) than a Gaussian one. The exponential
distribution, for example, has a kurtosis of nine. The lowest kurtosis,
one, is that of the Bernoulli distribution with p = 1/2. The latter
describes the distribution of outcomes when flipping a fair coin.
For some distributions, in particular certain power laws (see below),
higher moments may diverge. Even if a moment is finite, it is often
very sensitive to extreme events. Therefore, elementary statistic courses
often advise to discard outliers. This leads to highly deceptive results
if the true underlying distribution is heavy-tailed.
A more robust measure of central tendency than the mean is the
median m where P (x ≤ m) ≥ 1/2 and P (x ≥ m) ≤ 1/2. In other
words, the median separates the higher half of a sample or probability
distribution from the lower half. For a Gaussian distribution, mean
and median are identical. The concept can be generalised to quantiles.
For example, a sample can be divided into four quartiles.
2.2. The central limit theorem
The central limit theorem states that the sum of N Independent and
Identically Distributed (IID) random variates (numbers), normalised
by 1/
p
N , with zero mean and finite variance σ2, converges to a Gaus-
sian distribution with variance σ2. The mean has to be zero for the
limit to exist and the sum to not diverge. The normalisation by 1/
p
N
ensures that the characteristic scale of the distribution is constant. For
finite, but large N , the central limit theorem is well approximated
and the scale of the distribution will be finite even without normalisa-
tion. The theorem also holds for weak correlations and for random
6
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variates from different distributions with similar variances [Sor04].
Accordingly, the sum of many random forces acting on a particle or
the collective activity of many independent elements should generally
converge towards a Gaussian distribution.
There are, however, some exceptions and complications to this re-
sult. First of all, the Lévy distributions (see also sec. 2.3) , which have
an infinite variance, are stable under summation. Second, even pro-
cesses with a finite variance but long-range correlations may converge
arbitrarily slow. This includes higher order correlations, for example
due to a variance that slowly varies over a wide range of scales. Hence,
understanding why any real system deviates from the central limit
theorem requires an explanation why the underlying factors exhibit
such a remarkable behaviour. See section B.3 for an example of slow
convergence involving a market model.
2.3. Power-law distributed events
In the following chapters, Probability Density Functions (PDFs) with
power-law tails p(y)∝|y |−δ for large event magnitudes |y | play a
significant role. Note that δ> 1 and that the power law behaviour can
only be valid above a threshold or asymptotically for large |y |. Other-
wise the PDF could not be normalised. Figure 2.1 shows a comparison
of a time series generated from Gaussian distributed random variates
and one from power-law-tailed random variates. Both processes have
the same variance. The Gaussian distribution is very localised. After a
few dozen samples, the range of likely fluctuations is clearly visible.
The power-law-tailed process, however, exhibits extreme outliers that
effectively never occur for a Gaussian. Since these events are rare, the
bins in the tail of the empirical probability density are undersampled.
This problem can be mitigated by using logarithmically spaced bins,
but then the largest bin becomes extremely wide. There is, however, a
way to show all data points and the full distribution at the same time.
Figure 2.2 shows the Complementary Cumulative Distribution
Functions (CCDFs) in double logarithmic coordinates for the same
7
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Figure 2.1.: Comparison of two white noise processes (left column) with
unit variance but differently shaped distributions. The empirical probability
densities (right column) were calculated from 106 time steps and binned
linearly. (a): Gaussian. (b): power-law-tailed with PDF tail exponent δ= 3,
that is, CCDF tail exponent ξ= 2. More precisely, the latter distribution is
equivalent to a Gaussian below a threshold and then follows a power law. At
the threshold, it has a continuous derivative. Independent random variates
were generated using inverse transform sampling.
processes also shown in figure 2.1. The value of the CCDF (i.e. the
position on the y-axis) for the magnitude of each event (i.e. the
position on the x-axis) gives the probability to observe an even larger
one. Since this probability is equal to the area under the PDF for all
larger event magnitudes, a power law in the PDF with exponent δ is
equivalent to a power law in the CCDF,
P (|y | > x)∝|y |−ξ, (2.2)
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Figure 2.2.: CCDFs for the same processes shown in fig. 2.1. Grey dotted
line: Gaussian. Solid black line: power-law-tailed. Short red line: the tail-
exponent of the analytical distribution from which the random variates were
drawn.
with exponent ξ= δ−1.1 The CCDF for a given sample is calculated
by sorting all observed events by their magnitudes in descending order.
The values of the CCDF then follow by dividing each rank by the
sample size. The CCDF, therefore, shows all events. The random
deviations from the underlying true distribution increase in the end
of the tail. When the sample size is increased, the tail for a true power
law extends towards increasingly rare and large events. This effect
highlights a particular property of power-law-distributed events: if
1The Complementary Cumulative Distribution Function (CCDF) is most com-
monly used instead of the cumulative distribution function to depict power law
distributions. A likely reason is that the CCDF visually resembles the PDF in the
sense that large events are shown on the right-hand side of the x-axis. Note that
also the empirical CCDF is commonly called just “CCDF”. We here follow this
convention unless the difference in between the analytical ideal and the empirical
realisation is to be explicitely emphasised. Note, furthermore, that we will not
always distinguish between the notation for random process and a particular
realisation of that process, as long as the meaning is clear from the context.
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Figure 2.3.: Randomwalks with differently distributed increments, generated
by forming the cumulative sum over similar processes as shown in fig. 2.1.
Grey line: Gaussian distributed increments. Black line: a so-called Lévy flight
with power law distributed increments with CCDF tail exponent ξ= 1.5.
Because this distribution has a vanishing variance, the increments for both
walks were normalised to unit median magnitude.
one waits long enough, there will always come an event which surpasses
all previous ones by a significant margin.
The n-th moment of a power-law distribution only exist if n < ξ
and diverges otherwise. As mentioned above, Lévy distributions are
stable under summation and thereby beat the central limit theorem.
Their cumulative distributions exhibit tail exponents 0< ξ< 2.
IID random variates are commonly used to represent the incre-
ments of random walks or diffusion processes. Figure 2.3 shows two
random walks with the same typical increment size, but very different
distribution tails. The walk with Gaussian increments is closely related
to the Wiener process.2 The latter is well known, for example, as a
model for the Brownian motion of small particles in a fluid, resulting
2More precisely, it is used to numerically simulate the Wiener process, which is the
continuous-time limit of the random walk.
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from their random collisions with atoms or molecules. Clearly, the
changes in position from one time step to the next are all of the same
scale. In contrast, the walk with power-law-distributed increments
becomes dominated by rare, extreme jumps.
2.4. Self-similarity and power laws
The laws of physics do not change if one walks from one side of a room
to the other. The invariance of physical laws with respect to symmetry
transformations are very important in physics, since they reflect the
fundamental structure of nature. In the following, we briefly discuss
the symmetry of scale invariance.
The most well-known form of scale invariance is presumably the
self-similarity of fractals, where geometric features are repeated on each
scale. A simple fractal, the Koch curve, is shown in figure 2.4. There
are many more small structures than large ones: at the n-th iteration,
the curve consists of 4n segments of size 1/3n . After many iterations,
the curve looks exactly the same at any scale of observation. Physical
objects are only self-similar over a finite range of scales, and often
only approximately. Many spatially extended objects, including the
distribution of galaxies, geological structures, or blood vessels appear
to be self-similar fractal structures. The most strikingly self-similar
vegetable is the Romanesco. A specimen is shown in figure 2.5.
Mathematically, a scale invariant function (curve, observable) f (x)
at two different scales depends only on the ratio of the two scales:
f (λx)
f (x)
=λα⇔ (2.3)
f (λx)=λα f (x) (2.4)
for some exponent α and for all λ. Therefore, f is a homogeneous
function of degree α. A solution to (2.4) is a power law
f (x)∝ xα, (2.5)
11
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.
Figure 2.4.: The famous Koch curve is constructed by starting with the unit
interval as the initial segment. In each subsequent iteration, each segment
is dividing into three smaller segments of equal length. The central one
is replaced by an equilateral triangle. The base of the triangle is removed.
These three steps are repeated for an infinite number of iterations, forming a
self-similar fractal. The first six iterations are are shown above.
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Figure 2.5.: A Romanesco.
which can be verified by insertion.
Power-law distributed events exhibit the same statistics at all scales
of observation above the lower limit (cutoff) of the scaling regime, as
shown in figure 2.6. In practise, the largest scale will be determined
either by the length of the time series or by a second upper cutoff
to the power law due to, for example, the finite size of the system.
Particularly for steeper power-laws, extremely large sample sizes are
required to obtain events over several orders of magnitude. Then, the
limiting factor is most likely the sample size.3
3This note clarifies the notion of self-similarity in random processes, and what is
considered an (extreme) event in the following chapters.
A Wiener process, that is, the integral of a continuous-time Gaussian white
noise process, is self-similar. Its increments, however, are Gaussian distributed.
The Wiener process, therefore, only exhibits velocities within a narrow range.
Nevertheless, the process may, after a sufficient amount of time, wander arbitrary
far from where it started. If there is a mean reverting drift towards the origin,
however, the process is not self similar on longer time scales.
Control errors, for example deviations of a balanced stick from the upright
position, are quickly mean reverting. Otherwise, the system would not be stable.
As shown in sec. 6.2 ff., however, control errors during human balancing tasks
13
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Figure 2.6.: Two time series at different magnifications. (a, b, c): Gaussian
white noise. (d, e, f ): control errors in the minimal balancing model de-
scribed in sec. 7.3, which exhibits a power-law CCDF-tail with exponent
ξ= 1 in the analytical limit for large fluctuations.
are power-law distributed and, therefore, self-similar from a few millimeters up
to the possible movement range in the task. In practise, the upper limit for the
observed range in all experiments was the sample size. We consider these control
errors relevant events since large errors bear the risk that the subject loses control.
As another example, logarithmic price movements in financial markets are often
modelled as a Wiener process, but this severely underestimates the probability
of large price changes. As shown in sec. 10.3, the increments of price changes
actually follow a power law. A large price change may, for example, be a market
crash–an extreme event. There is possibly no hard upper limit for price changes,
but exchanges may suspend trading on major events.
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2.5. Fitting power-law distributed events
Estimating parameters of distributions of rare, extreme events gen-
erally requires large data sets and great care. Binning creates several
problems which can be avoided by using a maximum likelihood es-
timator [Sor04]. Power-law tail exponents can be obtained from the
Hill estimator after rank-ordering the event magnitudes, which is also
done when calculating the CCDF (see above). More precisely, the
magnitudes x = |y | of the events y are sorted in descending order, such
that
x1 ≤ x2 ≤ x3 ≤ . . . . (2.6)
The self-similarity of fluctuations with a power law CCDF with expo-
nent ξ is expressed in the ratio of the probabilities for observing two
event magnitudes xi and x j ,
p(xi )
p(x j )
=
(
xi
x j
)−ξ
, (2.7)
which is also a power law.
The Hill estimator uses the first r ranks, which correspond to the
largest events up to a cutoff. Smaller events, which may belong to a
different regime, are discarded. The maximum likelihood estimator
for ξ, based on the ratio of the xi , where i = 1,2, . . . ,r , and the event
magnitude at the cutoff xr , is [Sor04]
ξr =
(
1
r
r∑
i=1
ln
(
xi
xr
))−1
. (2.8)
The Hill estimator is sensitive to the cutoff, the optimal value of
which is generally unknown. It furthermore changes for different data
sets or when changing the parameters of a model. To improve the
robustness of the estimator while minimising manual interaction, the
following method was developed. The exponents ξr for 100 different
logarithmically spaced cutoff ranks r are calculated. For each cutoff,
15
2. Extreme events
the exponent is calculated using the Hill estimator equation (2.8). For
each of these power law fits, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS)-statistic
[MTW03, NIS14] follows as
Dr =max
i
(
Fi −
i −1
r
,
i
r
−Fi
)
, with (2.9)
Fi =
(
xi
xr
)−ξr
. (2.10)
It is calculated as if only the fitted tail would constitute the whole
distribution. This particular normalisation ensures that the expected
Dr decreases with increasing r unless the distribution deviates from
the power law. The optimal fit is
ξopt = ξropt , with (2.11)
ropt = argminr Dr . (2.12)
The range of cutoffs is chosen to be as wide as possible while avoiding
pathological cases which may occur in some particular situations.
Alternative methods to determine the cutoff were tested, but the above
one proved to be the most robust. In the following, we generally call
the best fit for the exponent ξ, dropping the index.
Since the Hill estimator tests the tail of the distribution, it is a
highly appropriate method to quantify the asymptotic behaviour for
large events. Methods that make more assumptions about the full
underlying distribution may lead to deceptive results. For example, a
method based on the assumption that the distribution is within the
Lévy regime always yields fitted exponents ξ< 2. Such a method based
on the return probability to the origin was found to yield erroneous fits
for the tails of logarithmic price returns [GPA+99, GPL+00, Lux06].
Regardless of this problem, the same method was used for stick bal-
ancing in several studies (see sec. 6.1).
Testing whether the underlying distributions in balancing time
series truly follow power laws is discussed in sec. A.1.
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Events in a time series are characterised not only their distribution, but
also by their temporal structure, which manifests as correlations. Two
measures of temporal correlations will be introduced below: the power
spectral density and the autocorrelation. The prior is more common
in motor control and useful to analyse the balancing tasks in part II,
while the autocorrelation is more common in quantitative economics
and therefore used in part III. Other measures are discussed briefly in
sec. A.5.
The Power Spectral Densities (PSDs) shown in the following were
estimated usingWelch’s method with aHanning window. Thismethod
sacrifices some frequency resolution to reduce random variability. In
addition, because the following PSD-figures will all use double loga-
rithmic axes, the periodograms were binned logarithmically.1 There-
fore, the periodograms exhibit less random variability at higher fre-
quencies.
Figure 3.1 shows a comparison of different types of noise. White
noise contains all frequencies with equal power. This is equivalent to
a signal that is completely uncorrelated in time. All processes shown
in figures 2.1 and 2.6 are types of white noise. Noise with temporal
correlations, in particular with a PSD that decays with increasing
frequencies as S( f )= f −λ, is called coloured noise.
A Wiener process is defined as the integral of white noise. This
introduces a factor 1/ f in the Fourier transform, which becomes 1/ f 2
1Low frequencies with at most one data point per bin were not binned. The
algorithm was tested with synthetic data and did not introduce significant biases.
For some uses other than plotting, more aggressive binning was required, which
is described in sec. 8.7.1.
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Figure 3.1.: Comparison of different types of noise. Solid black lines: white
noise. Dashed magenta lines: Pink noise, also called flicker- or 1/ f noise.
Dash-dotted brown lines: Brown noise, also called Brownian- or red noise.
Colored noise was generated using the method from [TK95]. All random
variates were Gaussian distributed, but the results are completely independent
of the respective distributions and only reflect the temporal structure. (a)
Power Spectral Density (PSD). (b): Autocorrelation.
in the power spectrum: the PSD decays with λ= 2 (fig. 3.1 (a)). In
other words, the power density per frequency falls 20dB per decade or
6dB per octave. This so-called “brown noise” is observed for Brownian
motion or other random walks with independent increments, for
example those shown in figure 2.3. Because the state (position) of an
unconstrained walk at each time is the integral or sum over all previous
states, the time series is extremely long-range correlated (fig. 3.1 (b)).
Yet, the process is memoryless in the sense that its increments are
independent: the Wiener process at each point in time depends only
on its current state and its infinitesimal change. The discrete-time
random walk at each time step t depends only on the position at t −1
and on the corresponding increment.
Pink noise has a PSD which decays with λ≈ 1, that is, 10dB per
decade or 3dB per octave (fig. 3.1 (a)). It is, therefore, often called 1/ f -
noise. The total energy per octave is constant. The time series is also
long-range correlated (fig. 3.1 (b)), but correlations decay faster than
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Figure 3.2.: Lowpass filtered continuous-time white noise, simulated with
1ms time steps. Solid lines: τ= 10ms. Dashed lines: τ= 100ms. (a) Black
lines: Power Spectral Density (PSD). Grey lines: the cutoff frequencies. (b):
Autocorrelation.
brown noise because the relative power of low frequencies is smaller.
1/ f -noise is observed in many systems, particularly at low frequencies–
at high frequencies it may be masked by other noise sources. Examples
include astronomic signals, electronic devices (“flicker noise”), the flow
of rivers and oceans, traffic, communication, biological systems, and
many more. 1/ f -noise can be seen as the half-integral of white noise,
an operation that is non-local in time. Correspondingly, fractional
derivatives may be used to describe dynamical systems with a long
memory. There is, however, no universal explanation why 1/ f noise
appears to be so ubiquitous. See [Pre78, Sor04] and also sec. 4.2 for
more in-depth discussions.
Simple dynamical systems or random walks within bounds exhibit
short-range correlations. Figure 3.2 shows results for a passive lowpass
filter
y˙(t )=−1
τ
y(t )+β(t ) (3.1)
with Gaussian white noise input β(t ). Fluctuations decay exponen-
tially with time constant τ. This behaviour is observed for a simple
RC-circuit or for the velocities in a diffusive process with friction. The
19
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PSD is constant for low frequencies up to a cutoff fc = 1/(2piτ). The
system effectively integrates all higher frequencies: the PSD decays
with 1/ f 2 like brown noise. The autocorrelation decays exponentially
with time constant τ, just like the fluctuations in y .
Higher-order filters have an even faster decaying high-frequency
response with even integer exponents (not shown). For example, the
position of a diffusing particle with friction is described by the integral
of the above first-order system equation (3.1).
20
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phenomena
In the following, several fundamental mechanisms for collective be-
haviours and power laws, which are related to the mechanisms dis-
cussed in later chapters, will be introduced briefly. We begin with
high-dimensional systems by introducing phase transitions and then
Self-Organised Criticality. Then, we will discuss intermittency and
multiplicative noise in simple, time-discrete maps.
4.1. Critical points in thermodynamic phase transitions
The laws of nature exhibit many symmetries with respect to trans-
formations such as translation, rotation, and reflection. The actually
realised states, however are typically less symmetric. The structure of
a solid state (crystal), for example, is only invariant against discrete
translations and special rotations. A thermodynamic system at a phase
transition abruptly changes between a less ordered but more symmet-
ric state, and more ordered and less symmetric one, depending on
external influences. The spontaneous breaking of symmetries is an
important principle for the description of, for example, the differenti-
ation of the fundamental forces and particles in the universe [oS14]
or for the onset of cell differentiation in an embryo [LB10]. It is at
the critical point, however, where the compromise between order and
disorder allows for complex behaviours and new symmetries like scale
invariance to emerge.
There are different types of phase transitions, most of which can be
classified as first or second order. Introductions to the field are found,
for example, in [Sor04, Sch04].
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Figure 4.1.: Bifurcation Diagram
of a supercritical bifurcation. At
the critical value µc of the control
parameter µ, the equilibrium of
the order parameter A at E(A)= 0
becomes unstable and new solu-
tions emerge. Close to µc , fluctu-
ations in A increase dramatically.
Inmathematical terms, a sudden qualitative change in the behaviour
of a system depending on a small, smooth parameter change is called a
bifurcation. Close to such a transition, many complex and dynamical
systems can be simplified in a way allowing to characterise important
aspects of their behaviour by a single order parameter A. The behaviour
of the system is determined by a control parameter µ. At a critical
value µc , an equilibrium (fixed point), represented by A, becomes
unstable.1
Figure 4.1 shows a supercritical bifurcation, which corresponds to
a second order (also called “critical”) phase transition. As an example
for such a phase transition, consider a ferromagnet. The macroscopic
magnetisation is the result of a competition between order and disor-
der. The alignment of spins in the material through local interactions
lowers the system’s energy, but thermal fluctuations destroy these corre-
lations. The temperature T takes the role of the control parameter and
the macroscopic magnetisation that of the order parameter. At high
temperatures, the system is paramagnetic, that is, globally disordered
unless it is exposed to a strong external magnetic field. The systems
susceptibility is small since alignment cannot propagate over longer
scales. At low temperatures, the alignment of spins dominates and
the system exhibits spontaneous macroscopic magnetisation without
an external field. The rotational symmetry of the spins is broken: the
system must be in one of several distinguishable macroscopic states
1There are more general formalisations which we will not discuss.
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(e.g. magnetised in one of two possible directions in the Ising model).
This order is robust against small perturbations. Exactly at the Curie
temperature Tc , however, the whole system forms one fractal cluster
[Con89]. Because of this self-similar structure, even small perturba-
tions can propagate over all scales. Several quantities, including the
susceptibility and the correlation length, diverge according to power
laws |T −Tc |−γ.2 In practise, however, the largest possible fluctuations
close to a critical point may be limited by saturation [Sor04].
Because a system close to criticality is dominated by collective
behaviours, global properties such as dimensionality and symmetry
are often more important than microscopic details. Therefore, very
different systems may exhibit the same universal exponents γ.
Not all bifurcations are phase transitions and not all bifurcations or
phase transitions are critical. A subcritical bifurcation, which corre-
sponds to a first order phase transition, does not exhibit the divergences
described above. Here, the order parameter discontinuously jumps
to a finite value. When the system moves through the critical region,
the old phase becomes metastable and the new one stable. Examples
include the phase transitions between liquid and solid, as well as gas
and liquid phases.
Today, many phenomena in fields as diverse as depression, epileptic
seizures, opinion formation in groups, climate change, and ecosystems
are described as bifurcations. Many critical systems do not exhibit the
precise universal exponents γ found in thermodynamics. There are,
however, sometimes other “universal” features over broad classes of
systems such as early warning signs close to phase transitions or other
tipping points [SBB+09].
4.2. Self-Organised Criticality (SOC)
Following the above considerations, the widespread occurrence of
persistent critical phenomena in nature – 1/ f -noise (sec. 3), fractal
2The different quantities generally have different exponents.
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structures (sec. 2.4), and power-law distributed events (sec. 2.3) –
still cannot be explained sufficiently. What is missing in the classical
paradigm is at least a plausible explanation why the control parameters
for so many systems should be tuned exactly to a critical point.
The first possible explanation for the robust emergence of critical
phenomena without fine tuning of parameters was given by SOC
[BTW87, BP95]: certain classes of dynamical systems have a critical
point as an attractor. SOC is typically observed in slowly driven
(i.e. non-equilibrium) systems with extended degrees of freedom and
non-linear interactions.
The canonical example is the formation of a sandpile. The system
is externally driven by adding grains of sand one after another. The
state with the lowest energy is a completely flat surface. When a grain
is added, however, it will roll away from where it landed only until
it reaches a locally stable position. The grains therefore pile up. If
the slope of the surface is too large, the pile will collapse. Because the
grains are added incrementally, however, the the average slope reaches
a critical value where the pile is marginally stable: A single grain can
start an avalanche of any size. The dynamical response of the sandpile
to small random perturbations is characterised by 1/ f -noise and the
avalanches are power-law-distributed.
For many SOC-models, the distribution of fluctuations can be
mapped to the first return time of a random walk [Sor04]. These
distributions are characterised by the scaling exponent 3/2. This is
a hint on simpler mechanisms that can generate critical behaviour.
There are, however, also many very different models that have been
considered SOC. There is no general understanding what precisely the
conditions for SOC are, no unifying framework, and no universality
in the strict sense found in thermal critical phase transitions [Sor04].
This limits the transfer of results for one system to another one, but
not the applicability of specific mechanisms for SOC in any particular
case. What is so far missing for the application in this work, however,
is a connection to behaviour, adaptation, and information processing.
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Figure 4.2.: Caricature of the con-
struction of an intermittend burst-
ing system in phase space. The sys-
tem spends long times at small dis-
tances y from the the origin (lam-
inar phase). During bursts large
distances y and velocities v occur,
but the trajectories are reinjected
into the origins vicinity.
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4.3. Intermittency
Systems that switch between qualitatively different kinds of oscillations
in an appearently random way are called intermittent. Such systems
can be constructed around (quasi-) invariant objects in a system’s
phase space near which the system will tend to spend long times. One
example is an invariant unstable object combined with a reinjection
mechanism driving the system back to the instability when it is far
away from it. The mechanism is depicted in figure 4.2.
4.3.1. On-Off Intermittency (OOI)
A special type of intermittency arises from of the repeated forcing of a
control parameter through a bifurcation point [PST93, HPH94]. As
an example, consider a logistic map
y(k+1)= a x(k) y(k)(1− y(k)) (4.1)
with a random parameter x(t ) drawn independently at each time
from the uniform distribution U (0,1). The map passes through a
bifurcation at y = 0 when a x = 1. For small a x, the system is stable.
When a is above an intermittency threshold, the system randomly
switches between quiet (laminar) and bursting phases, as shown in
figure 4.3 for a = 2.75. OOI exhibits some universal properties, for
example of the distribution of laminar phases (see also sec. A.10). It
has been suggested as a mechanism in many systems with extreme
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Figure 4.3.: On-Off Intermittency in a logistic map driven by multiplicative
uniform noise drawn from [0,2.75].(a): time series (b): CCDF for the
logistic map (black line) and a Gaussian distribution with the same variance
(dashed grey line).
events like stick-balancing and stock markets. However, as shown in
figure 4.3 (b), OOI generally does not exhibit power-law distributed
fluctuations because of the system’s nonlinear saturation, which is
necessary because the fixed point becomes unstable during bursting
phases [Sor98].
4.4. Multiplicative (parametric) noise
Some multiplicative noise processes different from the one discussed
above can produce a special kind of intermittency with power-law-
distributed fluctuations. These processes can be completely linear and
produce critical behaviour under relatively mild conditions for the
driving noise. Consider the random map
y(t +1)=α(t )y(t ) (4.2)
where α is a stochastic variable with probability distribution function
P (α). The logarithm of y(t ) is the sum over t IID variables. As long
as the central limit theorem is valid for P (α), this sum converges to
a Gaussian distribution. This means that y is distributed according
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to the log-normal distribution. To turn P (y) into a power law, we
need to make sure that (4.2) contracts, on average, and is repelled
from the origin. While keeping the random map linear, this is fulfilled
for a negative logarithmic growth rate E(ln |α|)< 0 by introducing an
additive noise term β(t ). The resulting process
y(t +1)=α(t )y(t )+β(t ) (4.3)
is is called the Kesten process. The essential results can be summarised
as:
• If α(t ) and β(t ) are IID real-valued random variables and if
E
(
ln |α(t )|)< 0, then y(t ) converges in distribution and has a
unique limiting distribution P (y).
• If, additionally, β(t )
/(
1−α(t )) is nondegenerate and if there
exists a µ> 0 with
1. 0<E(|β(t )|ξ)<+∞,
2. E
(|α(t )|ξ)= 1 and
3. E
(|α(t )ξ ln+ |α(t )|)<+∞
then the limiting distribution for y(t ) is for large y(t ) asymptotic to
P (y)∝ y−δ as y→∞ with δ= ξ+1 [Kes73, Sor04].
While the multiplicative term causes the process to contract, on
average, fluctuations across the stability boundary ln |α(t )| = 0 cause
intermittent amplification. Figure 4.4 shows the time series and dis-
tribution. While perfect tuning onto the stability boundary is not
required to yield observable power laws in the distribution of y , the
logarithmic growth rate still has to be adjusted to be negative and
close to 0. The exponent ξ is also not universal, but parameter depen-
dent. The Kesten process can also be used as a model for long-range
correlations [Sor04].
The Kesten process will serve as a conceptual starting point for
control models with power law distributed fluctuations discussed in
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Figure 4.4.: The Kesten process driven by uniform noise. Additive noise
was drawn from β(t )∼U (0,1), multiplicative from β(t )∼U (0.48,1.48).
(a): Time series. (b): CCDF. Black line: the Kesten process. Short red line:
power law fit (see sec. 2.5). Dashed grey line: a Gaussian distribution with
the same variance as the black line.
part II. The market models in part III involve state-dependent noise
as well. The main purpose of these models, however, is to understand
how such dynamics arise from fundamental principles in the specific
contexts.
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5. Introduction to human motor control
Many aspects of humanmotor control remain unknown. Nevertheless,
computational principles have emerged that provide a theoretical
framework for movement neuroscience [WG00, FS01, Sch02, FW11,
WDF11]. This introduction briefly summarises the main aspects of
this framework that will be relevant in later chapters.
As an illustration of how computational principles can be inferred
from observed behaviour, consider the following common situation:
Someone wants to get a carton of milk from the refrigerator. The
carton is grasped with one hand and then lifted faster and higher than
necessary since, unexpectedly, it is nearly empty. A fraction of a second
later the subject slows down the movement, realises the problem, and
then decides to put the box back into the refrigerator.
This simple example1 suggests that humans are able to anticipate
the outcome of certain actions. This requires some prior assumptions
about the dynamics of their own bodies and of the objects which are
being manipulated. If the estimates of the parameters or even the
structure of a dynamical system are incorrect, they can be rapidly, but
not instantaneously, corrected online. This action-perception cycle will
be discussed in the next section. Then the role of noise will be discussed
in more detail, followed by control strategies and cost functions. In
the next chapter, human stick balancing tasks are introduced. This
paradigm is central to the following chapters, where we investigate
the mechanisms behind rare, extreme missteps in adaptive, predictive
motor control.
1A similar task was investigated in [JW88]: When lifting an object, subjects scale
the lifting force applied by the fingertips in anticipation of the object weight.
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Figure 5.1.: Control diagram of a closed-loop controller.
5.1. The action-perception cycle
The Central Nervous System (CNS), with the brain at its highest
level, regulates virtually all human activity. Many of its functions can
be formalised using control theory, which deals with the behaviour
of dynamical systems with inputs. An external input to the control
system is called the reference. It can provide information about the
desired state of the system, which is called the output. The controller
manipulates one or more system variables to make the actual output
follow the reference. The subsystem to be controlled is called the plant.
Figure 5.1 shows the classic closed-loop controller. Here, the output
is measured using sensors. The difference of the measured output and
the reference is the control error. This error is fed back as an input
to the controller. This kind of negative feedback loop can be used to
stabilise a system’s dynamics. For example, cruise control stabilises a
car’s measured velocity v by accelerating if v is too low, and decelerating
if v is too high.
For human motor control, the situation becomes a lot more compli-
cated. Here, movement is created by skeletal muscles applying forces
to bones and joints. The output state may be, for example, the set of
muscle activations or the position and velocity of the hand. This state
changes continuously during movement. Other parameters, like phys-
ical properties of the body or the identity of a manipulated object, may
change on other timescales or discretely. External disturbances may
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influence the state in unexpected ways. Furthermore, sensory feedback
as well as the planning and execution of motor commands involves
substantial delays and uncertainties that have to be incorporated into
the control strategy.
For more than a hundred years, simple reaction times for visual
stimuli have been reported to be around 190ms on average [JMY+85].
That is, the time required for an observer to respond to the presence
of a stimulus by e.g. pressing a button. This is slower than reaction
times for auditory or haptic stimuli. Reaction times also increase with
task complexity. [Don68]
In many tasks, predictive control strategies move delays out of the
feedback loop. For example, when tracking a target on a touch screen
with a finger, humans predict the movement of the target to reduce
control errors [ES00]. For unpredictable changes in the movement of
the target, it still takes around 250ms to the onset of corrective finger
movements and several hundred milliseconds more to reacquire the
target.
How the CNS preforms predictive control is commonly explained
by distinguishing three stages in the sensorimotor loop [WG00] as
shown in figure 5.2. A motor command is generated based on
information about the task, context and output state. To do this, an
inverse internal model maps the desired consequences of a control
action to an appropriate command. Execution of this motor command
changes the output state. The loop gets closed when the actual changed
output state causes new sensory feedback. Internally, the consequences
of the execution of the motor command are predicted by a forward
dynamic model. Based on the predicted change of the output state, a
forward sensory model predicts the expected new feedback. Therefore,
further actions can be planned predictively before the sensory feedback
arrives. Several studies support the use of forward models in the
sensorimotor system, and provide evidence that estimates of the body
state use both sensory feedback and a model of the world which can
be adaptively reconfigured [FW11, WDF11].
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Figure 5.2.: A concept of the human sensorimotor loop with three stages:
motor command generation, state transition, and feedback generation. Mo-
tor commands to the muscles initiate mechanical movement of parts of the
body and thereby potentially of manipulated objects. That is, in control
theoretic terminology, the plant (∗). Sensors report the changed output state.
The expected dynamics of the plant and of the consequent sensory feedback
are predicted by the CNS using internal models.
Error based learning helps to adapt to changing contexts, to calibrate
behaviours, and to correct for systematic biases [WDF11]. Lack of
feedback for prolonged times can lead to erroneous behaviour like
walking in circles [SFSE09]. Trial based findings support adaptation
on different timescales coexisting in parallel [LS09]. Further, memory
decay rates depend on how quickly the learning environment changes
[HS09]. Behavioural flexibility is also present on shorter time scales.
Recently, trial to trial adaptation to force fields which were present
only during a part of each trial was investigated. It was found that
adaptation depends on hand movements within each trial before the
force field is switched on, but this memory decays quickly and vanishes
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after approximately 600ms [HFW12]. In another study, changes of
mind during movements suggest that motor strategies can even be
adjusted to information that was still in the processing pipeline when
a movement was initiated [RKWS09].
Visuomotor transformations are an integral part of the action-
perception cycle [FS01, CHM11]. Since both different sensors and
effectors in the body have many different frames of reference, the CNS
has to perform coordinate transformations. In addition, the use of
higher-level coordinate systems can solve the following problem: Con-
sider the approximately 600muscles in the human body as being either
contracted or relaxed. Even in this simplified situation, there are 2600
possible motor activations. A look-up-table from motor activations
to sensory feedback alone would need more entries than a list of all
the atoms in the observable universe. Hence, information about the
system state that is necessary for a given task needs to be represented
in a far lower dimensional space. For example, egocentric spatial coor-
dinates are likely used for working memory, eye movements, and for
ongoing or intended arm movements [FS01]. These coordinates are
often eye- or head-centred, but coexist with allocentric representations
(i.e. spatial coordinates relative to an external cue) [CHM11]. Such
high-level representations not only simplify movement planning, but
also facilitate imitation: There is evidence that watching another per-
son perform an action engages high-level sensorimotor representations
of the observed action [WDF11]. This includes mirror neurons which
fire when performing and when observing actions (ibid.).
Transformations to motor commands are likely performed by an
inverse model after response selection [FS01, CHM11]. This is pos-
sibly done in several steps, first calculating joint coordinates, then
the required joint torques, and at last the motor commands [FS01].
On the lowest level, reflex loops connect muscles and neurons in the
spinal cord. They help to stabilise joint angles by adjusting muscle
contractions much faster than signals can be send to and received from
the brain.
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5.2. Noise and uncertainty
The CNS has to deal with uncertainties due to incomplete knowledge
about the world. This is partly the consequence of incomplete obser-
vations of new, complex, or unpredictable environments. Ambiguity
also arises since sensors like eyes only capture a lower dimensional
projection of the world. However, there are also many intrinsic noise
sources in the CNS [FSW08]. This includes the biochemical trans-
duction of signals on the receptor level. Fluctuations of ion channels
in cell membranes and the stochastic transmission at synapses add to
cellular noise. Noise can also emerge at the network level, for example
due to interference.
Given the aforementioned noise sources, it should come to little
surprise that a significant amount of variability is observed between
repeated movements. Yet, several studies put little emphasis on plan-
ning noise and focus on execution noise instead. It was suggested that
the latter accounts for at least a large proportion of movement variabil-
ity [vBHW04]. Of particular interest is the finding that movements
show significant signs of signal-dependent noise. Forces generated by
voluntary muscle contractions were found to fluctuate with a stan-
dard deviation of 2−3% [JdCHW02]. This constant signal-to-noise
ratio corresponds to a linear amplification of both mean force and
fluctuations. There is evidence that this signal-dependent noise is the
consequence of the physiological organisation of the motor-unit pool
[JdCHW02]. That is, of the motor neurons that innervate a single
muscle. These findings are consistent with the ubiquity of Fitt’s Law
[Fit54] which describes a trade-off where faster and longer movements
are less precise.
However, the situation for some behavioural tasks is more compli-
cated. Some findings indicate that in addition to movement speed and
path, stiffness is a separate dimension which influences movement vari-
ability. When pointing to targets, higher co-contraction of antagonist
muscles can even reduce endpoint variances. Therefore, it was sug-
gested that increased motor-command noise during high-contraction
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movements can be compensated by less susceptibility to noise due to
an increased impedance of the arm, and possibly changed feedback
[OKI+04]. It is further possible that the impact of observation- and
planning noise increases in some situations. For example, recorded
preparatory activity of cortical neurons in monkeys suggest that at
least half of the observed movement variability likely had its source
during motor preparation even during a highly practised reach task
[CAS06].
There are several ways for the CNS to combat these problems. The
most basic method is averaging over redundant information sources
such as sensors in close proximity or neuronal populations with com-
mon input. Averaging over time can take place at the cellular level be-
cause of the temporal-integration properties of the neuronal cell mem-
brane. The behavioural relevance of temporal averaging is supported,
for example, by electrophysiological animal studies [FSW08]. Addi-
tionally, the CNS uses prior knowledge about the world to deal with
ambiguous and noisy observations [WG00, FS01, FSW08, FW11].
This includes the combination of sensory data from different modali-
ties which is often well described by Bayesian estimators. It has further
been suggested that temporal averaging and prior knowledge are com-
bined in an optimal way which resembles the famous Kalman Filter.
The latter can also be considered a recursive Bayesian filter: An estima-
tor is repeatedly updated using new observations and prior knowledge
about a systems structure such that the Mean Squared Error (MSE) is
minimised. Optimisation principles can also be used to minimise the
impact of execution noise; this topic is discussed in the next section.
Finally, there are also situations where noise may be beneficial to the
functioning of the CNS (e.g. stochastic resonance, avoiding local
minima in associative learning, …).
5.3. Costs and strategies
Movements are usually performed in order to achieve some goal.
Achieving this goal is connected to some kind of reward or utility.
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For instance, grasping a piece of chocolate and moving it into one’s
mouth may lead to reward signals in the brain. Failure to perform an
action due to uncertainties, for example concerning the location and
amount of chocolate, likely leads to less or no reward.
Maximising the utility of movement outcomes in the face of un-
certainty may be considered a decision problem [WL12]. In the
framework of statistical decision theory, this can be formalised as
minimising a loss function. This function can include not just the
movement error: Choices can be optimised given uncertainties, prior
knowledge, as well as costs and benefits of any outcomes that may
occur.
For instance, unpredictable external forces may be compensated
with a high co-contraction of agonist and antagonist muscles increasing
the stiffness of joints. However, this impedance control is associated
with highmovement costs due to faster exhaustion. Therefore, humans
try to minimise both the variability of motor output and the required
effort [OBD09]. For example, stiffness decreases when subjects learn
to act more predictively [WDF11]. However, predictable forces are
not the only perturbations which can be optimised for.
Movements can also be optimised such that the effect of execution
noise and other unpredictable perturbations with known statistics is
minimised. For a linear scaling of noise with the control signal, this
leads to smooth movements with minimal change of acceleration, a
model which is consistent with experimental findings [HW98, FS01].
Even with a trade-off between effort and accuracy in more complex
object manipulation tasks, smooth trajectories were still found to
be optimal [NBW09]. However, there are special situations where
humans may apply forces in a highly nonlinear or discontinuous way.
Especially during ballistic movements high, accelerations are produced
over short times to minimise the time required for the movement.
Examples include throwing or punching movements. Whether such
strategies may be relevant for balancing is discussed in chapter 9.
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A different type of cost is constituted by the use of CNS resources, in
particular memory. For example, a tradeoff between memory and mo-
tor effort was found in a visual search task [KK11]. Change blindness
(sec. 9.6.4) in object manipulation tasks even suggests that for certain
computations, information extracted from the fixation point is used
only when immediately needed to solve the current goal [TBHS03].
Despite these findings, many models of motor control treat percep-
tion and control strategy as separate problems. Typically, an observer
model and a planning model are used which are optimised separately
[WG00]. One notable exception is Optimal Feedback Control (OFC)
(see sec. 9.7).
The utility of a reward may also be modulated by factors which
are not direct costs. Time can be such a factor through temporal
discounting. That is, a reward is treated as less valuable the longer
it takes to obtain. For example, treating the execution of an eye
movement as a reward and assuming sub-second temporal discounting
enables prediction of dynamic features of saccadic eye movements
[SOdXXWS12]. Furthermore, several recent studies suggest that
subjects do not always maximise expected reward in sensorimotor
tasks. Instead, they are sensitive to risk as well [WL12].
Since concepts like utility and risk aversion originate in economics, a
direct comparison of decision making in motor control and economic
tasks suggests itself. It was found that subjects tend to be more risk-
seeking in motor tasks than in classical economic tasks. One study
concluded that the same subjects distort probability, but not value,
differently when making identical decisions in motor and classical
form [WDM09]. This is consistent with several studies on movement
planning. For example, in a pea shooter task it was found that subjects
act according to a loss function that punishes large errors less than
predicted by a quadratic loss function. For small errors, however,
the function is very well approximated by the MSE [KW04]. In
another study, it was suggested that the nervous system estimates the
likelihood that an error has been caused by either the motor system or
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the external world and uses this estimate to adapt optimally. In one
Bayesian model, this leads to an adaptation which reacts strongly to
small errors and ignores large ones [WK09].
5.4. Postural sway: continuous control and scaling
Manymodels in sensorimotor control only account for endpoint errors.
This is intuitive, for example, in pointing tasks; but some tasks have
a different structure. Consider one of the most basic human motor
skills: while quiet standing may appear to be static, it is a complex
dynamical control task. The human upright posture is unstable and
requires ongoing active balancing, leading to body sway. Numerous
studies have investigated the movement of the center of pressure under
the feet of humans standing on force platforms. Body movements have
also been measured using ultrasonic or infrared reflectors [WvHR88].
By analysing the scaling of mean displacements over different time
scales, the fluctuations in human postural sway have been found to
exhibit three regimes. Postural sway can be modelled as a correlated
random walk for short timescales. At a correlation time of approx-
imately one second, a crossover to an anti-correlated random walk
occurs [CDL94]. For very long timescales, the time-series become
uncorrelated [CC95]. To explain these features, postural sway was
modelled as an overdamped inverted pendulum with simple feedback
control [CDL93, Pet00]. The actual control strategy employed by the
CNS, however, is more complex but still unknown [KZJ11].
Upright standing was previously compared to other tasks that in-
volve balancing of an inverted pendulum. Foremost, balancing a
stick on a fingertip or comparable virtual settings were investigated.
These tasks are in the focus of the following chapters. In particular,
noise sources and cost functions in adaptive, predictive control, are
investigated with respect to their consequences for the statistics of
rare extreme control errors. The analogy between stick balancing and
upright standing is discussed further in section 9.6.1.
40
6. Balancing tasks
Stabilising an inverted pendulum is probably the most elementary
control problem. However, although numerous solutions exist, it is
still not completely understood how humans perform this task. It can
be realised by balancing a stick on a finger tip, which is discussed in
the next section. Observed fluctuations of displacement angles of the
stick show intermittent bursts of fluctuations.
Similar fluctuations where observed in Virtual Stick Balancing
(VSB) where an unstable target on a computer screen is stabilised.
The analysis of a VSB data set establishes the main features of human
balancing behaviour which this thesis part seeks to explain. First,
control errors are power-law distributed. Therefore, much more ex-
treme magnitudes are observed than what would be expected from a
Gaussian distribution. Second, Power Spectral Densities (PSDs) show
a characteristic knee with two distinct scaling exponents.
In the final section of this chapter, the strengths and shortcomings
of an existing balancing model are discussed. This model suggested
that reaction delays and strong multiplicative noise are key ingredients
for the observed fluctuations in stick balancing.
A more in-depth analysis of VSB data, including learning of bal-
ancing skills under different objectives, is found in chapter 8. There, a
larger data set is presented that was recorded in an optimised experi-
mental paradigm based on the findings to be presented in chapter 7.
6.1. Stick balancing on the fingertip
Several studies investigated humans balancing sticks on their fingertips,
usually while sitting on a chair [CM02, CBE+04, CLM06, CM12].
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Figure 6.1.: Stick balancing
on the fingertip is charac-
terised by the stick’s length l
and the vertical displacement
∆z. These quantities are
related to the displacement
angle by cos(θ) = ∆z/l .
The projection of the end-
points onto the horizontal
plane y = l (1 − cos(θ))
becomes relevant for VSB in
section 6.2.
y
l ∆z
Θ
The movements of the sticks’ endpoints in three dimensions were
tracked using motion capturing cameras. Priority was given to the
analysis of the dynamics of the relative vertical displacement ∆z/l
illustrated in figure 6.1.
The most prominent reported features of these dynamics are inter-
mittent fluctuations [CM02]. Here intermittency denotes the random
alternation between phases with extremely low movement amplitudes
and phases with high movement amplitudes. Initially, analyses focused
on scaling properties of velocity increments. Later, heavy tailed dis-
tributions of ∆z/l were also found. It was suggested that they follow
power-laws, but even more extreme fluctuations might occur when
the stick is about to fall [CM12].
Power spectra exhibit two distinct scaling regimes [CM02] similar
to the ones shown for VSB in figure 6.5 (section 6.2). For 0.1−1Hz,
a scaling exponent close to 1/2 was reported. A pronounced knee is
found above one Herz. For higher frequencies, the scaling exponent
was reported close to 2.5.
These effects have been attributed to the interplay of multiplicative
noise and reaction delays. As an explanation, it was proposed that
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the system is tuned very close to a stability boundary, with parametric
noise causing fluctuations across this boundary [CM02]. A model for
this theory is discussed in section 6.3. For the rest of this section, we
discuss a variety of results that play ancillary roles in the motivation
of the next chapters and in the discussion of their respective results in
the context of the research field.
Eventually, the stick always falls down. Survival times have been
reported to be fit well by the Weibull distribution [CM12]. For a
56cm stick, average survival times were 14s for novice subjects and
more than 100s on the third day of practise. For a 25cm stick, survival
times were dramatically shorter.
The effects of practise are also reflected in the distribution of velocity
increments, which are more heavy-tailed for skilled subjects [CBE+04].
It was claimed that these changes can be quantified as changing Lévy
flights (see sec. 2.3), but the fits were produced using a method which is
very susceptible to problems (see section 2.5): it severely overestimates
scaling exponents if the process at hand is not actually a Lévy flight.
The figures shown in [CBE+04, CB09] clearly show this problem:
the fits are far more heavy tailed than the data sets. Still, despite the
problematic method used for quantification, the differences between
high and low skill levels are substantial.
It was argued that the intermittency observed in stick balancing
is of the on-off type [CM02]. As discussed in section 4.3, On-Off
Intermittency (OOI) arises due to parametric noise which drives a
control parameter across a stability boundary. There are two arguments
for this conclusion. First, OOI is associated with a power-law scaling
in the power spectrum with exponent 1/2. Reported power-spectra
for stick balancing scale are close to 1/2 in the 0.1−1Hz range, but
not over all frequencies. Second, the laminar phases (sec. A.10) in
both OOI and stick balancing scale with exponent 3/2. Such scaling,
however, is not exclusive to OOI. A different example is found in
section A.10. Also, OOI is not necessarily associated with power-law
probability distributions (see section 4.3). Therefore, it is possible that
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the mechanism underlying the fluctuations in stick balancing is very
similar, but not necessarily identical to what is typically considered to
be OOI.
The distributions of laminar phases further lead to another observa-
tion: most of the waiting times between crossings of a small threshold
from above (i.e. from large to small displacement angles) are shorter
than the reaction time [CM02]. This was interpreted as evidence
that parametric noise helps to stabilise the system faster than reactive
control. While the proposed model shows that parametric noise can
indeed contribute to a more stable system (section 6.3), this effect
requires some parameter settings that are not easy to justify. A similar
distribution of laminar phases can also be found for extremely sim-
ple stable systems with additive noise (section A.10). Therefore it is
unclear whether these threshold passings can be interpreted as a type
of intentional corrective movements which emerge from parametric
noise, as was claimed in [CM02].
On a final note, stick balancing is predominantly driven by visual
input since, in contrast to e.g. upright standing, it is not possible to
balance a light stick with closed eyes. It was further reported that
when subjects closed their eyes and moved their hands to mimic the
movements during stick balancing, power spectra did not contain a
significant region with slope 1/2 [CM02].
6.2. Virtual Stick Balancing (VSB)
VSB facilitates data acquisition and setup manipulations compared
to real stick balancing [BCME04]. It typically involves only visual
feedback about the target, forgoing haptic feedback which may play
an ancillary role in real stick balancing. Further, movements in real
balancing are limited, for example, by the length and inertia of the
subject’s arm while in VSB additional limitations include the size of
the display, the movement range of the input device, or the latency of
the setup. The most common input device is a computer mouse which
is restricted to two dimensions. Many setups use linearised dynamics
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C
Ty
Figure 6.2.: A typical virtual balancing setup. Subjects try to catch a virtual
target T with cursor C which they control using a computer mouse. Both C
and T are displayed on a computer screen (rectangle). T moves according to
an unstable dynamics. Therefore, the distance |y | grows if C is not moved.
of first or second order. Nevertheless, VSB time series exhibit some
statistical features which are very similar to real stick balancing.
6.2.1. Experimental setup
Here main features of an experimental data set recorded by Marcus
Riegel are presented. The experimental setup was prepared by Udo
Ernst. Representative results for one subject are shown and the ranges
of the findings for all subjects are stated. The complete data set also
serves as a guideline for the modelling done in chapter 7. We first
published an analysis of this data in [PREP07]. The setup is depicted
in figure 6.2. In this task, a cursor C and a target T are displayed on
a computer screen. C is controlled by the subject’s hand and moves
linearly proportional to the position of a computer mouse. T is moved
by the computer according to
~Tt+1 = ~Tt + ∆t
τ
(~Tt −~Ct ), (6.1)
where ∆t is the sampling interval, and τ is a time constant which
determines how fast the distance |y | between C and T grows when C
is not moved. Subjects were told to keep C and T as close together as
possible without one of them running out of the screen. This situation
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can be thought of as a highly stylised form of balancing a light stick:
after linearisation and disregarding inertia, C and T correspond to the
projections of the two ends of a stick onto the horizontal plane (see
figure 6.1).
The horizontal and vertical positions of mouse and target were
recorded with 85Hz, the same frequency as the refresh rate of the
screen. At least 10 trials per day were recorded for at least four days for
each subject. A trial was discarded if either T of C left the screen. The
experiments were authorised by the ethics committee of the University
of Bremen.
Seven subjects participated in the experiments. Subjects 1, 2, and
3 performed the tasks with τ = const. According to their skills and
training, trials with τ= 13 s, and τ= 14 s were recorded. For the others,
τ was randomly switched every second to a value in
{ 1
3 s,
1
4 s,
1
5 s,
1
6 s
}
.
6.2.2. Results
Since the axes of the screen represent an artificial coordinate system
which is unlikely to be of any distinct meaning to the brain and
since the task is point symmetric, we exclusively analyse on the radial
distance |y | between mouse and target. |y | can be considered the (ab-
solute) control error. We further normalise |y | such that magnitudes
are in units of the standard deviation. Normalisation has no effect
on scaling in the Complementary Cumulative Distribution Function
(CCDF) and PSD, and allows for an easier comparison between differ-
ent distributions. A time series is shown in figure 6.3. Similar results
were obtained for all subjects (see sec. 7.5). Note the frequency of
events which are more than one order of magnitude larger than the
standard deviation.
The corresponding CCDF is shown in figure 6.4. Control error dis-
tributions for all subjects strongly deviate from Gaussians, exhibiting
power-law tails with CCDF scaling exponents ξ in the range of two
to four. The apparent cutoff of the power law for large |y | is caused
by temporal correlations: The few highest events all belong the same
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Figure 6.3.: Time series of normalised controller-target distances |y | (in units
of Std(y)) of the combined trials of four days for subject 3. τ= 14 s. Trial
length was 3min.
.
100 101
Control error jyj [std]
100
10¡2
10¡4
P(
jyj
È
x)
»Æ 3.0
Figure 6.4.: Complementary cumulative distribution Fc of the normalised
control errors shown in figure 6.3. Red diagonal line: power-law fit (see
section 2.5). Short red horizontal line: estimator cutoff. Grey dotted line:
Gaussian with unit variance1.
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Figure 6.5.: Power Spectral Density (PSD) for the same time series shown
in figure 6.3. Densities were calculated as described in sec. 3. The scaling
exponents λ1,2 have been estimated using linear regression. The two cutoffs
were obtained by minimising the MSE for a fit of the whole PSD with three
linear regimes. The fits for the low (red dashed) and high (blue dash-dotted)
regimes are depicted with a vertical offset only, so as not to obstruct the data.
peak which occurs close to 5000s in figure 6.3. A similar effect is
found for all single- and combined trials for all subjects. The position
of this apparent cutoff depends on the length of the analysed time
series. By using appropriate surrogate data, it is possible to show that
experimental CCDF tails are not significantly different from power
laws if temporal correlations are correctly accounted for (see secs. 7.7,
and 7.7)
Figure 6.5 shows the PSD for |y |. Spectra are constant for low
frequencies and above 0.1Hz approximate broken power-laws for all
subjects. The first scaling exponents λ1 are above 1/2 and below 2 and
1Since we here compare only positive events, a half-normal distribution is used. For
simplicity, albeit slightly imprecise, we use the term “Gaussian” for both normal
and half-normal distributions throughout this thesis.
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the second ones λ2 above two and below four. A knee is observed in
between one and five Hertz.2
The scaling features in the CCDF and PSD are stable over time and
can be found even in single trials. We found neither systematic trends
over time across subjects nor differences between the two conditions
(constant and variable τ) that reach significance3 [PREP07]. However,
especially for the CCDF there is a strong trial-to-trial variability within
each day. A more in-depth discussion is found in chapter 7 after
introducing an appropriate model to which the data is compared.
6.2.3. Other VSB experiments
The effects discussed above were reproduced in [MFC+11] in a similar
setup, but with an unstable second order dynamics. It was further
found that in more difficult tasks (faster acceleration of the target)
average control errors increase, but their distribution becomes less
heavy tailed. This effect is discussed in section A.6.
A different setup using a manipulandum as the input device was
studied in [MS02]. It was found, that subjects could tolerate blackouts
with no feedback for up to 600ms. A comparison of the data with
different generic controller types lead to the rejection of most possibil-
ities. The authors concluded that subjects used a forward model in
the sensory preprocessing stage of the control loop, allowing them to
predict movements during the blackouts.
2Note that the exponents for, for example, a damped harmonic oscillator would
be even integers. The finding that λ1 ≈ 1 hints at a process that depends on
states at different points in time (see sec. 3). The cutoffs, however, imply that this
temporal non-locality is restricted to a relatively short timescale.
3A re-analysis of the data for the first four days of each subject using the methods
from chapter 8 confirmed these results. However, the group with constant τ is
either very small or contains trials with different values of τ. This limits the power
of the study to detect small differences between trials grouped by condition or
day. For example, some subjects could only perform in more difficult trials with
smaller τ after some training. Therefore, training did have some effect on some
subjects.
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6.3. The Cabrera & Milton model
The fluctuations observed during balancing lead to the hypothesis,
that the system is tuned very closely to a stability boundary [CM02,
CLM06, CM12]. It was argued that parametric noise causes fluc-
tuations across this boundary like in OOI (see section 6.1). This
behaviour was modelled as an overdamped inverted pendulum with
delayed feedback and multiplicative noise:
θ¨(t ) = −Γθ˙(t )+q sinθ(t )−F (t ,θ(t − tr )) (6.2)
F
(
t ,θ(t − tr )
) = (R0+η(t ))θ(t − tr ),
where θ is the displacement angle (see figure 6.1). The influence of
friction is scaled by Γ= γ/m where γ is the damping coefficient and
m is the mass of the stick. q = g/l determines the acceleration due
to gravity. l is the length of the stick. g is the acceleration of gravity.
The feedback F is delayed by the reaction time tr . It exerts a restoring
force scaled by a parameter R0 that is perturbed by Gaussian white
noise η with variance σ2.
For carefully adjusted parameters, the model shows intermittent
fluctuations which appear similar to the observations for stick bal-
ancing. A time-series is shown in figure 6.6 (a). Comparison of the
simulations with and without noise reveals a main aspect of this model:
Multiplicative noise can prolong escape times. That is, the average
time until the stick tilts beyond the horizontal position and inevitably
falls down (detailed statistics not shown). In other words, if it’s not
possible to keep control using targeted movements, one might as well
wildly wiggle the stick around to get closer to the upright position
by chance. Occasionally, the model may even end up so close to the
origin that it stays stable (not shown).
Figure 6.6 (b) shows the PSD for the example time-series. This
author was not able to reproduce a broken power-law with a shallow
scaling regime close to 1/2 or even close to 1 for any parameter com-
bination. While it was claimed that the model can reproduce such
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Figure 6.6.: (a): Time-series for the relative vertical displacement of a bal-
anced stick simulated according to (6.3). Parameters: q = 10s−2, R0 =
9s−2, tr = 0.2s, Γ = 100s−1. Discretisation step h = 0.01s. Solid line:
σ= 10s−3/2 Dashed line: σ= 0. (b): Power Spectral Density for the same
time series as the solid line in (a).
PSDs, the only published evidence for this in the literature known to
the author are three data points at the low-frequency end of the power
spectrum shown in figure 3 in [CM02]. Therefore, it might be possi-
ble that there the low-frequency cutoff of the system’s response was
mistaken for another scaling regime. Another explanation is, that very
sensitive parameter-tuning is required in order to see the claimed effect
which makes reproducing it extremely difficult.4 However, whether
or not it is possible to find a parameter set where experimental power
spectra are reproduced is not central for the arguments pursued in the
following.
Note that in figure 6.6, parameters are different than in previous
publications, which assumed reaction times of 70ms. Such short
reaction times are inconsistent with the vast majority of the literature
on reaction times with visual stimuli (see section 5.1 or for a balancing
example [MS02]), as well as with experimental findings presented in
this thesis. Therefore, a more realistic feedback delay of 200ms is used.
4The publications on this model tend to include only incomplete information about
the parameters used to generate the figures. During personal communications,
one of the authors suggested that parameter tuning in this model is difficult.
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Figure 6.7.: Model time-series with (a): with low damping (q = 10, R0 = 9,
tr = 0.2, γ= 2.5, σ= 10, h = .01), (b): slight overdamping (q = 8, R0 = 9,
tr = 0.2, γ= 100, σ= 10, h = .01).
However, the exact value of the delay does not change the qualitative
findings for this model. Furthermore, the value of q corresponds to
a stick which is almost a meter long, but very similar results can be
obtained for a wide range of stick lengths.
The choice of the right parameter combination, however, is very
important. If the amount of multiplicative noise is too low, the system
just fluctuates around the position where it ends up in the noiseless case.
If the noise is too high, the stick escapes immediately. If the friction is
too low, the system oscillates. Noise then feeds energy towards these
oscillations, causing them to grow over time as shown in figure 6.7 (a).
This stick quickly falls, followed by wild fluctuations which are not
expected in the real world – the stick would turn upside down and
back up. This can be understood by considering the structure of (6.3):
even if the control feedback were not delayed, a frictionless system
could at best oscillate, but never be stabilised. Friction is necessary to
remove kinetic energy from the system. Therefore, very strong friction
is a prerequisite for the multiplicative noise to have a stabilising effect.
Further, a just barely overdamped stick will quickly either reach the
upright position or fall down. As shown in figure 6.7 (b), the model
becomes stationary once the stick reaches the upright position. This
is due to the lack of a re-injection mechanism like the additive noise
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in the Kesten process (section 4.4). The system is always either stable
or unstable and all observable dynamics are only transient. Therefore,
ongoing activity over more than few seconds requires both, high
friction and precise tuning to the stability boundary. No mechanism
has been proposed for the self-tuning of the system.
Despite the importance of the high damping in this model, its
origin has–to this author’s knowledge–not been discussed in detail
before. This circumstance seems quite peculiar since the stick by
itself is most certainly not highly damped. In other situations such as
upright standing, muscle reflex loops can act as dampers on shorter
timescales than the visuomotor control loop. A stick on the fingertip,
or even on a Ping Pong racket as used in some task variations [CM12],
only loosely sits on the support point with one end while the other
end moves freely. In section 7.8 it is shown how this problem can be
solved for the modelling approach presented in the next chapter.
A similar model to the one presented above is found in [BCME04],
but that model can per definition only be unstable or oscillate. It also
uses highly unrealistic parameters and is therefore not discussed any
further.
Taken together, the above model yielded some insights in the dy-
namics of marginally stable or unstable systems with noise. However,
difficulties to reproduce the statistical features of section 6.2, open
questions regarding parameter choices, and few connections to the
motor control literature reviewed in chapter 5, remain. Therefore, in
the following chapters, we take a slightly different approach which we
motivate in detail from the totality of the insights presented so far.
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Here we start over with a new perspective on balancing. Observing a
stick as it starts to fall allows for predicting where it is going to fall. A
controller can then stabilise the stick by moving its suspension point.
However, bringing the stick back to the upright position removes all
predictable dynamics from the system. Then, it is only possible to
observe residual unpredictable noise like hand jitter or wind. In this
situation an adaptive controller becomes very susceptible to missteps
because the deterministic movement of the stick cannot be clearly
discerned from the noise.
We can formulate this idea as a quite general physical principle
[PP11]: Stabilisation of a dynamical system annihilates observable
information about its structure. This mechanism can induce critical
points as attractors in locally adaptive control.
In the following sections, we will first explain why this new ap-
proach to balancing models is called for. Then, the underlying mech-
anism is characterised in detail. Next, a complete balancing model
is introduced. It involves a reaction time, an unbiased short-term
parameter estimator, and an optimal forward model based on this
prediction. In short, subjects move their hand in the direction where
they, based on their most recent observations, predict the target to
move next. This model can quantitatively reproduce the features of
human balancing behaviour discussed in the previous chapter. The
model further suggests that power-law error distributions arise because
subjects minimise mean control errors by eliminating random local
trends at the cost of rare, extreme errors [PP11]. This hypothesis is
tested in chapter 8. This chapter will conclude with a more detailed
investigation of the power law fits and their significance, as well as a
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higher order model. The latter, however, primarily serves to justify the
simpler model mentioned above.
7.1. Motivation
Most motor control models add multiplicative noise in the movement
execution stage. Some studies even suggested that movement vari-
ability arises mostly due to the organisation of the motor unit pool,
but for many tasks the situation is more complicated (see sec. 5.2).
In stick balancing (chapter 6), erratic bursts of fluctuations and high
movement variability hint at amounts of multiplicative noise that
seem difficult to justify with the few percent of signal dependent noise
measured during force production (e.g. in [JdCHW02]). Further-
more, if the observed noise were an immutable trait of movement
generation, fluctuations like those observed during balancing should
occur when similar movements are performed without actually bal-
ancing a stick. This is apparently not the case (see sec. 6.1), although
the author is not aware of any rigorous comparisons published as of
yet. Studies on other tasks like tracking (e.g. [ES00]) did not report
similar extreme bursting fluctuations. In chapter 8, it is confirmed
that the signal-dependent noise is indeed task dependent.
A different hypothesis than motor unit noise was proposed in the
existing literature on stick balancing (sec. 6.1). Parametric noise can,
in specific conditions, prolong escape times for unstable systems. It
has therefore been argued that the system is tuned closely to the bound-
ary of a stability domain across which it fluctuates due to parametric
noise. This implies that subjects add multiplicative noise to increase
the chance of catching the stick outside the basin of attraction where
otherwise it would be certainly lost. However, if this intention were
indeed the only reason for the strong multiplicative noise, one would
expect the latter to vanish in scenarios where subjects can easily main-
tain control using delayed, but planned movements. This is not the
case: even in VSB tasks where subjects can easily maintain control for
minutes, we still observe signs of strong multiplicative noise (sec. 6.2).
56
7.1. Motivation
It has even been reported that error distributions are more heavily
tailed for easy tasks than for difficult ones (sec. 6.2.3). This raises the
question of why extreme fluctuations, which pose the risk of losing
control, are not avoided.
Furthermore, the corresponding model by Cabrera and Milton
(sec. 6.3) cannot explain how the system stays close to the stability
boundary: if the simulated stick is brought in the upright position
once, it stops moving (figure 6.7 (b)). This is not a big problem in
the tasks for which this model was originally devised: difficult tasks
where control can only be maintained over short periods of time.
Yet the model cannot explain why subjects in easier tasks should act
as if they were barely able to maintain control. Most importantly,
however, this model cannot reproduce the scaling relations discussed
in section 6.2 and requires some hard-to-justify parameter choices (see
sec. 6.3). Anothermore technical problem is that since the intermittent
behaviour in this model is only transient, a stationary distribution of
fluctuations does not exist. In conclusion, previous studies on human
stick balancing found that multiplicative noise and reaction delays
play a central role, but could not provide a complete and convincing
model based on these findings.
In the following we present a new class of models where the main
source for parametric noise is the online estimation of parameters
which are then used for movement planning. Justification for this
approach includes evidence that human motor control is predictive,
and that humans are often capable of adapting to quickly changing en-
vironments by rapidly extracting information from their environment
as needed (see [MS02, PREP07], and chap. 5). The basic structure is
illustrated in figure 7.1: Subjects remove the predicted control errors
based on an online estimation of the systems dynamics.
In the next section, it is shown that such a system can self-organise
towards a critical state. In section 7.4, we show that the simplest
realistic model of this class can solve all the problems stated above and
explain VSB data in much detail.
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Predicted
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Figure 7.1.: Standard models of the action-perception cycle (sec. 5.1) include
forward models allowing subjects to predict the future dynamics of their
environment. In the following it is demonstrated that including rapid online
estimations of parameters can explain the strongmultiplicative noise observed
in balancing tasks.
7.2. Information Annihilation Instability (part one)
A predictive and highly adaptive controller, as described above, can
run into an instability because successful control annihilates observ-
able information about the controlled system: it is only possible to
predict where a stick is going to fall once it starts falling. When the
stick is brought into the upright position, all predictable dynamics are
removed, leaving only random fluctuations to observe. This principle
maps small control errors to large uncertainties about future dynam-
ics and vice versa, thereby inducing self-similar fluctuations. It can
be illustrated in a simple linearised example (published in [PP11]).
Consider a system with expected dynamics without control
y˙(t )=ϑy(t ). (7.1)
y(t ) denotes the system’s deviation from some target value (e.g. a
stick’s upright position) and ϑ is a hidden parameter1. Assume that
1The following considerations can be transferred also to higher-order systems if the
derivative at the fixed point is zero. This is demonstrated in section 7.8
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the system is observed at a given location y . The observer has access to
noisy observations of y and y˙ with respective probability distributions
p(y˙) and p(y). The noise may be either inherent to the system or
to the measurement process. The likelihood function of ϑ given an
observation at the location y is
L (ϑ|y, y˙) = p(y, y˙ |ϑ) (7.2)
= p(y˙ |y,ϑ)p(y |ϑ) (7.3)
= p(y˙ |y,ϑ)p(y). (7.4)
Further assume, that y˙ at the observed location is Gaussian distributed:
p(y˙ | y,ϑ) ∝ N (ϑy,σy˙ ). (7.5)
Maximizing the log-likelihood with respect to ϑ gives the unbiased
estimator2
ϑ˜= y˙
y
. (7.6)
The expected amount of information about ϑ that an observation
contains may be expressed using Fisher information:
I =−E
(
∂2
∂ϑ2
lnL
∣∣∣ϑ)= E(y2)
σ2y˙
. (7.7)
The MSE of the estimator is given by the Cramer-Rao bound
Var(ϑ˜)≥ 1/I (7.8)
which represents an uncertainty principle [FS95]. When observing
the system at the origin such that E(y2)→ 0, the susceptibility of the
estimator to random fluctuations diverges. Hence, stabilizing control
added to equation (7.1) evolves the system towards a critical point.
2The proof is found in sec A.11. (7.6) also follows from equation (7.13) or alter-
natively if the independent variable is y˙ . Equation (7.5) implies, that y will be
controlled for.
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Consequent control errors could be reduced using additional indepen-
dent observations. However, to do this optimally the controller has to
know a priori the exact form of a possible state- or time dependency in
ϑ. In the following, we settle for the minimal assumption that ϑ can
be considered constant over a small set of subsequent observations.
7.3. A minimal model
“ With four parameters I can fit an elephant,and with five I can make him wiggle his trunk.”
John von Neumann
To underline the generality of Information Annihilation Instability
(IAI) and to understand how it can be realised in an actual dynamics,
we here study the most simple example. Consider a random map
where dynamics, control and observation of the system (7.1) take
place only at discrete times t ∈ {1,2,3, . . . }. Then,
yt+1 =αyt +βt , (7.9)
with parameter α and Gaussian distributed independent random vari-
ables βt ∼ N (0,σ). Control by removing a prediction of yt+1 in
time-step t +1 gives
yt+1 = (α− α˜t+1)yt +βt . (7.10)
The estimation α˜t+1 that minimises the expected error given the two
most recent observations E(y2t+1|yt , yt−1) is
α˜t+1 = yt
yt−1
+ α˜t . (7.11)
We here assumed, that α can be considered constant over the span of
two observations, but that nothing else is known about its time- or
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Figure 7.2.: Analysis of the minimal adaptive control model exhibiting IAI.
Var(β)= 1. (a): time-series. (b): CCDF and analytical exponent. (c): PSD.
Note that the variance for this model diverges (see sec. 2.3). Therefore, also
the power per frequency increases with the length of the time-series.
state dependency. Equations (7.10) and (7.11) represent a minimal
adaptive control system with a restricted memory. It can also be
written as
yt+1 =− yt
yt−1
βt−1+βt (7.12)
revealing that the dynamics are independent of α, and that β only
determines the absolute scale of the fluctuations, not the relative
relation of subsequent values of y . A time-series is shown in fig-
ure 7.2 (a). The corresponding CCDF is shown in figure 7.2 (b). It
was shown analytically that the tail of the distribution obeys a power-
law P (|y | > x)∝ |y |−ξ with exponent ξ= 1 independently of α and
β [PREP07]. Using m ≥ 2 time-steps for the estimator numerically
yields ξ=m−1 (ibid.). The PSD is mostly white, except for a small
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dip at very high frequencies since the magnitudes of two subsequent
y are correlated (see eq. (7.12)).
This simple control mechanism yields critical behavior without
the need of parameter tuning [EP05]. It further demonstrates that
multiplicative noise can be the result of locally optimal parameter
estimation. These findings foreshadow a solution to the problems
specified in section 7.1. However, the model is still very abstract,
the CCDF exponent is too low, and the power spectrum lacks the
characteristic shape found experimentally. These problems are solved
in the next section.
7.4. A realistic model
Many real control systems including human motor control are not
time-discrete and movements are subject to limitations like maximum
forces. Therefore, we now consider the continuous control problem
posed by the stochastic differential equation
y˙(t )= 1
τ
y(t )+β(t ) (7.13)
where fluctuations grow exponentially with time constant τ. β(t ) is
Gaussian white noise, i.e. E(β(t )β(t ′))=σ2δ(t − t ′). A real controller
has a finite reaction time making stabilization non-trivial. It has to
remove a prediction y˜(t ) of y(t ) based on observations only up to some
earlier time t− tr . Furthermore, a controller cannot remove y˜(t ) from
equation (7.13) completely and instantly without reaching infinite
velocities. Instead, it may continuously remove a term proportional
to y˜(t ). To stabilize the system, the proportionality factor has to be
bigger than 1/τ. Thus, we get
y˙(t )= 1
τ
y(t )−γ ϑ˜(t ) y˜(t )+β(t ) (7.14)
with ϑ˜(t ) as estimator for 1/τ and a gain factor γ > 1. Since the
controller has already determined its own actions for all times t ′ < t ,
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the probability density p(y(t ′) | y(t − tr )) is a Gaussian whose mean
evolves according to equation (7.14), dropping β(t ). Solving for y(t )
with known actions for {t ′ | t−tr ≤ t ′ < t } and initial condition y(t−tr )
yields the prediction
y˜(t )=E(y(t ) | y(t − tr ), γ, {ϑ˜(t ′)}, {y˜(t ′)}) (7.15)
= eϑ˜(t )tr
(
−γ
∫ t−0
t−tr
eϑ˜(t ) (t−tr−t
′)ϑ˜(t ′)y˜(t ′) dt ′+ y(t − tr )
)
.
We now focus on an estimator for the hidden parameter 1/τ. The exact
continuous record log-likelihood function [PY09] for equation (7.14)
can be derived analytically:
lnL (1/τ)=
∫ t
t0
y(t ′)
τσ2
(
y˙(t ′)+γϑ˜(t ′) y˜(t ′)
)
dt ′
−1
2
∫ t
t0
y(t ′)2
τ2σ2
dt ′.
(7.16)
Since we are interested in the drift without control, the bracket in
the first term contains the observed velocity minus the controller’s
contribution. Maximising equation (7.16) with respect to 1/τ yields
the estimator:
ϑ˜(t + tr )=
∫ t
t0 y(t
′)
(
y˙(t ′)+γϑ˜(t ′) y˜(t ′))dt ′∫ t
t0 y(t
′)2 dt ′.
. (7.17)
equations (7.14), (7.15), (7.17) define a delayed predictive contin-
uous control system. By setting t0 to t − tm in equation (7.17), we
can restrict the integration window to an interval of fixed length tm .
While this constraint is sufficient to induce criticality [PP11], we here
introduce exponential forgetting to better approximate real forgetting
curves (see also subsec. 9.6.3). Keeping t0 fixed e.g. at −∞, expo-
nentially decaying factors exp(t ′/τm) with time constant τm under
both integrals in equation (7.17) create a smooth shifting integration
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window. The numerator and denominator can then be expressed in
differential form:
A˙(t ) = −A(t )/τm +
(
y˙(t )+γ ϑ˜(t ) y˜(t )) y(t )
B˙(t ) = −B(t )/τm + y(t )2
ϑ˜(t + tr ) = A(t )
B(t )
. (7.18)
This form of the estimator is essentially the quotient of two lowpass
filters. It is both easier to implement numerically, and biologically
more plausible than equation (7.17). Note, that B will always be
positive if y 6≡ 0.
The model investigated in the following is defined by equations
(7.14), (7.15), and (7.18). It is the continuous-time equivalent to the
minimal control model (eq. (7.12)). This can be shown by means of a
limiting case using a stroboscopic mapping (sec. A.12). The variance
of the driving noise σ still only determines the absolute overall scale of
the dynamics and therefore is only relevant for absolute errors, not for
scaling relations. Yet the introduction of a reaction delay breaks the
invariance with respect to the task difficulty (determined by τ) which
was found for the minimal model. Formally, one could renormalise the
model such that all times and time constants are defined relative to τ
to recover the invariance. However, since we are interested in scenarios
where the experimenter sets τ and the subjects CNS determines the
other parameters–some of which may be biologically predetermined–
the model in the following is discussed as a controller with three
parameters facing a task determined by one (external) parameter.
7.5. Comparison with experimental data
A time-series for the model described in the last section is shown in
figure 7.3. The model generates a stable distribution of extreme events
of similar magnitudes as the experimental data shown in figure 6.5.
The model time-series further quantitatively reproduces the main
scaling features found in the VSB data-set.
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Figure 7.3.: time-series of normalised control errors for the continuousmodel.
The simulation was performed for τ= 250ms which is close to the average
over all experimental conditions described in sec. 6.2. Controller parameters
were tr = 180ms, γ = 1.1, τm = 120ms (σ is irrelevant for normalised
errors). Time discretization: 85Hz.
Figure 7.4 (a) shows the CCDF. Small fluctuations are dominated
by the additive baseline noise while apparent deviations from the
power law for large fluctuations are caused by temporal correlations
only (see sections 6.2 and A.1). Figure 7.4 (b) shows the PSD. The
model exhibits a characteristic broken power law which is also found
for the VSB experiments.
The combination of CCDF and PSD scaling allows to narrow down
the plausible parameter range for the model. This facilitates a deeper
understanding of the experimental observations: The model predicts
reaction times comparable to simple visual tasks (see sec. 5.1), an even
slightly faster adaptation to observed trends, and cautious movements
that avoid overshooting.
In this parameter range, the exponent ξ is to a large extent deter-
mined by the controller’s memory τm . The faster the controller adapts,
the more heavy-tailed the distribution of control errors becomes. In
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Figure 7.4.: Comparison of normalised control errors for the model (thick
black lines) with the VSB time-series for several subjects (light colored lines),
for each of which combined trials of several days totalling in several hours of
data are shown. Trials with constant but different τ for the same subjects are
kept separate. The simulation is the same time-series shown in figure 7.3. (a):
CCDF. Diagonal line: power-law fitted to the simulation (see section 2.5).
Dotted line: Gaussian. (b): Power Spectral Density and scaling exponents
λ1,2 were estimated like in figure 6.5.
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addition, there is some interaction with other parameters: Longer
reaction times also decrease ξ, as do higher gains γ. However, the
latter dependence is very weak unless γ gets close to 2. For much
larger γ, the system becomes uncontrollable.
Realistic exponents λ1 are found for a combination of controlling
cautiously with γ just above one and adapting fast with τm ≤ tr . This
strongly reduces correlation strengths on time scales less than a second,
but leaves small correlations that persist over a few seconds. The
transition from the constant super-low frequency response to low
frequency scaling with exponent λ1 depends mostly on γ: Lower gains
lead to longer persisting correlations and therefore shift the scaling
onset towards lower frequencies. There is, however, some interaction
with τm which becomes relevant later in this thesis.
The knee position depends on the reaction time. tr in between 170
and 200ms yield good fits.
The high frequency scaling regime represents frequencies above the
controller’s active response, with λ2 being mostly parameter indepen-
dent. Only the onset of this regime close to the knee depends on
parameters, which can slightly influence the fitted exponents3. λ2 is
also the only measured quantity where the model as it is discussed here
inevitably lies at the very edge of the experimentally observed range.
However, passive damping increases λ2. It can be included using
either of the model extensions discussed in section A.4 and section 7.8.
High frequency ripples are found for several subjects in combined
and single-trial time series. These signatures are characteristic and
subject-dependent. In the model, the ripples are more pronounced.
However, if model time-series with slightly different parameters are
combined, the ripples are greatly reduced [PP11]. In addition, also
the aforementioned model extensions can reproduce a high frequency
regime with less ripples.
3Fitting only very high frequencies that are truly unaffected is not possible for the
experimental data. For the model, an example is shown in section A.4
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The effects presented above are robust to parameter changes in-
cluding tr → 0. τ may also be time dependent. Introducing a time
dependent σ creates additional higher order temporal correlations.
State dependencies reduce the increase of ξ with τm and cause addi-
tional clustering of control errors.
Based on CCDFs and PSDs, we can rule out other parameter
regimes, and several model modifications. Examples include mul-
tiplicative execution noise without adaptation (sec. A.3), and control
with a high gain (sec. A.2).
7.6. Why do subjects adapt rapidly?
The estimated values of two of the three parameters of the controller
model can be well justified from the existing literature (chap. 5). If
subjects increased their gain, one would expect that all planning errors
and the signal dependent noise in muscle activation should be scaled
up linearly. A small gain further minimises the risk of overshooting
or oscillation buildup in delayed controllers. All of this is consistent
with established findings like the well known Fitts’ Law [Fit54] which
states that faster movements become less precise.
Second, even though so far we could only indirectly measure re-
action times, findings are at the lower limit of biological restrictions.
Therefore, it is unlikely that subjects could react even faster. All else
equal, there are no obvious benefits associated with reacting slower.
This leaves us with explaining the memory time constant τm . Why
should subjects adapt to trends on such short time scales if the task
parameter is constant? This problem is resolved by a minimum in the
variance of y found for memory time constants τm close to the reaction
time tr . Figure 7.5 (a) shows the variance in dependence of the ratio
between reaction time and memory length for different reaction times.
For small τm , the variance diverges. The minimum’s exact position is
parameter-dependent: the optimal τm increases slightly slower than
tr .
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Figure 7.5.: Statistical properties depending on the ratio between thememory
time constant τm and the reaction time tr = 300, 200 and 100ms (different
curves top to bottom). τ = 250ms, σ = 1s−0.5, g = 1.05. Curves
are averages from 50 simulations of length 2 ·107 s with discretisation step
10ms. Dashed contours: possible range for VSB subjects. (a): Variances
correspond to mean squared control errors. Vertical lines: minima. Symbols:
τm = 1 s (triangle), 10 s (diamond), a controller using the true τ instead
of equation (7.18) (circle). (b): Corresponding exponents ξ. Error bars:
positions of minimal variances.
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Figure 7.5 (b) shows the corresponding CCDF tail exponents ξ. Po-
sitions where variances are minimal are marked with error bars. Here,
ξ is just below four for all conditions. However, because correlation
lengths increase with tr and tm , distributions may appear different
for limited data set sizes.
Summarising the above two paragraphs, fast adaptation minimises
mean balancing errors by tolerating rare, large errors in favour of the
removal of random trends (figure 7.5). Corresponding CCDF scaling
exponents lie in the highest range of those observed experimentally.
Therefore, subjects perform quite close to being optimal in the sense
of minimising the mean distance between target and controller given
the inevitable presence of a reaction delay and some baseline noise.
This hypothesis leads to several predictions which are investigated
experimentally in chapter 8. Until the end of this chapter, however,
we will first investigate two more aspects of critically adaptive control.
7.7. Significance and variation of power-law distributions
A commonly asked question for heavy-tailed empirical distributions
is whether they truly follow a power-law or just look approximately
linear on a log-log plot. This scrutiny stems from the difficulty to
discern power-laws from other heavy-tailed distributions in smaller
data sets. In short, we need surrogate data to which we can compare
the data that is to be tested. This surrogate data is generated such that
it follows a true power-law. It further shares the shape of the cutoff, the
steepness, and also temporal correlations with the data to be tested4
[PP11]. There is no standard way to generate such surrogate data,
but luckily we have a model with closely reproduces these features for
4A similar method is used in [CSN09] but no time-series were analysed. Neverthe-
less, the authors claim broad applicability of their methods, despite ignoring the
possibility of correlated measurements. To this authors knowledge, the meth-
ods presented here represent the only attempt in the literature to rigorously test
for power laws in time-series and other data sets where measurements are not
perfectly independent.
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Figure 7.6.: CCDF fits for the combined trials of each subject for all days,
and for each day separately. Each subject is marked by a different symbol, and
each condition by a different color as indicated above. Some subjects recorded
sets of trials with different fixed τ on the same day. (a): CCDF exponents.
Only one subject (triangle pointing to the right) shows a clear trend, all
others don’t. (b): Probabilities, that the KS-statistics for power-law fits for
the model (with parameters as in fig. 7.4) are worse than for experimental
time series. As expected if control errors for model and experimental data
were distributed equally, goodness of fits scatter around 0.5. Grey line:
significance level p> = 0.05.
the experimental VSB time series. The model is rigorously tested in a
two-step procedure in section A.1 and found to follow a true power
law. Therefore, testing whether power-law fits to the experimental
time-series perform worse in the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS)-test than
fits for the model tells us if deviations of the experimental CCDFs
from an analytical power law could have happened by chance. As
shown in figure 7.6, we cannot reject this null hypothesis for all but
one sample. The latter consists of the combined trials from 5 days
for one subject. Analysing the trials for each day separately does not
lead to a rejection of the null hypothesis. Therefore, we can conclude
that VSB control errors generally cannot be distinguished from a truly
power-law-tailed distribution. More details, including the analysis of
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single trials, are found in the supplement to [PP11], where the data
sets were grouped slightly differently.
On a note related to figure 7.6 (a), the coloring of the trials high-
lights a possible reason as to why no significant trends over time could
be detected: Subjects with constant τ during each trial performed
at different difficulties and sometimes in two different tasks on the
same day. To achieve a higher discriminability, experiments with more
subjects under identical conditions are required (see chap. 8).
7.8. Second order control
So far we only studied the simplest possible balancing task and the sim-
plest possible model for movement generation. That is, equation (7.14)
describes a first order dynamical system where predicted control errors
decay exponentially. This matches the VSB experiments shown in
section 7.5 since they featured an equivalent instability. Mechanical
systems, however, follow second-order dynamics. Therefore, real hand
movements eventually require the generation of forces. Furthermore,
very similar results have been reported for other VSB experiments that
did feature second order dynamics, as well as for real stick balancing
tasks (see chap. 6). Hence, a demonstration of IAI in a second order
system seems warranted, as does a justification for as to why a first
order description may suffice in certain situations.
To investigate the effect of second-order dynamics, consider control
of an inverted pendulum linearised for small angles5 and perturbed
by Gaussian white noise β:
y¨(t ) = ϑy(t )+ c(t )+β(t ) (7.19)
c(t ) = −γa ϑ˜(t )y˜(t )−γv ˜˙y(t ), (7.20)
5This simplification well-known from the “mathematical pendulum” should be
unproblematic since successful balancing of a real stick presumably involves small
angles. However, introducing a nonlinearity is straight forward.
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where again the system state is predicted based on observations that
are delayed by the reaction time, and on all planned control actions
c(t ′) for the intermediate times {t ′ | t − tr ≤ t ′ < t }:
y˜(t ) = E(y(t ) | y(t − tr ), y˙(t − tr ), {c(t ′}) (7.21)
˜˙y(t ) = E(y˙(t ) | y(t − tr ), y˙(t − tr ), {c(t ′}) . (7.22)
The system parameter is again estimated using a maximum likelihood
estimator with exponentially decaying memory
A˙(t ) = −A(t )/τm +
(
y¨(t )− c) y(t )
B˙(t ) = −B(t )/τm + y(t )2
ϑ˜(t + tr ) = A(t )
B(t )
. (7.23)
Equation (7.20) features one notable difference with respect to the first
order case equation (7.14): two different control terms with separate
gain factors. This is necessary for two reasons. First, imagine that the
controller would only counteract the acceleration due to the instability
in equation (7.19). Then, given finite initial y or y˙ , the system would
oscillate and never be able to stop. Second, the term proportional to
the velocity acts like friction. It removes kinetic energy from the system
and can bring it to halt, but it cannot move the system back towards
the origin. Hence, successful stabilisation requires both counteracting
the instability and the removal of kinetic energy.
Figure 7.7 shows distributions and spectra for different control
regimes. Power-law CCDFs are found for a large parameter range
(figure 7.7 a, c, e). However, the tail exponent here depends on the
gain parameters in a more complex way than in the first order model.
For underdamped control, the system shows strong oscillations (b).
These oscillations are suppressed when γv is increased (d). Further
increasing γc slows down the compensation of control errors, which
creates more long-ranged correlations. This effect is demonstrated
by a shift of the onset of the low-pass filtering in (f ) towards lower
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Figure 7.7.: Comparison of CCDFs (left column) and PSDs (right column)
for simulations of the model defined by equations (7.19) ff. in different
dynamical regimes. (a), (b): underdamped. γa = 5, γv = 1, τm = 140ms.
(c), (d): nearly critically damped. γa = 5, γv = 6, τm = 150ms. (e), (f ):
overdamped. γa = 1.2, γv = 10, τm = 100ms. All simulations: ϑ = 10,
tr = 200ms, discretisation step 10ms. Analysis like in figure 7.4.
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frequencies than in (d). The second order model for many parameter
sets exhibits a steeper high frequency scaling than the first order one–
even steeper than those observed for most subjects in VSB experiments.
For the combination of both high γa and γv , however, the second-
order model can exhibit λ2 as low as two (not shown). Nevertheless,
as discussed above, the second-order model does not exactly match
the task for the experimental VSB data presented in this thesis. A
matched set of experiments would be required in order to determine
the parameters that fit human behaviour.
To summarise: realistic time-series with power-law CCDFs and
broken power-law spectra are obtained when the first-order control
term in equation (7.20) dominates the system’s tendency to oscillate.
This finding explains why the first-order model approximation to
human balancing control described by equation (7.14) is an excellent
quantitative fit to the experimentally observed scaling–except for the
highest frequencies, which are more strongly damped for some subjects.
Further, for light sticks and VSB, it is plausible that humans plan where
to move their hand as opposed to planning which torques to apply
directly. The latter may then be calculated further down in the control
hierarchy (see chap. 5).
In any case, findings so far indicate that the scaling properties
in human balancing behaviour emerge during trajectory planning
and are–at least qualitatively–largely independent of many details of
movement force generation (see also sec. A.8).
As a final remark, the second-order model also offers a new per-
spective on the balancing model discussed in section 6.3. The latter
includes a substantial amount of friction which cannot be justified
for a stick on a fingertip. Here, in contradistinction, the controller
causes the system to behave as if it was overdamped. The responsible
term in equation (7.20) is proportional not directly to the relative
velocity of controller and target (or the displacement angle of the
stick), but to the controllers prediction of said velocity. This influence,
in contrast to ordinary kinetic friction, is possible by only moving
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the suspension point of the stick. Hence, an effective overdamping
of a balanced stick’s dynamics likely stems from the subjects desire to
suppress oscillations and to stop the stick from moving.
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In chapter 7, a critically adaptive balancing model was presented where
heavy-tailed error distributions resembling those observed in human
balancing tasks arise from a rapid online estimation of parameters.
The model suggests that subjects are highly adaptive even in stationary
task conditions, due to a trade-off between eliminating random trends
that accumulate during movements and a susceptibility to missteps.
This implies that if subjects are able to also employ different strategies,
the distribution of errors should depend on the task objective.
Here we test this hypothesis by imposing two different objective
functions on subjects in virtual balancing tasks: (S) minimising average
errors, and (K) minimising rare and atypically large errors. Experimen-
tal results confirm the expected trade-off between minimal average
errors and heavy-tailed fluctuations. Further model predictions, and
the effect of training will be discussed as well. Considering the re-
sults of this study, we conclude it to be highly unlikely that the other
mechanisms for multiplicative noise found in the literature are the
dominating factors in this task.
In the following, after establishing the new experimental setup, we
will show that the scaling features discussed in section 6.2 are observed
in condition (S). Next, we will qualitatively investigate the changes of
the error distributions over time with respect to the two task objectives.
Then we will quantify their statistics rigorously and test further model
predictions. Finally, we will compare model fits for naive and trained
subjects.
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y
T C
Figure 8.1.: In one-dimensio-
nal VSB, subjects control the
cursor C using a position en-
coder on a rail. The unstable
target T is displayed with a
fixed vertical offset, but also
moves horizontally only. y is
the horizontal displacement.
8.1. A new paradigm in VSB
Previously, we explained many features of control error statistics in
two-dimensional human balancing tasks (chap. 6) using a model where
movements occur only in one dimension (chap. 7). Therefore, we here
introduce a simplified VSB task corresponding directly to this model.
The setup is shown in figure 8.1.
This task corresponds to an inverted pendulum on a cart, a well
known control problem. Subjects move a light low-friction slider
along a rail. On a computer screen behind the rail, a cursor C is
displayed at the same horizontal position as the hand-grip of the slider.
A target T is moved by the computer according to
T˙ (t )= 1
τ
(
T (t )−C (t )), (8.1)
where T (t ) and C (t ) are the positions of T and C, respectively, and at
each time t . τ= 250ms. Hence, the distance |y(t )| grows exponen-
tially if C is not moved. Here, the horizontal displacement is given by
y(t )= T (t )−C (t ) (8.2)
8.1.1. Experimental protocol in brief
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of two groups with different
instructions: (S) minimising the standard deviation of y , and (K)
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minimising the kurtosis of y (see sec. 2.1). (S) was explained to the
subjects as minimising average errors. (K) was explained as minimising
the influence of rare, extreme errors. That is, avoiding rare errors that
are somuch larger than the average ones that these rare events dominate
the average over all errors. Each trial lasted 3 minutes. After each trial,
subjects received feedback on their performance: The trial score (i.e.
the standard deviation or kurtosis) as well as an individual top 10 high
score table was displayed.
To ensure that all subjects performed under comparable conditions,
a strict schedule was arranged. Each subject recorded trials on four days
in a row. Trials were aborted and discarded if T left the screen1. Each
subject tried to complete 10 trials every day. If at least one trial was
aborted, one more trial was recorded on that day. Therefore, in order
to keep the amount of training comparable among subjects, some of
them completed less then 10 trials on some days. Trial completion
rates are found in section A.6.1. New trials were started by the subjects
after a 1min pause enforced by the computer. Subjects were instructed
to relax and focus on more distant objects in between trials.
For each subject and on each day, the target position was disturbed
by random fluctuations during two randomly selected trials. These
noise trials served a dual purpose: measuring reaction times directly,
and testing how error distributions depend on absolute movement
amplitudes. We did not record more noise trials so as to not interfere
with the training process too much.
10 subjects participated in each condition. The results of one subject
in (S) and two subjects in (K) had to be discarded.
8.1.2. Detailed Protocol
The input device was a magnetoresistive position encoder (WayCon
MAB, linear with 0.02% error). The analog output of the position
encoder was digitised at 5kHz and 16bit. While this sensor measures
1The rail in this setup is long enough such that C can be moved outside of the
screen.
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the position of a magnet without requiring mechanical contact, we
added a slider that can only be moved in one dimension. A small round
grip was firmly attached to the slider allowing for comfortable and
precise usage. The slider could be moved with low friction, comparable
to a computer mouse2.
Stimuli were presented on a (365±1)mm wide CRT-screen (Sam-
sung SyncMaster 950p) at a horizontal resolution of 1600px. The
screen was updated at (100.002±0.001)Hz. The stimuli consisted of
two solid discs with a radius of 5px and an additional 0.5px wide
smooth edge. They were rendered with 8× anti-aliasing3. The con-
troller was rendered in bright green and the target in white. The
background was black.
To ensure optimal timings, we used the Psychotoolbox [Bra97,
Pel97] to generate the stimuli and to record the data. The target
dynamics were simulated in double precision floating point format
at the data sampling frequency of 5kHz with τ= 250ms. For every
screen refresh, the then current state of the simulated stimuli was
rendered to a frame. The time needed to get new data from the AD-
converter, update the simulation, and draw a new frame was shorter
than the time between frames. We also recorded the analog VGA
vertical synchronisation pulse in a separate channel an found that the
system never failed to draw a new frame in time.
Recorded target positions exhibit high frequency noise with a max-
imum amplitude below 3 quantisation steps. This corresponds to
2Increasing downwards pressure on the slider slightly increased friction. We had
no means of measuring this force during trials. Nevertheless, we instructed the
subjects to use little pressure and suspect that they tried to minimise the effort
required to move the slider. In any case, it is highly unlikely that friction between
slider and rail impaired the subjects’ ability to perform either precise or fast
movements
3Therefore, movements were displayed very smoothly and even sub-pixel move-
ments were visible. Data from some subjects reveals that they actually tried to
compensate sub-pixel distances between controller and target.
80
8.1. A new paradigm in VSB
jumps of the target position significantly below one pixel. Subjectively,
no jitter in the displayed target position could be perceived.
For the noise trials, we had to use slightly low-pass filtered noise
because otherwise, erratic jumps in the target position were too dis-
tracting. Therefore, we used Gaussian white noise and applied a finite
impulse response low-pass filter with a time constant of 100ms. This
filter is linear phase, that is, it adds a frequency-invariant delay which
we subtracted to calculate linear responses. If a noise trial was not
completed and there were less than 11 trials already recorded on the
same day, the number of noise trials was set to 3 and the total number
of trials on that day to 11. See also section A.7.
Subjects sat on an chair with individually adjusted height, back-,
and armrests. The screen viewing distance was approximately 65cm.
The room was lit evenly and indirectly from behind the screen.
We recruited healthy subjects aged 18 to 35 using a bulletin on
the university campus and website. Subjects stayed for approximately
one hour on each day. Payment was 8 euros per day. On the first day,
subjects read and signed an information sheet. The experimenter filled
out a data sheet. The blank documents can be found in section A.14.
They were developed with advice from (past) members of the centre
for cognitive sciences (ZKW) of the University of Bremen, including
Marc Shipper and Cathleen Grimsen. Subjects were assigned random
codes in order to collect both the personal data and measured trials
pseudonymously. All subjects declared to be free of all of the following
properties:
• known neurological, ophthalmological, and cardiac diseases
• medication that may influence driving ability
• heavy use of caffeine, alcohol, or nicotine
• regular use of other drugs.
Ametropia was required to be fully corrected by either glasses or con-
tact lenses. All subjects reported to be able to clearly see the experi-
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mental stimuli. Handedness was tested according to the Edinburgh
Handedness Inventory. All subjects except one were right-handed.
The left-handed subject did not perform significantly different from
the right handed ones. All subjects performed the task with their
dominant hand.
On the first day, subjects completed a training program to ensure
that they could perform the task. This training consisted of three trials
à 30s with increasing difficulty: τ decreased from 500ms to 250ms.
If a subject failed to complete any of the three trials, the training
program was repeated once. Training trials were included neither in
the high scores nor in the results of this study. We tried to have each
subject perform at the same time of day on each of the four subsequent
recording days. Only a few exceptions had to be made. On each day
before starting their trials, subjects had to rate their subjective fitness
and the amount of sleep in the previous night.
High-score tables were separate for all subjects to ensure equal
motivation. However, the individual high scores were initially filled
with dummy entries that were identical for all subjects within each
task condition respectively. These entries were chosen such that some
were easy to beat and others were moderately challenging.
One subject’s results were discarded due to failure to participate on
four days in a row. Two subjects’ results were discarded because they
had severe difficulties in concentrating on the task and performing
fast and precise movements–both were computer science students.
The computer was prepared by David Rotermund, who also wrote
a custom low latency driver. The Psychotoolbox setup, including the
framework for timing and stimulus updates, was prepared by Udo
Ernst. He further built the analog breakout box for the AD-converter.
This box and the cable connections were then slightly modified by the
author to include a balanced analog signal transmission and optimised
shielding. The author further wrote the experiment-specific code,
planned and conducted the experiments.
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Figure 8.2.: Normalised control errors for the combined trials of day one
of subject one who was in (S). (a): Time series. (b): Complementary Cu-
mulative Distribution Function (CCDF) (solid black), normal distribution
(dashed grey), and power law (red diagonal line) fitted using the hill estimator
with a cutoff (short red line) that optimises the KS-statistics. (c): Power
Spectral Density (PSD) and fitted scaling exponents λ1,2 minimising MSEs.
High frequencies eventually level out. Frequencies above his point where
excluded from the analysis. Methods: see figs. 6.4 and 6.5
The experiments were approved by the ethics committee of the
University of Bremen and conducted according to the data privacy
law of the state of Bremen.
8.2. Scaling in one-dimensional VSB
Figure 8.2 (a) shows the control errors |y | for the combined trials of
day one for one subject in (S). The time series was analysed using
the same methods as in previous chapters. Results closely resemble
those for the mouse-based VSB experiments: a power-law tail in the
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Figure 8.3.: Over four days, subjects either had to minimize the standard
deviation (red) or the kurtosis (blue) of the horizontal controller-target
displacement y . Each marker represents both statistics for one completed
trial. Each combination of symbol and color corresponds to a different
subject. Dashed line: The kurtosis of a Gaussian is 3.
CCDF (fig. 8.2 (b)) and a broken power law in the PSD. This result
confirms a non-trivial model prediction: the most prominent features
of human balancing error statistics can be modeled by considering
only movement amplitudes; the process of planning the movement
direction within the two-dimensional plane can be neglected.
8.3. Standard deviation versus kurtosis
Having established that the new protocol yields the expected results
for naive subjects, we focus on the main question of this study: What
is the effect of intense training with different task objectives? Fig-
ure 8.3 shows standard deviations and kurtoses of the controller-target
displacement y for all completed trials of all subjects on each day.
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Over time, the two conditions separate into distinct clusters. On day
four, almost all trials in condition (S) are heavy tailed. In contrast,
kurtoses for most trials in (K) are close to those for a Gaussian or even
below. All except one subject (symbolised by a triangle pointing to the
right) from (K) exhibit much higher standard deviations than those in
(S). However, even for this subject lower standard deviations coincide
with higher kurtoses and vice versa. For each group, there appears
to be a higher degree of variability within the other statistic than the
respective score. More statistical differences between the two groups
are investigated in detail in section 8.5. First, however, we investigate
how the differences between the two groups arise.
8.4. Different control strategies
To understand the behavioural differences between trained subjects
in the two score conditions, consider the 30s time-series parts shown
in figure 8.4. All four examples were recorded on day four. For each
example, controller and target positions as well as their displacements
are shown.
For (S), even though there is some variation between subjects and
even between trials for the same subject, figure 8.4(a) is quite repre-
sentative (despite being one of the more extreme examples). In this
condition, all subjects managed to keep C and T closely aligned most
of the time. This is reflected by the low standard deviations close to
a millimetre (fig. 8.3). Nevertheless, both C and T are constantly
moving. From time to time, subjects fail to perfectly keep track of the
target’s movements. This manifests itself in under- or overcorrection
of small fluctuations. Sometimes, like in the depicted example at
9s, even brief movements in the wrong direction are observed. Such
missteps can lead to errors that are many times larger than the standard
deviation. Nevertheless, as soon as subjects notice the target’s sudden
escape, they are usually able to correct their mistake. Precise corrective
movements re-stabilise the target with little to no oscillations. More
examples are shown in section A.8.
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Figure 8.4.: Target and Controller positions and the corresponding horizon-
tal displacements y for different subjects. All time-series are parts of trials
recorded on day 4. The y-axes have different scales to improve the visibility
of small movements. The allowed range for T extended from 0−365mm.
The given task was to minimise (a): the standard deviation, or (b-d): the
kurtosis. Subjects from top to bottom: 8, 2, 10, 16.
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For (K), subject strategies are much more diverse. However, all of
them involve avoiding control movements while lingering near y = 0.
Here we discuss three trials with sub-Gaussian kurtoses (i.e. < 3). In
figure 8.4(b), the subject performs regular oscillations while trying
to restrict T to a small part of the screen. In contrast, the subject in
figure 8.4(c) tries to overshoot as little as possible and stops if y gets too
small. Yet another strategy is shown in figure 8.4(d): this subject keeps
T drifting slowly between both edges of the screen. The movements
are performed in a slightly intermittent manner: C repeatedly closes
up T and slows down again.
Naturally, avoiding close co-movements of C and T leads to much
larger Std(y). Whether larger movement amplitudes per se have any
side effects is investigated in section 8.6.
8.5. Statistics of day to day changes
Here we will quantify the changes in numerous parameters between
conditions and days. There are inter-subject differences even within
groups, but we do not discuss them in detail.
8.5.1. Median statistics
As is apparent from figure 8.3, the trial score distributions are highly
non-Gaussian. We therefore apply robust, non-parametric tests. Stan-
dard box plots are used to visualise quartiles and more extreme devia-
tions that are not outliers4. For an example, see figure 8.5. To test for
significant changes between samples, we apply two different tests.
4For each sample, 25% of the data points lie below the lower edge of the box and
another 25% above the upper edge. Whiskers (vertical lines above and below each
box) indicate variability outside of this range. The upper whisker extends to the
largest data point that is within the upper quartile plus 1.5 times the interquartile
range. The lower whisker is calculated analogously. Extreme outliers are not
shown to leave space for labels.
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First, the median test is a nonparametric test for the null hypothesis
that the medians of the populations from which two samples are drawn
are identical. However, it has a relatively low statistical power.
Second, the rank-sum test (also called e.g. the Mann-Whitney-
Wilcoxon test) has a much higher power. For non-normal distributions
it surpasses the t-test in efficiency. On normal distributions it is nearly
as efficient. However, it tests whether the probability of an observation
from one population exceeding an observation from the other one
is not equal to 0.5 [FP10]. This equals a shift in median only if the
distributions of both populations have the same shape (except for the
shift).
We follow the common practise to use stars to indicate significance.
One star: p < 0.05. Two stars: p < 0.01. Three stars: p < 0.001.
However, we use a compact visualisation for two tests at once. Outlines
are drawn for stars corresponding to the rank-sum test. The median
test is indicated by filling the smaller area within each star. For example,
two stars only one of which is filled correspond to p < 0.01 for the
rank-sum test, but only p < 0.05 for the median test. If only outlines
are drawn, only the rank-sum test found significant differences. This
indicates that samples from one populations are more likely to be
greater than samples from the other one, but we could not detect a
significant shift in the median. Such a finding may be caused by the
higher sensitivity of the rank-sum test. However, it is also possible that
the populations have differently skewed distributions with identical
medians. In none of the following figures did the median test indicate
a lower p-value than the rank-sum test (this would be drawn as a small
filled star due to the missing outline).
8.5.2. Score differences
Box plots for the standard deviations and kurtoses for the trials in each
score condition and for each day are shown in figure 8.5. As expected
from figure 8.3, distributions for both conditions evolve differently
over time. On day four, the distributions are highly separated with (S)
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Figure 8.5.: Box plots of (a): standard deviations, and (b): kurtoses for the
trials also shown in figure 8.3. For each day, (S) (red, left) and (K) (light
blue, right) are analysed separately. Medians (thick horizontal lines across
each box) are also stated as numbers above the upper whiskers. P-values
are indicated by star outlines for the rank-sum test and star fillings for the
median test. E.g. on day 2, kurtoses distributions for the two conditions
are found to be different with p < 0.001 (three stars) for the rank-sum test,
but only p < 0.05 (one star) for the median test. See also section 8.5.1, and
footnote 4.
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Figure 8.6.: CCDF-tail exponents ξ on each day for subjects in (S). (a):
single trials. (b) combined trials for each subject. Exponents were fitted like
in fig. 8.2.
exhibiting lower standard deviations and higher kurtoses than (K). In
addition, some more subtle changes are found. For (S), both standard
deviation and kurtosis distributions have slightly yet significantly lower
means after training.
8.5.3. Scaling in (S)
Figure 8.5(a) shows the evolution of tail exponents fitted to the cumu-
lative distributions of the trials in (S). A highly significant increase in
the median is found. For the combined trials of each subject on each
day, the change appears even more extreme (fig. 8.5(b)). On day four,
the measured median exponent is very close to ξ= 4, the optimum
predicted in section 7.6.
However, while combining trials into longer time series tends to
give better fits (which we verified using surrogate data), we also obtain
less fits and therefore lose statistical power. For the combined trials, we
only find a significant difference when using the more sensitive rank-
sum test. Therefore, we can say that (in the combined trials) we tend to
find higher exponents on day four, but not that the median increased.
There is one more possible effect. The inter-subject variation is very
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low on day one and much higher on day four. This may indicate that
training does not affect all subjects to the same extent. This point is
discussed again in section 8.7.3. The finding that the variation among
the kurtosis trials is reduced over time is consistent with an increase
in the tail exponent for surrogate data (not shown).
We cannot reject the hypothesis that the distribution tails follow
true power laws for any of the combined trials in the error condition5.
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Figure 8.7.: For combined trials, similar values are found, but the changes
from day one to four are not significant.
Figure 8.7 shows statistics for different parameters fitted to the
PSDs using the same methods as in figure 8.2. Median low frequency
5p> = 0.44±0.08 for day one, and p> = 0.48±0.07 for day four; 0.5 would be
expected if model and data were perfectly identically distributed. See also sec. 7.7.
Here, we used the median model parameters shown in fig. 8.10. For single trials
we obtained p> = 0.62±0.04 and p> = 0.65±0.03, respectively.
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scaling exponents λ1 are 1.2 on day one and significantly decrease to
0.8 on day four (fig. 8.7(a)). Median high frequency scaling exponents
λ2 are 3.6 on day one and significantly decrease to 3.3 on day four
(fig. 8.7(b)). In other words: both scaling regimes become shallower
over time, but the change is more pronounced for the low frequency
regime.
The position c1 of the low-frequency scaling onset tends to occur
at slightly lower frequencies on day four than on day one (fig. 8.7(c)).
However, this might be an artefact of the automated fitting caused by
the smaller difference between the flat, ultra-low frequencies and the
low-frequency scaling regime which is shallower on day four than on
day one.
An even smaller yet highly significant change is found in the po-
sition c2 of the knee. Here, median values decrease from 1.6Hz to
1.4Hz. While one might again suspect that this is an artefact of the
fitting method, there is independent evidence that this is not the case
(presented in the following sections).
Findings for the spectra of the combined trials are consistent with
those presented above, but the trends in this case fail to reach signifi-
cance due to the then low number of samples (not shown). Fits for
λ1 tend to be slightly higher on average for combined trials than for
single trials (not shown); this effect is also found for fits to model time
series of corresponding lengths (fig. 8.12).
8.6. Noise trials
Figure 8.8 shows a comparison of the trial scores for normal trials and
noise trials. The randomperturbations of the target caused significantly
highermovement errors. This effect wasmore pronounced in (S) where
median standard deviations increased approximately by a factor of 6.
Despite this large effect of the artificial noise, we found no significant
change in median kurtoses. If there were a small effect that failed to
reach significance due to the relatively small number of noise trials, it
would be a very small increase in kurtosis for the noise trials. Therefore,
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Figure 8.8.: Comparison of (a) standard deviation and (b) kurtoses for trials
with and without artificial noise. The sample groups for each day are arranged
as follows: First (S) (reds), then (K) (blues). Within each condition, first
normal trials (lighter colours) and then noise trials (darker colours). That
is, conditions left to right are {(S), normal}, {(S), noise}, {(K), normal},
{(K), noise}. Stars indicate significant differences between the trials with and
without noise for each score condition. To avoid confusion, no tests for
differences between days are shown. Tests are explained in section 8.5.1.
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Figure 8.9.: Reaction times calculated from the linear responses measured
during noise trials. That is, the average response time of each subject to a
delta pulse.
we can rule out the possibility that an increase in standard deviation
per se causes smaller kurtoses. This is consistent with the hypothesis
that in order to avoid the IAI, the deterministic movements of the
target have to be large enough to be clearly distinguishable from the
noise.
In the PSDs, the only robust effect is an increase in the high-
frequency-scaling exponent (not shown). This is likely caused by
the artificial noise dominating all other noise sources.
The noise trials can be used to directly measure the subjects’ reaction
times. This is done by calculating linear responses from the recorded
movements and the known noise tracks. An example is shown in
section A.7. Figure 8.9 shows how the results are distributed for each
day and condition. Reaction times are found to be close to 200ms.
Further, reaction times in (S) tend to be longer on day four than on
day one. While we only have a quite limited number of noise trials and
therefore a low statistical power in this test, the result is consistent with
the hypothesis that the knee in the PSD correlates with the reaction
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time. In figure 8.7 we found lower median frequencies for the fitted
knee positions on day four than on day one. It appears quite unlikely
that two completely different measurements would produce spuriously
significant effects in the same direction. A third method of detecting
the same effect results discussed in the next section.
8.7. Fitting changes during score condition (S)
How and how well can the model fit the above results? To answer this
question, the first step is to find appropriate model parameters.
8.7.1. Obtaining model parameters
In order to track the changes in the distributions and spectra over
the days, we use automated fitting methods. Since the model has
only three free parameters to fit the trials (tr , γ, and τm), they can be
arranged in a three-dimensional grid. We considered 14208 parameter
combinations, each of which forms a node in the aforementioned
cubic grid. The parameter ranges were chosen such that no fitted
parameter sets lie on the surface of the cube. To avoid potential biases
that may arise from comparing parametric fits which themselves have
to be automatically calculated, we took a different approach.
For each node, we simulated 50 time series of the same length as the
experimental trials. For each simulation, we calculated the CCDF and
the PSD. To be able to average and store these results for all nodes and
to quickly compare them to the experimental trials, we first binned
each CCDF along the probability axis. These averages were stored for
all parameter combinations creating a hypercube. Later, we processed
each trial in exactly the same way. A modified KS-test suitable for the
binned data was used to determine for each trial the dissimilarity to
each average simulated CCDF. For the PSDs, we binned along the
frequency axis and used MSE to determine the dissimilarities.
We then calculated a combined dissimilarity measure by normalis-
ing the KS-statistics and the MSEs by their respective medians over
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all parameter combinations and then added the two results. For each
trial, the simulation average with the smallest dissimilarity was then
determined to correspond to the most fitting parameter set.
There were several requirements for the binning process which
slightly increased its complexity. For both CCDFs and Probability
Density Functions (PDFs) we calculated 100 logarithmically spaced
bins using the same method. These bins were overlapping and all
data points were weighted with a Blackman window, and according
to their non-uniform spacing within each bin. Hence, each binned
data set is smoother than the original data set, yet overlaps it perfectly.
The point of this exercise is that logarithmic binning without properly
considering that each bin has more data points in one half than it does
in the other half can cause biases. Furthermore, the lower-frequency
data points in the PSDs are quite far apart. Empty bins are avoided
since the bins are overlapping and centre-weighted.
Since we know that the model’s ability to fit the PSD’s high fre-
quency regime for individual subjects is limited, we only considered
frequencies up to 6Hz to determine the best model parameters. This
allows us to stick to the most simple continuous-time balancing model
which otherwise fits the data extremely well. The alternatives (secs. 7.8
and A.4) would mean introducing unknown new parameters like a
correlation length for the driving noise or the inertia of the arm.
8.7.2. Model parameters for each day
Figure 8.10 shows how the model parameters fitted to the trials of
each subject in (S) evolved over time. First, median reaction times tr
slightly yet significantly increased from 198ms on day one to 214ms on
day four. This is consistent with the PSD-knee positions and reaction
times from linear responses reported above. Second, gains γ ≈ 1.1
were found for all four days. Third, median memory time constants
τr were found to significantly increase from 115ms on day one to
145ms on day four.
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Figure 8.10.: Model parameters for
which average CCDFs and PSDs
are most similar to the trials in (S).
Similarity was determined as de-
scribed in subsection 8.7.1. Fig-
ure generation is explained in sec-
tion 8.5.1.
8.7.3. Changes in distributions and Spectra
To better comprehend how the statistics of naive and trained subjects
differ, we repeated the analysis performed for the mouse-based VSB
time-series (section 7.5) for the new data set, but for days one and four
separately. Figure 8.11(a) shows the CCDFs for the combined trials
of day one for each subject in (S), and for a model simulation with
parameters according to figure 8.10 for the same day. Figure 8.11 (a)
shows the same analysis for day four. In both cases, the model repro-
duces the data very well despite using parameters that were fitted to
single trials. Consistent with figure 8.8, there appears to be a higher
inter-subject variation among the exponents on day four than on day
one.
Figure 8.12 shows the PSDs for the same time series as in Fig-
ure 8.11. As expected, the high frequency scaling for the model is
not steep enough to perfectly fit the experimental data. However, this
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Figure 8.11.: Comparison of the CCDFs for the normalised control errors
for the model (thick black lines) with the VSB time-series (thin red lines)
for the subjects on (a): day one, and (b): day four. For each day, the trials
for each subject were combined into one time series. For each day, model
parameters correspond to the median best fits to the single trials shown in
figure 8.10.
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Figure 8.12.: Comparison of Power Spectral Densities for the model (thick
black lines) with the VSB control-error time-series (thin red lines) for the
subjects on (a): day one, and (b): day four. For each day, model parameters
correspond to the median best fits to the single trials shown in figure 8.10.
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discrepancy is greatly reduced on day four (consistent with fig. 8.7).
Experimental spectra level much earlier than the Nyquist frequency.
This is presumably related to either perception or movement thresholds
since it is not observed for larger movement amplitudes. Nevertheless,
low frequencies as well as the position and shape of the knee are fitted
very well.
8.8. Error distributions in score condition (K)
Since there is an enormous variability among the subjects’ strategies
in (K) (section 8.4), we will not consider individual fits here. In-
stead, we focus more on the qualitative differences between the error
distributions for the two score conditions.
Figure 8.13(a), and (b) show the PDFs for the combined trials of
all subjects on day four in condition E and K, respectively. Here we
did not use CCDFs in order to show that the error distributions for
trained subjects in (K) are often bimodal. Note the differences on the
y-axes in figure 8.13 (a), and (b). In the latter case, the distributions
are much less broad and some are even shallower than the normal
distribution. As a qualitative model, we extend our standard balancing
model (section 7.4) to include a threshold ² below which no control
actions take place. A comparison of the model with and without
threshold is shown in figure 8.13 (c). The threshold greatly reduces
the weight of the distribution tails. For sufficiently large ², p(y)
becomes bimodal. A short time series for the model with threshold is
shown in figure 8.13 (d).
In contrast to condition (S), the behaviour of (at least several)
subjects in (K) cannot be reproduced well by the model. Therefore,
testing for the power-law hypothesis in (K) using the same method
as in (S) is not well justified. If the test is performed anyway, the
high variability among the subjects in this condition shows again. The
hypothesis can be rejected only for 3 subjects on day four. However,
mean fitted exponents are very high at 6.8±0.8 (note that the algorithm
always returns an exponent, even if the fitted distribution is not a
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Figure 8.13.: Comparison of error distributions in the two score conditions
on day four, and appropriate model variations. In the upper row, PDFs are
shown for the combined trials of each subject in (a): (S), (b): (K). In (c),
and PDFs for two models are shown. Red line: τ = 250ms, tr = 210ms,
g = 1.1, τm = 145ms, σ = 1s−2. Blue line: A model with the same
parameters and an additional threshold ² = 1. For |y | < ², no control
actions are performed. In all PDFs, normal distributions are drawn as dotted
lines. (d): A part of the time series for the model with a threshold.
power law). Visually inspecting the distributions reveals that some
indeed appear to follow very steep power-laws (not shown). In any
case, the distributions are so steep that only a very small range of
values is observed in finite time series (fig. 8.13 (b)). Therefore, one
can hardly speak of scaling for any of the trials in (K). Also, average
p>-values are 0.19±0.07, respectively. This is much lower than in the
error condition (sec. 8.5.3).
Power Spectral Densities vary even more then the PSDs. As one
may expect from figure 8.4, some of them show peaks at very differ-
ent frequencies. Hence, no superimposed spectra are shown as the
result would be very confusing. Please turn to the next chapter for a
discussion of the results of this part of the thesis.
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9. Summary and Discussion
Human balancing dynamics are characterised by intermittent bursts
of control errors and distinct regimes of temporal correlations. These
features were ascribed to the interplay of reaction delays and parametric
(i.e. multiplicative) noise [CM02]. However, existing explanations for
multiplicative noise focus predominantly on execution noise and are
inconsistent with several experimental observations (section 7.1). In
contrast, a new model introduced in chapter 7 explains these empirical
findings in great detail. In this model, parametric noise arises from
the adaptive online estimation of parameters.
The following review and discussion of the results presented in the
previous chapters concludes our investigation of human balancing
behaviour. First, the main experimental and theoretical results are
summarised. Subsequently, we discuss why the new adaptive model
is consistent with experimental findings, while previous explanations
fail. Next, the structure and parameters of the new adaptive model are
discussed in more detail. We will then broaden the scope of the discus-
sion to consider other behavioural tasks and possible implications of
this work for our understanding of internal models in a more general
context, that is, mental models of the world that humans may use in
order to plan their behaviour. Finally, we briefly discuss possible future
theoretical and experimental opportunities that are directly connected
with this thesis. A much broader discussion including the relevance
of the theoretical results for completely different fields of research is
found in part IV.
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9.1. The critically adaptive model in brief
The balancing model (chapter 7), which is central to the previous
chapters, makes only few assumptions. First, human reaction times
close to tr = 200ms are compensated by using an internal model. This
is consistent with standard models of human motor control (chap. 5).
The major innovation in this model is the use of a forward model
based on recently observed trends. In simpler terms, a stick is balanced
by predicting where it is going to fall and moving the suspension point
towards the predicted position slightly faster. The model controller
has three parameters: A reaction time tr , a time constant for the
exponentially decaying weights of past observations τm , and a gain γ
which determines how fast predicted controller-target displacements
y are compensated. The task difficulty τ = 250ms in the model is
chosen to match the experimental conditions. Finally, the model is
driven by additive baseline fluctuations: Gaussian white noise which
represents the sum of all additive noise sources in the control system.
The amplitude of the noise σ only determines the absolute scale of the
fluctuations in the model; all other features like scaling exponents are
invariant. We therefore focus on normalised time-series and thereby
eliminate the influence of σ on the results.
Successful control (bringing the stick into the upright position)
removes predictable dynamics from the system. This creates a self-
similar instability where small |y | lead tomore uncertainty about future
dynamics, and vice versa. This Information Annihilation Instability
(sec. 7.2) also plays a major role in part III of this thesis.
9.2. VSB experiments
Our analysis in the previous chapters involves two VSB experiments.
That is, tasks where subjects control a cursor C to stabilise an un-
stable target T on a computer screen. The adaptive control model
can reproduce statistical features of the measured control errors |y |
quantitatively in great detail. First, large |y | are distributed according
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to a power law. Deviations from this description can be explained by
chance (sec 7.7). Second, the PSDs exhibit a broken power law with
a pronounced knee.
In the first experiment (sec. 6.2), the control problem is two-
dimensional and subjects interacted with the computer using a mouse.
Fitting the model to the experimental trials requires cautious, smooth
movements with gains just above one, and fast adaptation with τm
just below tr . The model further predicts that the position of the knee
in the PSD is determined by tr .
These findings raise the question of why subjects adapt on such short
timescales even in stationary experimental conditions. As an answer,
the model predicts that this control strategy reflects a nearly optimal
compromise between the elimination of random local trends and rare
large errors. The optimum is characterised by CCDF distributions
with a power law tail with slope ξ = 4 while experimental trials are
found in between 2, and 4. Therefore, we predicted that intense
training while minimising Var(y) should lead to exponents closer to
4, but not to a Gaussian distribution ([PP11], sec. 7.6). Training
with a different objective function, on the other hand, may lead to
completely different error statistics.
To test these predictions, a new task was developed. Since the
model only includes control errors in one dimension, in the new task
a slider is moved on a rail to control the cursor (fig. 8.1). After each
trial, a high score is shown. Subjects were randomly assigned to one
of two score conditions. (S): minimisation of the standard deviation
Std(y)=√Var(y), and (K): minimisation of the kurtosis Kurt(y) (i.e.
avoiding heavy-tailed distributions). All subjects recorded trials on
four subsequent days according to a strict training schedule.
On day four, differences between the error distributions for the
two conditions are highly significant. In (S), subjects were able to
closely follow the target with median standard deviations of just 1mm.
Median kurtoses were measured at 5.3, distinctively higher than the
kurtosis for a Gaussian distribution which is 3 (fig. 8.5). Over time,
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median tail exponents increased from 2.7 to 3.6 for single trials, and
from 2.1 to 3.9 for the combined trials of one day of each subject
(fig. 8.8). Therefore, subjects in this condition moved closer to the
optimum predicted by themodel. In (K), however, standard deviations
were 9.2mm, and kurtoses only 2.7. These subjects further used a
number of different strategies that avoid closely aligning C and T, and
thereby avoid the IAI (sec. 8.4).
At this point, one may ask whether the excess kurtosis in (S) is
due to the very small distance between C and T. For example, there
may be a lower threshold below which errors are not detectable by
the subjects, or additive, heavy tailed motor execution noise which
dominates during very small corrective movements. Therefore, dur-
ing two trials per day for each subject, we disturbed the movements
of T with additive Gaussian distributed noise. Thereby, the median
Std(y) in (S) is increased sixfold. This as high as for (K) for days two
and three, for both of which there is a highly significant difference
between the measured kurtoses for the two score conditions. How-
ever, in (S), the kurtoses during normal trials and noise trials are not
significantly different. Therefore, we can rule out the possibility that
error amplitudes per se (and thereby also the velocities at which T
and C move, see sec. A.9) have a significant effect on the shape of the
error distributions. This confirms one more prediction of the adaptive
control model.
For (K) Std(y) is increased in noise trials, too. A small increase
in Kurt(y) relative to the normal trials is found on day four (but
not on the other days), which is only just significant in one of two
tests. Therefore, it might be a chance result. Nevertheless, it is quite
remarkable that high and very noticeable amounts of artificial noise
(which also had to be slightly non-white to be less confusing) did not
have any more pronounced effects. If the increase in kurtosis on day
four were real, it would still go in the opposite direction of the effect
found during normal trials (low standard deviations leading to high
kurtoses). Therefore, the differences in kurtoses between the two score
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conditions cannot be attributed to different standard deviations per
se. As predicted by the IAI, rare extreme missteps are avoided only if
larger movements lift |y | above the unpredictable baseline noise.
The adaptive control model can fit the measured distributions for
both naive and trained subjects in (S) (see figs 8.10, 8.11, and 8.12).
Automatic fitting using the CCDFs and PSDs yields values for both
τm , and tr that significantly increase with training. Fitted gains γ,
however remain constant over time. The increment in reaction time is
very small, but it is confirmed by directly measuring linear responses
using the known perturbations during noise trials. This change in
reaction time also coincides with a significant shift in the position of
the knee in the PSD, as predicted by the model. Further, the fitted
parameters are very close to those measured during mouse-based tasks.
In contrast, subjects in (K) can only be approximated by a mod-
ified model since they employ a variety of different strategies, all of
which avoid proximity to the unstable fixed point. By introducing a
threshold to the model below which control errors are not corrected,
normalised error distributions become quantitatively very similar to
the experimental ones in (K) (fig. 8.13).
9.3. Existing explanations in the literature
Most motor control models include involuntary execution noise to
explain movement variability (sec. 5.2). However, this mechanism
only explains noise amplitudes up to few percent of the muscle force
independently of the task. The extreme bursts of fluctuations ob-
served in balancing tasks, however, indicate much higher amounts of
multiplicative noise1.
Furthermore, a task dependency is found in chapter 8. In two task
conditions, which only differ in the objective function that is conveyed
by a high score displayed after each trial, error distributions follow
1In [JdCHW02], 3% of motor unit noise were reported. E.g. in figs. 6.6 and 6.7,
the noise surpasses the average applied force. See also sec. 4.4, as well as figs. A.4,
and A.11 (d).
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completely different statistics (see above). In particular, subjects in
condition (S) exhibit lower standard deviations and heavier distribu-
tion tails (kurtoses) than subjects in (K). The higher errors and lower
kurtoses in (K) further coincide with higher velocities and acceler-
ations of the subjects’ hands (fig. A.12). We can therefore rule out
constant multiplicative noise in force generation generation (motor
unit noise), as well as classical speed-accuracy tradeoffs (e.g. Fitts’ law,
see sec. 5.2) as explanations of the intermittent error bursts: Neither
mechanism can explain a decrease of the bursting fluctuations for
increased movement amplitudes, velocities, and accelerations.
A prevalent explanation for the bursts of fluctuations in balancing
tasks is that high amounts of multiplicative noise drive the system
across a stability boundary. These fluctuations were further presumed
to be added by the CNS for stabilisation. (see secs. 6.1 and 6.3).
This mechanism may conceivably be task dependent and can explain
higher amounts of multiplicative noise than motor unit noise. A
conceptual similarity to the results presented in this thesis is that
the parametric noise is considered to be related to a useful control
strategy as opposed to limitations or even defects of the movement
apparatus. However, if there were a task dependency, and if the
noise were added for its allegedly stabilising effects, it should prevail
in difficult tasks and for large or fast movements. Neither is the
case: the intermittent bursting occurs in the scenario which is the
least demanding for the movement generation apparatus. That is, a
situation where subjects successfully minimise fluctuations and retain
control for minutes. Further, since subjects are able to retain control
in the face of either artificial perturbations or while generating large
voluntary movements themselves, the control task is far away from
any stability boundary. Therefore, we have to reject both assertions of
this mechanism. This result is confirmed by the recent finding that
easy tasks lead to more heavily-tailed error distributions than difficult
tasks [MFC+11]–another observation that is reproduced only by the
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adaptive balancing model2. In addition, bursts of control errors in the
experiment described in chapter 8 occur suddenly and without the slow
buildup which is typical for processes with multiplicative execution
noise (sec. A.8). Furthermore, the standard model for multiplicative
execution noise during balancing exhibits several problems (sec. 6.3).
These include the inability of the model to reproduce the scaling
relations found in VSB tasks, as well as unrealistic parameters3
On a final note, a semi-predictive controller was suggested for bal-
ancing tasks with delay in one purely theoretical study [IMS13]: A
proportional-derivative-acceleration controller corresponds to a predic-
tive controller without including the controller’s own contributions in
the prediction. It was shown–unsurprisingly–to perform better than a
proportional-derivative controller without acceleration feedback. No
argument was given as to why this controller should be biologically
more plausible than an actually predictive one. The only missing
component would be an efference copy which is commonly assumed
to a be available in the motor cortex ([WDF11]). The study does not
include a comparison with experimental fluctuations. Therefore, it
does not provide a notable contribution to the present discussion.
9.4. Rail- vs mouse-based VSB
During one-dimensional VSB, error distributions for subjects in (S)
closely resemble those in the earlier, mouse-based experiment. This
2See sec. A.6. This finding is highly non-trivial. First, due to the well known speed-
accuracy tradeoffs, testing the system at its absolute limits should increase the
chance to measure multiplicative execution noise. Second, purposeful addition
of multiplicative noise which hypothetically could have a stabilising effect should
be more prevalent in difficult tasks.
3In particular, the model assumes high amounts of friction that are not present
neither physically while balancing a freely moving stick on the fingertip, nor
in the VSB tasks discussed in this thesis. The main problem here is that the
model by Cabrera and Milton is not predictive. A second order variant of our
adaptive (and predictive) control model allows for a deeper understanding as to
why balancing dynamics can appear to be overdamped. See sec. 7.8
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finding is a non-trivial test of a model prediction: the dominating
effects only rely on the absolute distance between C and T.
One may ask, however, why no significant signs of an improved
performance after training were found in themouse-based study. There
are several possible answers to this question. In the study described in
chapter 6.2, the number of subjects was much lower than in the rail-
based one (chap. 8). Subjects in the mouse-based study further had an
irregular training schedule: For some subjects, there were days without
any trials in between the days were the experiments took place. There
were also many different task conditions and some subjects recorded
trials in different conditions on the same day (sec. 7.7). Finally, subjects
in the mouse-based experiments had no objective feedback on their
performance. We therefore expect that more controlled experiments
using a mouse would lead to training effects that are very similar to
those reported for the rail-based setup.
9.5. Structure and parameters of the adaptive model
As discussed above, many experimental findings are reproduced only
by the adaptive control model (chap. 7). Another important feature
of the model is its biological plausibility. First, the model is consistent
with standard models of motor control and the action-perception
cycle. The crucial change with respect to these established findings is
the introduction of online parameter estimation as a dominant source
of parametric noise (fig. 7.1).
Second, the model is well-suited for a neuronal implementation: In
addition to leaky integration, our model only requires normalisation
which may, too, be an ubiquitous neuronal mechanism in the brain
[CH12]. This is a desirable feature, since the low reaction times of
balancing subjects (close to simple reaction times for visuomotor tasks)
might be interpreted as an indication of a control strategy which is
effectively automated at the neuronal level.
Since the model includes only three free parameters for the con-
troller, automated fits to single trials are highly feasible (see above).
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These fits suggest that well trained subjects in (S) adapt slower and
also react slightly slower than untrained ones, while the gain of their
corrective movements remains unchanged (see above). This finding
corresponds to moving closer to the optimum in figure 7.5 (a). It
may therefore be seen as an indication that subjects successfully opti-
mise their trade-off in between average and freak errors within their
biological limits.
The fitted reaction times were validated using direct measurements
(figs. 8.9, and 8.10). Since there is no evidence that subjects could
possibly react much faster (sec. 5.1), reaction times require no further
justification. However, the combination of rapid estimation and
smooth movement execution warrants some further discussion beyond
the finding, that only these model parameters are consistent with the
experimental data (see e.g. sec. A.2, and A.3).
9.5.1. Memory
The controller’s memory decay time constant τm determines the time
scale on which it estimates the time constant τ of the control problem.
As it turns out, values of τm just below tr minimise Var(y). A con-
troller that adapts rapidly to observed trends leads to smaller average
errors than a controller that uses the true τ. These exploitable trends
during which the system deviates from its average dynamics emerge
from random perturbations of the smooth control movements. Since
eliminating these trends increases the system’s susceptibility to the IAI,
there is an optimal tradeoff in between the two effects.
However, we found that the behaviour of naive subjects is best
explained with a model that adapts slightly faster than optimal in the
above sense. Over time, trained subjects appear to move closer to
the predicted optimum4. There are several possible interpretations
4When comparing the prediction (figure 7.5 (b)) and the subjects’ estimated ex-
ponents (figure 8.8), subjects appear to be closer to being optimal than the
automated model parameter fits (figure 8.10 (c)) suggest. However, the distri-
butions of these estimates do overlap and also show the same trend over time.
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for this result. First, differences in movement execution between the
model and real subjects may add a bias to the estimated parameters
or the predicted optimum. Yet, the effects of training in stationary
conditions indicate that the result is at least qualitatively correct.
A shorter than optimal memory on naive subjects may have a variety
of reasons. At first, subjects have little knowledge about the system
details. Therefore, they might construct an ad-hoc forward model by
extracting trends. Adapting on very short timescales may indicate that
subjects initially expect the system to be non-stationary. Furthermore,
since we also found an increase in reaction times tr with training, there
might be a neuronal tradeoff in between slower adaptation and tr .
Alternatively, there may be neuronal noise which accumulates during
a more prolonged integration of observations. In this case, the CNS
would have to optimise structural details that are not included in the
model.
However, even naive subjects are most likely within in the param-
eter range where the dependence of Std(y) on τm is rather shallow
(fig. 7.5 (b)). Therefore, subjects may optimise for additional factors.
They might minimise the use of memory resources, underestimate
the impact of rare extreme events, interpret small errors as correctable
motor errors and large errors as singular externally triggered events, or
be risk-seeking. All of these factors have been suggested to be relevant
in other motor tasks (see sec. 5.3). In addition, if naive subjects used
imperfect internal models, fast adaptation would be useful to realign
the internal model of the world with observations.
Note, that exponents for experimental time series have to be estimated from very
limited sample sizes. Further, even on a single day, real time-series are potentially
not perfectly stationary. We did not quantify the subjects’ distances from the
predicted optimum more rigorously, since it presumably cannot be reliably dis-
tinguished how much such a measure would depend on both, subject parameters
and model abstractions.
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9.5.2. Movement execution
A real controller cannot remove predicted errors immediately. Instead,
it has to continuously approach the desired state. While the adaptive
model does not include physical movement limitations like finite mus-
cle forces in detail, they are still approximated. In reality, the planning
and execution of movements is a complex, high-dimensional problem
which may include nonlinearities and non-stationary parameters. A
very prominent feature of real hand trajectories are bell shaped velocity
profiles [Sch02]. They might be considered one of the most obvious
goals of a model extension.
Luckily, however, the linear first-order approximation to continuous
movement execution has proven to suffice for the model to reproduce
many experimental findings even for single subjects in much detail.
These results range from error distributions and spectra to linear re-
sponse functions. Only some stereotypical features of the shapes of
single error bursts (or peaks) are reproduced merely approximately
(sec. A.8). Nevertheless, the underlying mechanism that initiates these
bursts is based on a very general principle (sec 7.2). Hence, highly sim-
ilar results were found for a second order model (sec. 7.8). Therefore,
in order to avoid unnecessary model complexity and overfitting, the
first order model can be considered appropriate for many purposes.
Statistical features of experimental time-series are best reproduced
by the model for low gains 0.5< γ< 1.2. No correlation was found
between γ and the amount of training of the subjects. This may
indicate that cautious movements are optimal given biological costs or
constraints (for an overview see sec. 5.3). Subjects might, for example,
minimise effort, smoothness, or optimise a speed-accuracy tradeoff.
This result is neutral with respect to different strategies for muscle
contractions, including even intermittent activations, as long as the
resulting trajectories are smooth. Note, however, that the model
parameter fits represent averages over whole trials. Therefore, subjects
might act cautiously most of the time, yet occasionally perform ballistic
movements.
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Subjects in (K), that is, minimising kurtoses, generated regular os-
cillations which increased Std(y)much more than necessary according
to the model. One may speculate that these strategies are easier to
perform than constantly stopping and accelerating again. Since small
Std(y) were not directly rewarded in (K), subjects may have chosen to
create substantial amounts of observable and predictable movements.
Note, however, that T moves faster for larger |y |. Therefore, main-
taining easier detectable deterministic movements is in conflict with
minimising effort. Faster and larger movements may also potentially
reduce accuracy (sec. 5.2), although we found no evidence that this is
was a problem (sec. 8.6). Still, the finding that most subjects in (K)
seem to prefer similar standard deviations (fig. 8.3) might indicate an
optimal tradeoff.
9.6. Some similar and dissimilar tasks in the literature
9.6.1. Postural sway
Maintaining an upright posture has previously been compared to
the stabilisation of an inverted pendulum (sec. 5.4). Compared to
stick balancing, however, upright standing is a much more complex
task featuring proprioceptive, visual, and vestibular feedback [LSB77,
FTM92]. Ankles stiffness and local feedback loops act dampening,
and are even sufficient to stand. Yet, the different sensory modalities
are integrated dynamically [vdKP11], and possibly used predictively
(e.g. [WPP+98]).
Despite this increase in complexity, postural sway time-series still
exhibit three distinct scaling regimes that are very similar to those
found for balancing errors (sec. A.5). However, the natural frequency
of quiet standing is on the order of one second [WPP+98]. Accord-
ingly, the transition from superdiffusion for short timescales (high
frequencies) to subdiffusion also occurs closer to 1s than for balancing
(compare fig. A.6 (b) to [CDL94, CC95]. Possible causes for this
shift may include the higher inertia of the full body compared hand
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movements, or additional processing time required for the integration
of the additional sensory modalities. There are, however, even more
possibilities. For instance, it has been reported that maintaining bal-
ance with minimal effort is most likely prioritised over minimal sway
[KZJ11].
Whether IAI plays a substantial role during upright standing is
unknown and most likely context dependent. It could, however,
provide an interesting new explanation (in addition to minimising
effort) for as to why subjects exhibit large sway amplitudes during
normal standing.
9.6.2. Intermittent- or bang-bang control
A possible source for confusion lies in the different uses of the term
“intermittent”. In this thesis, intermittent fluctuations of control
errors are discussed. That is, the alternation between phases with
small control errors and bursts of extreme fluctuations. Intermittent
control, in contrast, denotes control strategies with discontinuous
control actions. Such strategies have been discussed in the context of
humanmotor control. The discussion becomes evenmore complicated
since there are several different types of intermittent control strategies.
Direct evidence for the intentional use of intermittent control has so
far only been reported in very specific tasks.
In one such task, subjects stood on a balancing board and had
to shift their weight in order to regulate a force in a virtual control
task while simultaneously keeping their own balance [SFV+09]. The
virtual task was to stabilise an inverted pendulum with friction. When
the board was used with a low gain, subjects tended to apply forces
that were bimodally distributed. Either a maximum force was applied
in one of two possible directions, or the pendulum was allowed to
drift freely. Velocities were still unimodally distributed.
In another experiment, a simulated unstable load with very high
friction was investigated [LGLG11]. This task may be considered
similar to balancing an inverted pendulum inside of a honey pot.
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Subjects exerted a control force using a joystick. Subjects who were
instructed to not use the joystick continuously, but to gently tap on
the joystick with their fingers, preferred this method and performed
slightly better than when using continuous control.
These strategies are similar to a bang-bang controller (on-off con-
troller) which switches between discrete states like, for example, a
thermostat. Such controllers can be optimal in certain certain scenar-
ios. In the two experiments discussed here, however, their effectivity
likely stems from the very specific task conditions.
Some studies argued that intermittent control has advantages over
continuous control. However, such conclusions were usually drawn
from the comparison with proportional-derivative control and there-
fore don’t necessarily apply to all types of continuous control [KZJ11].
Others argued that strategies with a minimal change of acceleration
were the least susceptible to multiplicative noise ([HW98, FS01],
sec. 5.3). By this argument, some intermittent strategies like bang-
bang control would have severe disadvantages in many human motor
control tasks.
In principle, intermittent control and even bang-bang control is
compatible with both predictive control and IAI, as shown by the
model with continuous dynamics and pulsed control in figure A.14.
The experimental observations in easy VSB tasks, however, are best
described by smooth continuous control movements. This is consistent
with vast parts of the motor control literature (sec. 5.3). That is not
to say that subjects might not occasionally stop moving during a
trial. However, only one subject in score condition (K) use a strategy
involving frequent stopping (sec. 8.4). Also, subjects may sometimes
perform ballistic movements when extreme errors have to be corrected
quickly (sec. A.8). That is, when subjects realise that a large distance
between C ans T has to be corrected to not lose control, they may use
maximal velocities and accelerations over a very short period to catch
up. Yet, subjects on average act more cautiously (sec. A.7, fig. 8.10 (b)).
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Nevertheless, control with smooth movements may still be consis-
tent with discontinuous force generation. For example, an intermittent
activation of muscles may be an energy-saving alternative to impedance
control (i.e. high stiffness) and therefore an epiphenomenon of effort
minimisation [ATN13]. Muscle activations could be measured ex-
perimentally using, for example, electromyography. However, how
muscle contractions are controlled in detail only marginally concerns
the IAI which is initiated during movement planning.
9.6.3. Sequential effects & Bayesian estimation
In many behavioural tasks, subjects respond faster and more accurately
to stimuli that are consistent with a recent pattern. Here we discuss
one investigation of such sequential effects, and the connection of the
adaptive models presented in this thesis to Bayesian estimation.
Sequential effects have been linked to the common tendency in
humans and animals to mistake chance results for hidden patterns or
causes. In [YC08] it is investigated whether they reflect the engage-
ment of mechanisms that otherwise serve for adapting to a changing
environment. To model sequential effects in a two-alternative forced
choice task ([VNB+02]), two different Bayesian models are intro-
duced. In both models, the probability γ that a stimulus is repeated is
a hidden parameter that has to be estimated. In a fixed belief model,
γ is assumed to be constant over all trials. In a dynamic belief model,
γ changes according to a Markov process. Only the latter model can
explain the behavioural data. It is further shown that Bayes-optimal
prediction in this case is well approximated by a linear filter that
weights past observations exponentially.
As noted above, the presumably faster than optimal adaptation in
naive subjects might be considered a sign that subjects initially seek
robustness in potentially non-stationary tasks. This interpretation
is consistent with the hypothesis proposed in [YC08] that humans
apparently act sub-optimal in certain behavioural experiments because
they are adapted to non-stationary environments. It is also consistent
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with the finding that subjects in VSB tasks can tolerate a frequently
changing time constant τ ([PREP07], fig. 7.6). As a final note, ap-
plying recursive Bayesian estimation to the a discrete-time balancing
problem with a hidden time constant leads to a Kalman-like filter.
Adding a “locality bias”, that is, making the estimator assume a rapidly
changing τ, yields the minimal control model described in section 7.3.
This alternative derivation, however, is quite lengthy and does not add
considerable new insights. It is therefore omitted.
9.6.4. Change Blindness
While we experience a detailed and stable visual world, evidence sug-
gests that little information is preserved across views [SL97]. Unless
a change in a visual scene evokes a localisable transient on the retina,
people will generally not detect it. For example, in an experiment
[SL98] one experimenter asked pedestrians for directions. This inter-
action was briefly interrupted by a door which was carried between
the experimenter and the pedestrian. During this interruption, the
occluded experimenter was replaced by a different experimenter. Only
half of the pedestrians detected the change. This phenomenon is called
change blindness.
In another experiment [TBHS03], subjects had to sort blocks of
different sizes and colours in a virtual reality environment onto one
of two conveyor belts. After picking up a block, subjects made a
saccade (eye movement) towards the conveyor belts. Sometimes the
blocks size was changed during this saccade. If size was a task-irrelevant
feature, subjects generally failed to detect the change when they looked
at the object again. Even though subjects were instructed to report
possible bugs in the virtual reality program, 88% of the subjects never
reported a change. If the block size was relevant for a decision that was
made before the change, approximately one third of the changes were
detected. If a decision based on the block size had to be made after
the change, half of the changes were detected. The authors suggested
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that subjects extracted information from the fixation point only “just
in time” when needed to solve the current goal.
Nevertheless, human memory is not generally bad. For example,
when shown hundreds or thousands of photographs, humans can later
accurately (sometimes 95% correct) remember which ones they have
seen before. Despite this ability, subjects cannot detect whether they
are shown a manipulated version of the image, as long as the gist of
the scene remains intact (summary of several papers in [SL98]).
One might argue that these findings have a certain similarity to
human behaviour in balancing tasks. This analogy becomes more
obvious if the adaptive model is paraphrased as follows: Subjects
internalise an abstract notion of the task of catching a target that
constantly moves away from the cursor. The detailed information
necessary to plan the corrective movements, however, is extracted
from the observations just in time.
9.7. Conclusion and Outlook
We found that subjects in VSB tasks most likely employ highly dy-
namic forward models. That is, movement planning strategies which
are based on information about predictable dynamics which is ex-
tracted from observations on the fly. Such a strategy presumably
allows for behavioural flexibility with minimal demand on working
memory. It was shown to be consistent with a minimisation of average
errors. This type of controller naturally precludes its own ability to
predict future dynamics of the control system. In particular, a tradeoff
has to be made between the reduction of average errors by eliminating
even local trends that arise by chance, and rare extreme missteps due
to an increased susceptibility to noise. This tradeoff is not fixed. In-
stead, training under different task objectives can fundamentally alter
a subject’s behaviour in a balancing task.
These results highlight that action and perception are subsystems
of a greater system. The interaction of these subsystems can give rise
to emergent effects. For example, it can usually be expected that the
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environment stores information about itself. Internal models don’t
necessarily need to replicate more of this information than required
for a decision at the very moment in time where it is made. This is
particularly true if adaptive behaviour is favourable anyway due to
incomplete information, non-stationarities, or random perturbations.
However, as discussed above, while such strategies may be very flexible
they might also lead to phenomena like sequential effects and change
blindness. If interaction with the environment eliminates dynamics
which are required to observe information on the systems structure, a
controller runs into an IAI.
In contrast, many existing motor control models treat movement
variability and perception as separate problems. For balancing in
particular, the most prevalent model in the literature (sec. 6.3) assumes
non-adaptive behaviour, and enormous amounts of multiplicative
execution noise–a hypothesis that we can consider highly unlikely
based to the results presented in the previous chapters.
Most other motor models are adaptive and feature some kind of
optimisation (sec. 5.1). However, perception and control strategies
are typically optimised separately. To estimate hidden system states,
many models use Kalman Filters which, in order to calculate the op-
timal weight for new observations (Kalman gain), are constructed
with detailed knowledge about the structure of the control system. In
addition, a typical control strategy is optimised according to some
criteria like, for example, minimising jerk. To account for experi-
mentally observed movement variability, these models often include
multiplicative execution noise. However, as discussed above, the com-
mon attribution of movement variability to execution noise alone is
not sufficient to explain empirical findings in balancing tasks.
One possible future direction for motor control modelling is to
consider interactions between the different subsystems that contribute
to behaviour. This idea raises many questions. At which stages of the
action-perception cycle is adaptivity necessary? Which cost functions
lead to holistic strategies for perception and control that can reproduce
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experimental findings? Are ideal observers necessary or even possible
without excessive training for any given task? Is it possible that the
CNS generally uses generic forward models that are adapted to a given
task as needed? Alternatively, might humans even perform some kind
of model-free control using ad-hoc-predictions? If so, can predictions
be made across different tasks?
Normative models usually have to be constructed for any given
tasks by the experimenter. Instead, some of the above questions may
potentially be studied in the context of Optimal Feedback Control
(OFC) . This framework allows the calculation of control laws that
optimise a mixed cost function which specifies accuracy and energetic
costs [TJ02, FW11]. OFC predicts that feedback gains are task depen-
dent, vary throughout the task, and that task-irrelevant fluctuations
will be ignored. In contrast, gains in Kalman Feedback Control (KFC)
models are adjusted to minimise perception errors independently of
the task.
As more concrete follow-ups to the previous chapters, several studies
could be conducted. First, the influence of the task difficulty deter-
mined by the system time constant τ may be studied quantitatively in
more detail. In particular, how the scaling of control errors changes
when τ is varied close to the reaction time tr could allow to estimate
how much multiplicative noise arises during movement planning as
opposed to movement execution. Similar results might be obtained
by comparing the influence of different levels of artificial noise in a
large number of trials. The differences in movement amplitudes be-
tween the two most extreme conditions should be as large as possible.
However, according to the presently available results, the influence of
execution noise appears to be very small.
Next, first- and second-order target dynamics, as well as one-, two-,
and three dimensional balancing tasks could be compared. Of partic-
ular interests is a detailed comparison of VSB and real stick balancing.
While the results presented in this thesis should in theory be very
general, this hypothesis remains to be tested empirically. A further
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question is how far IAI is relevant for postural sway. Such a study
may directly compare fluctuations during stick balancing and upright
standing. It is very likely that different results would be obtained for
upright standing under different conditions (e.g. on one leg or an
unstable platform), and for different task objectives.
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A.1. Significance of power-law fits
Here we demonstrate that the CCDF for the continuous balancing
model follows a true power law. When temporal correlations are
properly taken into account, remaining deviations from an analytical
power law can be explained by chance. This finding further justifies
the use of the model as surrogate data for tests of significance in the
experimental data. These and more results were published in the
supplement to [PP11].
A.1.1. Motivation
Whether differences between two CCDFs can be explained by chance
alone can be assessed using significance tests like the KS-test. How-
ever, there are also systematic sources for deviations. Experimental
data often is only approximated by a certain analytical distribution of
independent random variables, but does not truly follow this idealisa-
tion. In very large data sets, even the smallest differences may become
significant. A common source for such deviations are correlations,
including higher order ones. Then, the measurements are not per-
fectly independent anymore and deviations are larger than analytically
predicted for absolutely independent random variables. While prob-
ability distribution and autocorrelation are completely independent
features, statistical tests usually assume Independent and Identically
Distributed samples. Yet, every time-series with a sufficiently high
sampling rate violates this assumption.
A common problem for testing power laws in finite data sets is that
often only the tail of a distribution follows a power-law in the limit
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of very large events. When determining a cutoff above which to fit,
a non-trivial trade-off has to be made. On the one hand, systematic
deviations due to imperfect convergence to the power law are more
prominent for smaller events. On the other hand, many fewer samples
are available for very large event magnitudes. Last not least, it is
possible that a distribution has no hard cutoff, but a slow gradual
convergence towards a power-law.
A.1.2. Reducing correlations
To assess how well an analytical power law fits the CCDF-tails of
simulated time series, we proceed in two steps. First, we show how
deviations from the power-law in the model time series depend on
temporal correlations. Second, we introduce a method to compare
the quality of fits between a given distribution and surrogate data.
This is done by comparing how well model time series and power law
distributed independent random variates are fitted by an analytical
power law.
Figure A.1 (a) shows the CCDFs of balancing errors made by the
control model (sec. 7.4), and a fit. For large events, the distribution is
approximately linear in double logarithmic coordinates until it takes a
sudden break at the largest event. The reason for this effect is that the
largest few data points all belong to a single peak in the time series.
To reduce the correlations between the analysed events, distributions
of subsets of the same time series are shown where only one event
every second (fig. A.1 (b)) and every 10 seconds (fig. A.1 (c)) were
used.1 Finally, figure A.1 (d) shows the distribution for independent
random variates that follow a power-law above a threshold. A method
to quantitatively evaluate the goodness of the respective fits is the
KS-statistic. This nonparametric test calculates the maximum distance
D between two distributions. For independent random variates, the
p-values can then be calculated independently of the actual shape
1Note how this choice of subsampling intervals relates to the correlation structure
investigated in figure A.6
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Figure A.1.: ( a): Complementary cumulative distribution of balancing er-
rors |y | made by the control model described sec. 7.4 with reaction time
tr = 170ms, gain γ = 1.07 and memory time constant τm = 140ms. The
system time constant was τ= 250ms. Time discretisation was h = 11.8ms.
Red diagonal lines: power law fits. Short red horizontal lines: Hill-estimator
cutoff optimising the KS-statistics. (b), (c): Distributions of subsets of the
same time-series as in (a), but with only one value of |y | every ∆t = 1 and
∆t = 10 seconds used respectively. (d) Independent random variates that
are distributed according to a Gaussian below a threshold xth = 2.5 and
according to to a power-law with ξ= 2.5 above. The exact analytical shape
of the distribution was obtained by requiring the PDF and its first derivative
to be continuous at xc . The variates were then obtained from uniform ones
using inverse transform sampling. pKS-values refer to tabulated p-values for
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics. For the p>-values, 1000 time series with
random variates like in (d) were generated and a power-law was fitted to each
one. The p>-values refer to the fraction of times that the KS-statistics of a fit
was worse than for the one distribution depicted in the respective subfigure.
As the correlations in the model time series decrease, both goodness of fit
tests converge towards those for the IID variates.
125
A. Appendix
of the distributions that are tested against each other. Here, we call
these common p-values pKS values. They are stated for each respective
subplot in figure A.1. The probability that the deviations of model
distributions from an analytical power-law are explained by chance
alone increases as the correlations decrease. When only one event every
10s is taken into account, the pKS-value for this particular time series
even reaches 0.9. That is, even though the largest approximately 5 data
points appear to deviate from the power law, even larger deviations
are to be expected by chance alone according to the KS-statistics. On
average, of course, one expects p-values values of 0.5 for two identical
distributions. Commonly, p-values below 0.05 lead to the rejection of
the hypotheses, that the observed deviations between two distributions
can be assessed to chance alone.
A.1.3. Testing for convergence
The previous method has several disadvantages. First, massive sub-
sampling is required. Applied to real data sets containing at most 106
events, only 103 events are left over. Since only few of these events
belong to the distribution tail, it spans less than one order of mag-
nitude of control errors. Second, reducing the data set reduces the
discriminatory power of the KS-Test. Third, to use as many data
points as possible in smaller data sets and avoid fitting random kinks,
it is useful to calculate fits using a range of cutoffs and then use only
the one that minimises a loss function. We exclusively used the cut-
off that minimises the KS-D-value. From our experience, various
criteria generally tend to underestimate the cutoff if the tested range
includes too small events. This additional complication may decrease
the goodness of some fits.
To avoid these problems, we determine p-values by numerically
calculating the probability that the KS-statistics of appropriate sur-
rogate data shows bigger deviations from the respective fits than the
tested distribution2. This p-value is called p> in the following, and in
2A similar method without respecting correlations is discussed in [CSN09].
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figure A.1. Again, we expect this value to be 0.5 on average for data
sets drawn from exactly the same distribution.
In principle, calculating p> requires no subsampling. Unfortunately,
power-law-distributed random variates with appropriate correlations
are not readily available. Therefore, we here compare very large sub-
sampled model time series to independent random variates, allowing
us to maintain a constant sample size while reducing correlations3.
Figure A.2 (a) shows the average p> for model time series with
different amounts of subsampling while the total number of events
was held constant. That is, correlations are reduced without reducing
the number of analysed events. Therefore, the observed convergence
towards 0.5 for low correlations is not caused by a loss of power of the
test. However, virtually identically results are obtained if the sample
size is not kept constant [PP11]. Similar results are also found for
different parameter sets including controller τm that minimise mean
squared control errors (not shown).
We tested three different constant sample sizes. As the number
of events is increased from the red curve in figure A.2 to the blue
one, the test becomes more discriminative. Naively, one might have
expected the opposite, that is, the finite correlation length to become
insignificant for sufficiently large time series. However, the KS-Test
assumes that the maximum distance D between the empirical cumu-
lative distribution function of n IID samples of a random variable
and the true underlying distribution scales as D∝ 1/pn. This scaling
is violated for correlated samples, for which convergence is slower.
Therefore, while D still converges towards zero, calculated pKS-values
3Minor problems with the described method may still be expected because the
exact correlations in the tested time series and the surrogate ones may differ. Also,
distributions frommodel and experimental time series are convex for small |y | and
then usually become slightly concave when converging towards an approximately
straight line in log-log coordinates. The distributions of the transformed random
variates we use for comparison (fig. A.1 (d)) are convex up to the threshold and
then exactly follow the power law by construction. However, these potential
pitfalls turned out not to be very problematic.
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Figure A.2.: Significance tests with different amounts of decorrelation by
subsampling. (a) Probability, that the KS-statistics for power law fits for
independent random variates that follow a true power law above a threshold
is worse than for control errors from the continuous control model. For
each data point, 103 model time series were compared to 103 different sets
of random variates each. (b): Probability, according to the two-sided KS-
statistics, that the tails of two simulations of the continuous control model
follow the same distribution. For each data point, 102 tuples of model
time-series were compared to each other. In both (a) and (b), parameters
were chosen as in fig. A.1 except for trial lengths. Here the total number of
tested samples from the model was held constant for each ∆t at 104 (red),
105 (green) and 106 (blue) analysed control errors. For example, in order
to get 106 control errors that occurred 10s separated from each other, each
simulated time series contained 8.5·108 steps before subsampling. To restrict
the analysis to the distribution tails, cutoffs for the Hill estimator were set
to use only the larger half of the log-range of the ccdf. For example, for
sets consisting of 106 events, only the largest 103 ones were used. Dashed
lines: A p-value of 0.5 is expected for a comparison of IID samples drawn
from identically distributed populations. Dotted line: significance level
p> = 0.05. As correlations in the model time series decrease, KS-statistics
converge towards those for the IID variates–albeit slower in (b) than in (a).
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also converge towards zero instead of keeping an average of 0.5 as is
the case for independent samples.
This effect can also be demonstrated numerically. However, since
we don’t have a method to generate power law distributed random
variates with arbitrary correlations, figure A.2 (b) shows analogous
results for a two-sided test. Here, the tails of two time series for
the same model with identical parameters are compared. Just like in
figure A.2 (a), correlations lead to an underestimation of the amount
of deviations expected for a given sample size, and therefore low p-
values. Convergence towards 0.5 for subsampled time-series is even
slower than in the one-sided test. Most notably, for a fixed amount
of subsampling p-values decrease when the number of samples is
increased. This demonstrates that the KS-test indeed becomes more
sensitive to correlations for larger sample sizes. We found similar
results for correlated Gaussian random variates (not shown), but could
not find an example where correlations become insignificant for large
sample sets.
In conclusion, we cannot reject the hypothesis that model error
distributions follow a power-law in the limit for large errors. This result
justifies the use of the model as surrogate data for the experimental
time series. Subsampling is not required in this case, since the model
time-series exhibit temporal correlations that are very similar to those
in the experimental time-series. P-values for VSB-experiments are
discussed in sections 7.7, 8.5.3, and 8.8. Some more examples are
shown in the supplement to [PP11].
A.2. Model with increased gain and memory
As discussed in section 7.5, realistic time series for the balancing model
are obtained for a combination of cautiously performed control with
γ slightly above one, and fast adaptation with τm ≤ tr . Increasing
either γ or τm increases λ1 which can even exceed λ2 (not shown). In
that case, the characteristic knee shape of the experimental spectra is
not reproduced. Further, the power law scaling of the control errors
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Figure A.3.: Comparison of experimental time series (thin coloured lines)
with the balancing model in a slow adaptation, high gain regime (thick black
lines). Parameters: τm = 1s, γ= 5, tr = 180ms, τ = 250ms. As opposed
to the combination of smaller τm and γ, here (a) the onset of the power
law in the probability distribution, and (b) the characteristic knee in the
experimental power spectra is not reproduced.
y vanishes if only τm is increased (fig. 7.5 (b)). Increasing also γ
amplifies control errors again, thereby reestablishing a power law tail.
However, the characteristic shapes of the CCDF and PSD are not
recovered, as shown in figure A.3.
A.3. No adaptation and multiplicative execution noise
Figure A.4 shows a non-adaptive (yet predictive) controller which
is driven into the critical regime by precisely tuned parametric exe-
cution noise. This model does not reproduce experimental spectra.
It also features a softer onset of the CCDF scaling than observed in
the experimental time-series and for the adaptive model. For this
model, the shape of the error distribution depends on both the addi-
tive and multiplicative parts of the noise. Therefore, in contrast to the
adaptive model, the overall scaling cannot be chosen independently
from the tail exponent. Most significantly, the error distribution only
resembles a power law for very specific parameter choices. No pa-
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Figure A.4.: Comparison of experimental time series (thin coloured lines)
and a modified balancing model where the estimator 1/ϑ˜ has been replaced
by the true system time constant τ (thick black lines). To obtain power laws,
parametric noise has been introduced by choosing the scaling for the driving
noise as σ (t ) = 1+ 0.2 · |y˜(t )|. Other parameters: γ = 1.1, tr = 200ms,
τ= 250ms. As opposed to the adaptive model (sec. 7.5), here both (a) the
onset of the power law in the CCDF is slightly too shallow, and (b) the
characteristic knee in the PSD is not reproduced at all.
rameter combination reproduces the experimental spectra. See also
section A.8.
A.4. Model high-frequency response.
Figure A.5 (a) shows the PSD for the balancing model (sec. 7.5)
simulated with very short discretisation steps. The scaling converges
towards values of 2 for high frequencies. Figure A.5 (b) shows the
model driven by strongly low-pass filtered noise. The scaling exponent
λ1 is at most weakly affected while the high frequency scaling exponent
λ2 is doubled. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis, that λ1
mainly characterises active control behaviour while λ2 characterises
intrinsic noise and passive damping properties of the system. The
filtering also affects the small resonances close to the reaction time
found in the experimental time series.
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Figure A.5.: (a): Power spectrum for the balancing model (sec. 7.4), but
simulated with much smaller discretisation steps. Parameters: tr = 180ms,
g = 1.1, τm = 120ms, τ= 250ms. (b): Power spectrum for a model with
the same parameters, but driven by low-pass filtered noise with a time-
constant τlp = 0.5s.
A.5. Variance- and displacement scaling
Multi-scaling in diffusive processes is sometimes investigated with
different measures than those used throughout this thesis. Here, we
apply two popular measures that allow to compare VSB to other pro-
cesses. Figure A.6 (a) shows the dependence of the standard deviation
of the series of increments y(t +∆t )− y(t ). For short increments,
the scaling exponent of one characterises hyper-diffusive behaviour
(i.e. positive correlations). Around increments of 10s the scaling ap-
proaches the expected value for an uncorrelated random walk of 0.5.
Very similar behaviour has been reported for stock-market time series
[MS00].
Figure A.6 (b) shows the dependence of mean square displacements
between control errors E(y(t +∆t )2− y(t )2) on the time ∆t by which
they are separated. Again, hyperdiffusion is observed for small ∆t .
For the smallest timescales, experimental time-series are slightly more
correlated then those from the model. Like the power spectra for very
high frequencies, this deviation is most likely due to passive damping
which is not included in the model. For ∆t in between the reaction
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Figure A.6.: Scaling of (a): the standard deviation of the cumulated mag-
nitudes, and (b): mean displacement for different time intervals ∆t . The
analysed time-series for model (thick black lines) and experiments (thin
coloured line) are the same as in fig. 7.4. The dashed line in (a) indicates the
scaling of a random walk (H = 0.5).
time and 10s, the scaling corresponds to subdiffusion. For even higher
∆t , saturation is observed. This is expected for mean-reverting pro-
cesses. Similar scaling regimes for displacements have been reported
before for center of pressure trajectories of upright standing humans
[CDL94, CC95]. They have been speculated to represent time scales
dominated by open- and closed-loop control. While this idea is basi-
cally consistent with the structure of the adaptive control model, the
latter one does not include a mechanism for open-loop control like
damping of joints by reflexes or mechanical properties.
A.6. Influence of the task difficulty
It was recently reported that easy VSB-tasks lead to more heavily tailed
control error distributions than difficult ones ([MFC+11], Fig. 4). A
more difficult task involves an unstable system with a shorter time
constant. This corresponds to, for example, a shorter stick. As shown
in figure A.7 this result is reproduced by the balancing model.
This finding may seem counter-intuitive and the opposite effect
can be found for systems with very strong multiplicative execution
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Figure A.7.: Comparison of CCDFs for the model (sec. 7.4) in a hard balanc-
ing task with τ= 100ms (solid red line), and the same model in a more easy
setting with τ= 250ms (dashed black line). Other parameters: tr = 200ms,
g = 1.1, τm = 140ms, σ= 20. For the purpose of this comparison, the two
time series were not normalised.
noise (not shown). However, the model (fig. A.7) provides a simple
explanation. In a very difficult task, subjects cannot keep the the
controller as close to the target as in an easy task. Therefore, average
fluctuations are bigger for more difficult tasks. However, the rare
extreme missteps in easy tasks were caused by adaptation in situations
where predictable dynamics are difficult to discern from random noise.
This happens in particular if controller and target are very close to each
other for prolonged periods of time (see secs. 7.2, and A.8). Therefore,
in the model, the amplitudes of the most extreme control errors are
less affected by an increase in task difficulty.
A.6.1. Rail trial completion
Figure A.8 shows trial completion rates for the experiments described
in chapter 8. On each day and in each condition, 70% or more of the
trials were completed. Completion rates for trials in (S) increase over
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Figure A.8.: Trial completion rates in one dimensional VSB. Red: (S), light
blue: (K). The y-axis starts at 60% for a better visibility of the means and
standard errors. Since single trials can only be complete or incomplete,
median statistics are inappropriate for this figure. Significance levels from
Fisher’s exact test are are consistent with the depicted standard errors (and
therefore redundant and not shown).
time and are also significantly higher than those for in (K). In the latter
condition, there are large differences between subjects, depending on
their strategy.
A.7. Measured and modelled linear responses
The noise trials in the one-dimensional VSB experiment described
in chapter 8 allow for a calculation of the subjects’ linear response
functions. For each noise trial, the result shows a subjects average
response to a δ-pulse. An example is shown in figure A.9.
After the pulse, control errors initially grow. Only after the reaction
time, the controller notices the unpredicted error and starts to correct
it. Therefore, we obtain a direct measure of the reaction time. Result
statistics are shown in figure 8.9. Some subjects’ mean reaction times
differ by more than two standard deviations (not shown). We can
therefore conclude that individual differences exist. Automated model
fits to the regular trials on a given day usually also reproduce the linear
responses measured during noise trials well (fig. A.9).
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Figure A.9.: A linear response measured for subject 1 on day 3 (black), and
for the model (red) using the same noise track and identical processing.
Model parameters were set as the median of the automatically fitted regular
trials for this subject and day (method in subsec. 8.7.1): tr = 204.3ms,
g = 1.0685, tm = 152.5ms. Both linear responses were normalised to match
a unit δ-pulse.
As described in subsection 8.1.2, we used coloured test noise since
white noise was too confusing in pretests of the experiment. Prior
to calculating the linear responses, we filtered out noise with higher
frequencies than present in the test noise (using a finite impulse re-
sponse linear phase filter with a Kaiser window of order 10). Using
the same method on different types of surrogate data revealed that
the qualitative shape of the pulse responses was not affected (not
shown). However, maxima of the linear responses were offset 10ms
on average towards shorter times. This shift is caused by the applied
filtering and noise present in finite time series. Under ideal conditions
(white test noise and much longer time series), the peak coincides with
model reaction times. Therefore, the reported reaction times (fig. A.9)
correspond to the measured peaks of the linear response plus 10ms.
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For the model, the decay of the pulse response for lags above tr
depends on both γ, and τm in a complex way. Some additional
modulation is caused by the use of coloured test noise. Therefore,
unfortunately, the pulse responses do not provide a direct measure of
further model parameters.
A.8. Movement microstructure
The results in this part of the thesis focus on rapid online adaptation
as a source for multiplicative noise. Therefore, the investigated balanc-
ing model includes an explicit high-level mechanism for movement
planning. For movement generation, the simplest linear first order
approximation is sufficient to explain many details of error statistics
observed in VSB experiments.
The actual neuronal mechanisms for translating the planned move-
ments into muscle commands and the physics of the arm were not
considered. However, the data and models presented may provide
a starting point for future work in this direction. While (average)
pulse responses are well reproduced by the simple first order contin-
uous model (sec. A.7), some differences are found for the shapes of
the peaks in the actual time series. Therefore, we here discuss some
representative examples from the experiments described in chapter 8.
Figure A.10 (a), and (b) both show parts of time series containing
several error peaks of different amplitudes. Several of these “peak
archetypes” may occur within the same trial. Smaller errors which are
just above the baseline fluctuations are characterised by a sudden rise
and a slower decay ((a): 12s, (b): 6s). Larger errors sometimes are
counteracted very fast involving a small amount of oversteering ((a):
23s). If oscillations occur, they typically decay quickly. Other times,
subjects understeer leading to a short series of peaks with the same sign
((a): 45s, (b): 75s after y changes the sign once). Many peaks initially
start with a smaller movement in the opposite direction, although this
is not always the case (fig. A.10 (c), fig. 8.4 (a)). Plateaus with large er-
rors for several seconds are less common (fig. A.10 (d)). For the model
137
A. Appendix
.
0 30 60
time [s]
15
10
5
0
¡5
y[
m
m
]
(a)
0 60 120
time [s]
40
20
0
¡20
y[
m
m
]
(b)
0 15 30
time [s]
40
20
0
¡20
y[
m
m
]
(c)
0 15 30
time [s]
20
10
0
¡10
y[
m
m
]
(d)
Figure A.10.: Parts of control error time series for one-dimensional VSB
experiments (chap. 8). The examples represent different archetypes of error
peak shapes in condition (S) and were taken from: (a): subject 1, day 1,
(b) subject 15 day 4 (c): subject 6, day 1 (d) subject 5, day 1.
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Figure A.11.: Details of simulated time series for different model variations.
First, the basic continuous model with median fitted parameters (see fig. 8.10)
for (a): day one, and (b): day three. Modifications include: (c): a model
with additional multiplicative noise with tr = 200ms, g = 1.1, τm = 130ms,
σ= 1s−0.5, σy = 0.2s−0.5. (d): a non-adaptive model with multiplicative
execution noise with parameters like in figure A.4. (e): A just underdamped
second-order adaptive control model (sec. 7.8) with parameters ϑ = 10,
tr = 200ms, γa = 5, γv = 3, τm = 160ms.
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(sec 7.4), peaks are typically corrected with strong understeering. This
is shown in figure A.11 (a). The initial sharper correction can be un-
derstood intuitively: since control errors grew faster than expected, the
estimator for a brief moment severely overestimates how fast control
errors will grow in the future. After some more observations far away
from the baseline noise become available, model predictions get very
precise. Dynamics then are dominated by an exponential decay with
a time scale set by the controller gain γ. Understeering, however, can
be much more subtle than in figure A.11 (a). This is especially true
for model parameters fitted to later days as shown in figure A.11 (b).
Like in the experimental time-series, peaks in model time series often
start with a small movement in the opposite direction.
Model variations also influence the shape of the error peaks. In-
cluding multiplicative execution noise in addition to adaptation leads
to irregular clusters of errors and occasional plateaus (fig. A.11 (c))
with steep flanks. In contradistinction, a model with only multiplica-
tive execution noise exhibits a slow buildup of large fluctuation as
shown in figure A.11 (d). The same effect, which is in conflict with
experimental observations, is also found for the model introduced
by Cabrera and Milton (sec. 6.3). Finally, the second-order adaptive
model exhibits wider peak tops than the first order one. It also allows
for more oscillatory behaviour (fig. A.11 (e)).
In summary, control error time-series from both experiments and
the adaptive balancing model exhibit isolated, extreme peaks. In
contrast to processes with multiplicative execution noise only, these
peaks do not build up slowly, but instead arise suddenly. However,
while the adaptive balancing model reproduces statistical features very
well, the shapes of single peaks are only approximated. Unfortunately,
it is not quite certain how to interpret these findings. For example, the
rare plateaus with large errors for several seconds could be caused by
additional multiplicative execution noise (fig. A.11 (c)). Alternatively,
they might occur intentionally (fig. 8.4 (d)) if a subjects wants to move
the target, for example, towards the center of the screen. It is also
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Figure A.12.: PDFs for (a) cursor velocities, and (b) cursor accelerations on
day four in the experiment described in chap. 8. Score condition (S): red
lines, (K): light blue lines. Time-series were downsampled to 100Hz to
reduce high frequency noise.
unclear how much of the over- and understeering in the experimental
time series is planned, or arises due to noise or the inertia of the arm.
Nevertheless, the basic mechanism of IAI and the scaling statistics of
the error time series appear to be largely invariant against such details
of movement generation.
A.9. Hand velocities and accelerations
In chapter 8, subjects who minimise Kurt(y) (K) keep larger distances
y between the target T and the cursor C than subjects who min-
imise Std(y) (S). T moves faster for larger |y |. Therefore, subjects
who don’t keep y as small as possible have to speed up their hand
movements as shown in figure A.12 (a)4. In order to keep T on the
screen, the direction of its movement has to change frequently. This
also requires stronger hand accelerations in (K) than in (S) as shown
in figure A.12 (b).
4One subject in (K) exhibits velocities that are comparable to (S). This particular
distribution is difficult to see because it is mostly covered by the data from (S).
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Figure A.13.: Simulation of a random walk with time-delayed drift back to
the origin: x˙(t )=−0.1x(t−200ms)+η, where η is normal distributed white
noise. (a): Time-series and a threshold at 1.0005E(|x|). (b): PSD for the
times between threshold passings from above δt (crosses), and a power law
with slope 3/2 (dashed line).
A.10. Laminar phases
It has been reported that during stick balancing, the times between
crossings of a small threshold from bigger control errors towards
smaller ones scales like a power law with slope 3/2 [CM02]. This
measure often yields results that are very similar to the so-called lami-
nar phases, that is, the lengths of the phases below a threshold. This
seems to have led some authors to use the terms interchangeably
(which for simplicity is done here, too). The observed scaling was
interpreted as evidence that the intermittent fluctuations during stick
balancing are an instance of OOI (see also sec. 6.1).
In this thesis, laminar phases are not considered for two reasons.
First, the author found this measure to be less useful in distinguishing
between different control models than CCDFs and PSDs. Second,
very simple stochastic processes that are detached from control can
lead to laminar phases which appear to scale with exponent 3/2. A
most primitive example is shown in figure A.13: a random walk with
a time-delayed drift back to the origin. This process involves neither
an instability nor multiplicative noise. Yet, the laminar phases don’t
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look more different from a 3/2 power law than the examples in Figs. 1
and 3 in [CM02] do. Also, the laminar phases are often shorter than
the delay, which was argued to be a beneficial feature of multiplicative
noise in the same publication.
A.11. Proof that the continuous estimator is unbiased
The expectation value of equation (7.6) is:
E
(
ϑ˜(y˙ , y)
) = E( y˙
y
)
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∫ ∞
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y
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Therefore, the estimator is unbiased.
A.12. Time-discrete limit of the continuous model
In the following, we demonstrate how the minimal time-discrete IAI
model (sec. 7.3) can be obtained as a limiting case of the more realistic
continuous model (sec. 7.4). We first recapitulate the prerequisite
continuous model equations for the readers convenience. This proof
was published in the supplement to [PP11].
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A.12.1. The continuous model
The observable dynamics of the continuous control system are
y˙(t )= 1
τ
y(t )−γ ϑ˜(t ) y˜(t ) +β(t ) (A.1)
with time constant τ and Gaussian white noise β(t ). The second
term on the right-hand side is the controller’s contribution, which is
proportional to the expectation value (prediction)
y˜(t )= eϑ˜(t )tr
(
−γ
∫ t−0
t−tr
eϑ˜(t ) (t−tr−t
′)ϑ˜(t ′)y˜(t ′) dt ′+ y(t − tr )
)
(A.2)
of y(t ) given observations up to time t − tr where tr is the controllers
reaction time. Here,
ϑ˜(t + tr )=
∫ t
t−tm y(t
′)
(
y˙(t ′)+γϑ˜(t ′) y˜(t ′)
)
dt ′∫ t
t−tm y(t
′)2 dt ′.
(A.3)
is the continuous record maximum likelihood (ML) estimator for 1/τ.
To make y˙ negative on average, the control term contains a gain factor
γ> 1. tm is the controller’s memory length. In section 7.4, we modi-
fied equation (7.17) by using an exponentially decaying integration
window to obtain a differential formulation. We will omit this step
here because because we would have to revert it later on to obtain the
desired limit anyway. However, the discrete limit can be performed
using the form in the main paper, too.
A.12.2. Performing the limit
Now consider a special case where the controller is not active all the
time. Instead of a constant gain, let
γϑ˜=
∞∑
i=1
δ(t − i∆t ), ∆t = kr tr , kr ∈R (A.4)
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Figure A.14.: (a): Conditional probability density p(y(t ′) | y(t )),
t < t ′ < t +∆t . (b): Short time-series of a hybrid continuous model with
pulsed control defined by equations (A.1), (A.4), (A.7) and (A.8). Time
constant τ = 13 s, memory length m = 2 steps, reaction delay kr = 1 step,
noise level σ= 1, pulse interval tp = 10/85 s.
thereby removing the predicted y completely during short control
pulses. In this case, the stochastic differential equation (A.1) can be
solved in between two control pulses (see figure A.14):
y(t +∆t −0)= e(∆t−0)/τ y(t )+
∫ t+∆t−0
t
β(t ′)dt ′ (A.5)
where the zeroes indicate that the solution describes the system at time
t +∆t , but before the control pulse at this time has been applied. y(t )
which is given includes the control pulse at time t . To obtain y(t+∆t )
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after the control pulse has been applied, the latter is simply added.
Hence, using the simplified notation
yk = y(k∆t )
k = 1,2, . . .
α = e∆t/τ
α˜ = eϑ˜∆t
y˜k = y˜(k∆t )
m = min{n ∈N | n ≥ 2,n ≥ tr /∆t }
βk =
∫ k∆t
k∆t−1
β(t ′)dt ′
we obtain
yk+1 =α yk − y˜k+1+βk . (A.6)
The prediction (A.2) can be expressed similarly after inserting (A.4):
y˜k+kr = α˜krk+kr yk −
kr−1∑
i=1
α˜
kr−i
k+kr y˜k+i . (A.7)
Finally, we assume that the controller only observes the system at the
times when the control pulses are applied. We then have to replace
the continuous record ML estimator θ˜ for 1/τ (A.3) by the discrete
ML estimator for α:
α˜k+kr =
∑m−2
i=0 (yk−i + y˜k−i ) yk−i−1∑m−2
i=0 y
2
k−i−1
. (A.8)
Here, the integral over the observed time interval [t−tm , t ] has been re-
placed by the sum over the pastm observations. Detailed information
on this limit can be found e.g. in [PY09]. For an intuitive under-
standing, note the large bracket in the numerator in equation (A.3)
containing the observed velocity corrected by the controllers action
at the time of observation. This term is changed analogously to (A.6)
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since interaction between controller and system now takes place only
during control pulses. In (A.8), the bracket in the numerator therefore
contains the observed y corrected by the control pulse at that time.
Equations (A.6) - (A.8) represent the discrete-time limit of the
continuous model equations (A.1) - (A.3) under the condition (A.4)
that the controller interacts with the system only during short control
pulses. Choosing the reaction delay kr = 1 and memory m = 2 (there-
fore dropping the sums), the discrete system reduces to the minimal
model equations (7.10), (7.11) (renaming k to t).
A.12.3. Discussion
We performed the discrete time limit such that during each pulse the
expectation value of y is removed completely. Hence, the controller
is optimal given the pulse times and memory length. However, this
controller is not able to faithfully reproduce many of the experimental
findings. Also, the time scale of the discrete steps cannot be related to
any time scale in the continuously recorded experimental time-series.
A more detailed discussion is found at the end of supplement two to
[PP11].
A.13. Predictability of extreme events
Here we demonstrate that the Information Annihilation Instability
does not necessarily lead to completely unpredictable dynamics. In-
serting equation (7.10) into (7.11), the minimal IAI model takes the
form
yt+1 =−βt−1 yt
yt−1
+βt . (A.9)
Assume that an observer with knowledge of Yt = {yt , yt−1, yt−2, ...}
and equation (A.9) attempts to predict yt+1. Assume further that the
observer already has an estimation y˜t which includes all information
contained in previous observations–a prediction that is so good that it
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perfectly predicts the first term in equation (A.9). Then, the probability
density for yt+1 is
p(yt+1|Y ) = N (y˜t+1,σ2β) where (A.10)
y˜t+1 = −βt−1 yt
yt−1
, (A.11)
since the observer knows everything except for βt , which did not
influence the observations Yt .
In the next time-step, the actual realisation of yt+1 is observed. This
allows the observer to calculate the previously unknown noise term
βt :
βt = yt+1− y˜t+1 (A.12)
even though it cannot be observed directly. Since now the observer
knows Yt+1 and βt , the task to predict yt+2 at time t +1 requires the
same operations that were necessary to estimate yt+1 at time t . An
optimal prediction doesn’t even require all events Yt+1. The previous
two observations of y and the previous optimal prediction suffice:
y˜t+1 =− yt
yt−1
(yt − y˜t ). (A.13)
Figure A.15 shows a realisation of the minimal model and the corre-
sponding predictions. For each time step t , the prediction error is
exactly the noise term βt−1 which was unknown at time t −1 when
the prediction was made. Although we assumed perfect knowledge
about the initial state when deriving the predictor, it is robust against
small errors in the initialisation.
An alternative to the above method is to consider (A.9) as anMA(1)-
Prozess
xt = btβt−1+βt . (A.14)
with one time dependent parameter bt = yt/yt−1. Then, a general
solution to the prediction problem can be obtained even for completely
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Figure A.15.: Minimal IAI model described by (7.10) (black line), and a
prediction of each time step based on past observations according to (A.13)
(red line).
unknown initial values. For large t , this solution converges against
(A.13). An overview over the necessary methods, and the more general
class of ARMA-processes can be found in [Hon90]. If the process
to be predicted cannot be observed directly, Kalman-filters (which
can also be considered recursive Bayesian estimators) can be used.
Unfortunately, these considerations are not trivial to transfer to more
complex balancing models. Attempts to predict the continuous model
in a similar way were not successful as of yet.
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A.14. Documents for 1-D-VSB experiments
Zur Erforschung von Grundlagen der mensch-
lichen Bewegungsplanung und -kontrolle wer-
den insgesamt 20 gesunde Versuchsteilneh-
mer zwischen 18 und 35 Jahren gesucht. 
Im Experiment wird am Computer virtuell ein 
instabiles System balanciert. Jede Versuchs-
person versucht an vier aufeinander fol-
genden Tagen für jeweils eine Stunde (inkl. 
Pausen) einen möglichst hohen Highscore zu 
erzielen. Die Teilnahme wird mit
8 € / Stunde
vergütet. 
To investigate fundamental principles of hu-
man movement planning and -control, we are 
looking for 20 healthy testing subjects aged 
18 to 35. 
During the experiments, participants balance a 
virtual instable system displayed on a compu-
ter screen. Each participant tries to reach the 
best highscore possible on four subsequent 
days for one hour (incl. breaks) each day. Pay-
ment for participants is
8 € / hour.
Kontakt / Contact: Felix Patzelt
 Cognium, AG Pawelzik (Theoretische Neurophysik), Zimmer / Room 2430
 Hochschulring 18 (nahe Fallturm / close to Drop Tower)
 E-Mail: balancierversuche@neuro.uni-bremen.de
 Tel.:   +49 421 218 62005
Felix P
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Versuchsteilnehmer Gesucht /
Participants Wanted
Zentrum für 
Kognitionswissenschaften
Institut für
Theoretische Physik
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Institut für 
Theoretische Physik
Abt. Neurophysik
Fachbereich 01
Physik/Elektrotechnik
Zentrum für Kognitionswissenschaften
Arbeitsgruppe 
Prof. Dr. Klaus Pawelzik
Hochschulring 18
Cognium, Raum 2440
28359 Bremen
Dipl. Phys.
Felix Patzelt
Cognium, Raum 2430
Telefon 	 (0421) 218 - 62005
eMail 	 felix@neuro.uni-bremen.de
Universität Bremen · Fachbereich 01 · Postfach 33 04 40 · 28334 Bremen
Sekretariat
Agnes Janßen
Cognium, Raum 2470
Telefon 	 (0421) 218 - 62000
Fax 	 (0421) 218 - 62014
eMai	 ajanssen@neuro.
	 uni-bremen.de
Aufklärungsbogen für Versuchspersonen
Vielen Dank, dass  Sie sich bereit erklärt haben, an einer Studie zur menschlichen 
Motorkontrolle teilzunehmen. In dieser Studie wird untersucht, auf welchen 
Funktionsprinzipien und -mechanismen die Planung von Kontrollbewegungen 
beim Balancieren beruht. Dazu werden Sie an vier aufeinanderfolgenden Tagen für 
jeweils bis zu einer Stunde mittels eines  Schiebereglers ein auf einem 
Computerbildschirm dargestelltes System balancieren (tägl. 10 Trials  à 3 Min. + 
Pausen). Weiterhin informiert Sie ein Highscore über Kontrollfehler, die Ihnen dabei 
unterlaufen. Sie haben die Aufgabe, Ihren Highscore soweit es Ihnen möglich ist 
zu verbessern. Vor Beginn der Versuche wird ein Datenblatt ausgefüllt. Bitte 
erscheinen Sie möglichst ausgeruht zu den Versuchen. Eine Teilnahme unter 
Einfluss von Alkohol, Drogen oder Medikamenten, die die Fahrtüchtigkeit 
beeinflussen können, wird nicht gestattet.
Die im Rahmen der Studie durchgeführten Experimente sind nichtinvasiv, d.h. es 
werden zu keinem Zeitpunkt direkte physische Veränderungen am Körper vorge-
nommen. Medikamente werden nicht verabreicht. Daher sind von den Experimen-
ten ausgehende Gesundheitsbeeinträchtigungen und Risiken kaum vorstellbar.
Die Vergütung beträgt 8,-- Euro pro Versuchsstunde.
Die Teilnahme an der Studie ist freiwillig. Sie können jederzeit und ohne An-
gabe von Gründen aus der Studie aussteigen, ohne dass dabei für Sie per-
sönliche Nachteile entstehen werden. Ein Wiedereinstieg in die laufende Stu-
die ist nicht möglich. Die Ergebnisse der Studie und ihre Daten werden ver-
traulich behandelt und unterliegen den Vorgaben des Bremischen Daten-
schutzgesetzes.
Sie haben jederzeit die Möglichkeit, Fragen zu Ablauf, Thematik und Organisation 
der Studie zu stellen. Für Hinweise, Kritik, Verbesserungsvorschläge, Anregungen 
und Beobachtungen sind wir sehr dankbar.
Informationen, die ihre Identität mit ihren Daten in Verbindung bringen, werden von 
diesen getrennt und Dritten unzugänglich gesichert aufbewahrt und unmittelbar 
nach Abschluss der Studie gelöscht, spätestens nach einem Jahr.
Mit Ihrer Unterschrift bestätigen Sie, dass Sie über die Studie und Ihre Rechte 
vom Versuchsleiter aufgeklärt wurden. Darüber hinaus  erklären Sie sich damit ein-
verstanden, dass Ihre anonymisierten Ergebnisse der Studie für wissenschaftliche 
Veröffentlichungen verwendet werden dürfen.
Datum: _________________      Unterschrift: ___________________________
151
A. Appendix
Institut für 
Theoretische Physik
Abt. Neurophysik
Fachbereich 01
Physik/Elektrotechnik
Zentrum für Kognitionswissenschaften
Arbeitsgruppe 
Prof. Dr. Klaus Pawelzik
Hochschulring 18
Cognium, Raum 2440
28359 Bremen
Dipl. Phys.
Felix Patzelt
Cognium, Raum 2430
Telefon 	 (0421) 218 - 62005
eMail 	 felix@neuro.uni-bremen.de
Universität Bremen · Fachbereich 01 · Postfach 33 04 40 · 28334 Bremen
Sekretariat
Agnes Janßen
Cognium, Raum 2470
Telefon 	 (0421) 218 - 62000
Fax 	 (0421) 218 - 62014
eMai	 ajanssen@neuro.
	 uni-bremen.de
Subject information sheet
Thank you for for participating in this  scientific study on human motor control. In 
this  study, fundamental principles  and mechanisms underlying the planning of 
control movements during balancing are investigated. On four subsequent days, 
you will use a slider to control a system displayed on a computer screen for up to 
one hour each day (10 Trials  per day, 3 min. per trial + breaks). After each trial, a 
highscore will inform you about your performance. Your task is to improve your 
score as much as possible. Before you begin your trials, a data sheet is  filled out. 
Please make sure to be in good health and to sleep sufficiently while you take part 
in this study. Participation under the influence of Alcohol or (even medical) Drugs 
which could influence ones driving ability is not acceptable.
The experiments  conducted in this  study are non-invasive. That is, at no point will 
physical changes  be made to your body. No drugs  are administered. Therefore, no 
risks or negative effects to your health are imaginable.
Payment for participation in the experiments is 8,-- Euros per hour.
Participation in the study is voluntary. You may drop out of the study at any 
point in time without giving any reasons and without any personal disadvan-
tages. Re-entering the study is not possible. All results and personal data will 
be treated discretely and are subject to the privacy law of the city of Bremen.
You may ask questions  regarding experimental procedures as well as concerns 
and organisation of the study at any time. We appreciate any kind of remarks, 
criticism, suggestions and observations.
Information linking your identity to your data is kept separate from said data and 
inaccessible to third parties. It will be destroyed when the study is completed, af-
ter one year at the latest.
By signing below, you confirm that you have been informed about this  study and 
about your rights by the experimenter. You further consent with the usage of your 
anonymised results for scientific publications.
Date: _________________      Signature: ___________________________
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Datenblatt - Institut für theoretische Neurophysik
ZKW, Universität Bremen, Hochschulring 18, 28359 Bremen
Code: BALHS11-! ! ! ! Datum:  ! ! !
Geboren (Monat/Jahr): ! ! ! Geschlecht:!O m! O w!
Trifft eine der folgenden Eigenschaften zu?
- Vorerkrankungen (neurologisch / ophthalmologisch / Herz-, Kreislaufsystem)
Beispiele nennen: Schlaganfall, Parkinson, Grauer Star, Herzinfarkt, Epilepsie
- Konsum von Medikamenten, die die Fahrtauglichkeit beeinträchtigen
 Wäre Konsum dieser Medikamente an den Versuchstagen nötig?
- Regelmäßiger, sehr starker Koffeinkonsum
Anzeichen: Zittern, Nervosität, Schlafstörungen, erhöhter Puls, Extrasystolen („Herzstolpern“)
- Regelmäßiger Alkoholkonsum tagsüber für das Wohlbefinden nötig.
Versuche müsse nüchtern durchgeführt werden. Dabei dürfen keine Entzugserscheinungen auftreten.
- Starker Nikotinkonsum (deutlich mehr als 1 Schachtel / Tag)
Treten starke Beeinträchtigungen auf, wenn eine Stunde lang nicht geraucht werden kann?
- Regelmäßiger Konsum anderer Drogen.
! Ja führt zum Ausschluss (ohne Speicherung der Daten)! ! ! O nein!
Computernutzung (Stunden/Tag), -spiele: 
! ! !                       !
Sport:
! ! ! ! ! !
Sehhilfe: ! ! O keine! O Brille! O Kontaktlinsen 
Stärke (dpt):!! O Links !          ! O Rechts ! !
Fehlsichtigkeit muss auskorrigiert sein. Zu Versuchsbeginn noch einmal nachfragen, ob der Stimulus klar zu erkennen ist.
Händigkeit (Tätigkeiten vormachen, X: Präferenz, XX: Andere Hand wird nie benutzt):
Zeilen 1-5: Score Berechnen nach Edinburgh Handedness Inventory, Oldfield 1971. Zeile 6: Experimentspezifische Fragen.
Schreiben! ! ! OO L! OO R
Zeichnen! ! ! OO L! OO R
(Ball) Werfen! ! ! OO L! OO R
Mit Schere schneiden! ! OO L! OO R
Zähne putzen! ! ! OO L! OO R
Computer-Maus / Touchpad! OO L! OO R
Mit Messer Schneiden (ohne Gabel)! OO L ! OO R
Mit Löffel essen.! ! ! OO L ! OO R
Mit Besen kehren (obere Hand)!! OO L ! OO R
Streichholz anzünden! ! ! OO L ! OO R
Kiste öffnen (Deckel)! ! ! OO L ! OO R
Schieber im Versuch! ! ! OO L ! OO R
Probandengruppe / Highscore-Kriterium
 O Minimaler quadratischer Fehler! O Minimale Kurtosis
-----------------------------------------------------------  Hier abtrennen -----------------------------------------------------------
VP-Identifizierung - Institut für theoretische Neurophysik
ZKW, Universität Bremen, Hochschulring 18, 28359 Bremen
Code: BALHS11-!    !         Name:  ! ! ! ! !  ! !
E-Mail oder Telefon:  ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Getrennt vom Datenblatt zu Lagern!
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Part III.
Speculative markets

10. Characterisation and modelling of
financial markets
In the following chapters, analytical, numerical, and experimental
results that concern the modelling of financial markets as dynamic
and adaptive information processing systems are presented. Particular
attention is placed on collective dynamics towards information effi-
ciency, equilibria, bubbles, and market instabilities. This approach is
explained in the next section after a brief introduction to the field and
more classical approaches in economic research. The existing literature
is explained and discussed in more detail in the rest of this chapter.
10.1. Introduction
“ It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, thebrewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner,
but from their regard to their own interest.”
Adam Smith
Social systems self-organise. Consequently, collective dynamics can
emerge that pursue a common goal not present in the behaviour of
the individual agents. This idea had a particular impact on economic
theories where individuals acting out of pure self-interest were thought
to substantially, if unknowingly, promote the public interest as if they
were led by an invisible hand [Smi76].
157
10. Characterisation and modelling of financial markets
The concept of equilibrium, in which every agent acts in their
own selfish interest, became dominant [FG09] in modern economics
[Sam09]. Equilibrium models exhibit desirable traits. For example,
every agent’s wish to buy or sell a good at the equilibrium price is
fulfilled.
10.1.1. The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH)
In the following, we focus on financial markets. Here, one funda-
mental hypothesis is that competitive traders exploit information that
enables profitable trades (sec. 10.2). In this picture, the market re-
laxes rapidly towards equilibrium prices that “fully reflect available
information” [Fam70], or at least come close to this limit [GS80].
Consequently, risk-free profits cannot be made by (re-)using said in-
formation. In ideal financial equilibrium, current prices are the best
possible measure of “fundamental values”, as well as the best predic-
tors of future prices, and thus provide accurate signals for allocating
resources to their most productive uses [FG09, FL12].
If true, one of the implications of the EMH is that prices should
fluctuate randomly [Sam65]. That is, prices would immediately adjust
to relevant unpredictable news, and there would be no other systematic
trends [otRSAoS13, Lux09].
Due to a significant number of theoretical and practical advantages,
as well as consistency with some key empirical findings, game theory
and the resulting equilibrium models are almost the only approach in
mainstream economic theories [FG09]. Despite reoccurring reports
of empirical “anomalies”, many economists still consider market effi-
ciency to be a valid starting point [BGV00, FG09]. These anomalies
include the finding that early models can only explain a fraction of
the variation of real prices from the variation of fundamentals [CS89].
Numerous model extensions were developed to improve this situations
[otRSAoS13].
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10.1.2. Empirical (and other) problems
Some features of price movements that previously were considered
minor anomalies are in fact so prevalent and dominant that many
non-orthodox researchers now consider them to be “stylised facts”
[Far99, Lux09, MS00]. Here we focus on two of the most prominent
observations.
Magnitudes of price changes (“volatilities”), are found to be cor-
related over long periods of time. That is, large price changes are
typically followed by large ones and small changes by small ones
[Man63, GVA+99] (see also figs. 10.2 (b), 10.5 in sec. 10.3). Fur-
thermore, logarithmic price changes (log returns) exhibit heavy tails
that are well described by power-laws (figs. 10.2 (a), 10.4). Hence,
extreme events that are many times bigger than the standard deviation
occur at a much higher frequency than what would be expected if they
were Gaussian distributed [Man63, GVA+99, Far99]. In the natural
sciences, phenomena similar to these stylised facts have been observed
in so-called “critical” states in complex systems at the boundary of
order and disorder. These highly fragile states self-organise in certain
out-of-equilibrium systems (see part I).
Another finding may be considered even more devastating for the
EMH: Most extreme price jumps are not caused by identified new
information, and most identified new information doesn’t cause large
price jumps [JLGB08, CPS89, Fai02]. Furthermore, analyses of high-
frequency trading data indicate a self-referential and rather incremen-
tal information processing operating with long memory (sec. 10.6,
[Bou10, BFL09]) and over various time scales [AMS98, PS10].
These findings were associated with substantial market inefficiencies
including herding effects [DW96], “bubbles”, or the interactions of
heterogeneous traders with limited rationality [LM99b] in a market
exactly at a critical point [CMZ05a]. Therefore, more attention to
out-of-equilibrium theories that include microeconomic interactions
of traders has been called for [FG09, Lux09, HB10].
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So far, however, there is no consensus on how the EMH is to be re-
fined; some even argued that it should even be disposed of completely
[LM99b]. One of the problems as we move away from a perfectly
rational market is that we face an increasingly diverse zoo of possi-
ble approaches. There are even significant differences among leading
economists within the field of equilibrium economics. For example,
even two economists who won the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Eco-
nomic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel in the same year (2013)
disagree on whether markets are rational [Kes13]:
“ [Eugene Farma] and I seem to have very different views.It’s like we’re different religions.”
Robert Shiller
Our focus on financial markets notwithstanding, solutions to the
aforementioned problems are also potentially relevant for macroeco-
nomics, that is, models of the aggregate economy. Here, equilibrium
models and the lack of attention to microscopic heterogeneous inter-
actions have been criticised as well [HB10]. It has also been argued
that macroeconomic models should include a financial sector [BS14].
Furthermore, the use of new financial instruments made possible by
the EMH, as well as a common disbelief in bubbles and market in-
stabilities [Fel08] and thereby in their impact on macroeconomics,
are frequently named as factors that contributed to the economic
crisis that peaked in 2008 [Kru09, CFH+09, HB10]–although some
remain convinced that all causes were external to markets [FL12].
10.1.3. A different approach
In the following chapters, we investigate whether the apparent anti-
nomy of stabilising information efficient control and a dynamics
resembling systems operating close to criticality can be resolved. Here
the term “control” is used to describe the hypothesised tendency of
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markets to absorb the impact of predictable information. This descrip-
tion allows for an abstract comparison with part II where balancing
a stick on a finger tip and similar elementary control problems were
investigated. The results show that power-law-distributed fluctuations
can be a signature of an adaptive controller that minimises predictable
local trends. For human subjects and our model, Complementary Cu-
mulative Distribution Functions (CCDFs) of the arising fluctuations
follow power-laws in the same range as those of log-returns.
Motivated by these results, the main ambition in the following
chapters is to investigate if market dynamics that strive towards in-
formation efficiency can also give rise to instabilities. This task is not
trivial since the variables in the previously investigated balancing mod-
els don’t represent economically meaningful quantities. We therefore
search for minimal ingredients that allow multi-agent market models
to reproduce the stylised statistical features of real price changes. The
latter were found in very different markets, and hardly changed over
the last century (sec. 10.3, [Lux09]) or even since the 18th century
[Har98]. Accordingly, we assume them to be caused by fundamental
mechanisms of trading, and to be at least qualitatively independent
of most details of the organisation of a particular market. The same
argument can be made for many details of trader behaviour, which
changed dramatically over time as new financial instruments were
invented and computers took over much of the trading activity.
In addition, we focus on linking individual and collective behaviour.
A primary concern is to to disentangle the effects of different means
of adaptation that are intermingled in many existing models discussed
below. Therefore, we differentiate between agents as an abstraction
of either pure trading strategies or actual traders, and investigate the
differences between some of the most elementary types of information
in markets. The resulting insights are prerequisites for self-organised
information efficiency and thereby for answering whether the latter
can be related to market instabilities. At the same time, these results
contribute to a better understanding of multi-agent models in general.
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10.1.4. The course of action
In order to find appropriate assumptions for parsimonious dynamical
market models, relevant fundamental results from the existing liter-
ature are discussed in the following sections. Unfortunately, due to
the sheer volume of existing work, a complete overview is out of the
scope of this chapter.
First, we discuss why markets should evolve towards equilibrium at
all, how market efficiency is commonly defined, as well as some of the
implications, benefits and problems of this reasoning. Next, example
time-series are shown that exhibit the “stylised facts” introduced above.
In the subsequent sections, we briefly discuss economic rationality,
bubbles, and price formation. Even though this introduction has a
limited scope, some aspects of the economic literature are discussed
that are not necessary to understand the models introduced in later
chapters. These details are, however, relevant to show how this work
is related to the existing fields of research, why certain simplifications
were made, and how diverse and full of controversies the existing
literature really is. An especially large gap exists between standard
economics and the interdisciplinary complex systems approach. In
the final sections of this chapter, multi-agent models are introduced.
One particular type of multi-agent model is discussed in more detail:
minority games.
Equipped with these basics, and starting in the next chapter, we
pursue the questions posed above. A working hypothesis following
from part II is that instabilities and non-Gaussian fluctuations should
arise in markets adapting to endogenous information. This use of past
prices as an input makes sense if the market is supposed to self-organise
towards unpredictable price changes.
Our first approach is directly motivated by the main result of chap-
ter 7: a predictive and adaptive controller that successfully eliminates
all predictable dynamics self-tunes to a critical point. In chapter 11,
an instantiation of this effect is demonstrated in a parsimonious trad-
ing model. It is demonstrated that the success-dependent change of
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the impacts of different trading strategies leads to collective learning
analogous to a neuronal network. If traders try to profit from com-
plex temporal patterns in the over- or underreaction of their peers,
however, equilibria are perpetually destabilised. In this regime, the
model reproduces the heavy-tail distributed and clustered movements
of real prices.
A different approach is taken in chapter 12, where we introduce a
modified minority game as a minimal experimental model for collec-
tive behaviour in highly speculative markets. Subjects were predomi-
nantly information efficient with respect to the most recent past. A
close link is found between the unbiased random walk property of
prices, and bubbles. Combining the surprisingly simple stochastic
process that captures the subjects’ behaviour with the pricing rule
of the trading model from chapter 11 also reproduces the aforemen-
tioned “stylised facts”. Next, a slightly more complex experiment is
presented that incorporates more features of said trading model. It
allows for extreme price jumps even for small numbers of subjects.
This is demonstrated in closed group experiments and in a public
browser game.
10.2. Equilibria and efficiency
Consider, for example, two markets, A and B , where apples are traded
at different prices pA < pB . It is then profitable to buy apples at A
and immediately sell them at B . Such trades, however, increase the
demand at A and the supply at B . Therefore, pA is expected to rise
while pB is expected to fall as long the aforementioned trade remains
profitable. Neglecting friction (e.g. transportation costs), the prices
should quickly relax towards an equilibrium where pA = pB . If this
was not he case, there would be a “money pump” which could be
operated at any scale. Generating immediate riskless profit like this is
called (pure) arbitrage.
The above reasoning can be extended to speculative trading involv-
ing different points in time. For instance, if one had reason to believe
163
10. Characterisation and modelling of financial markets
that the price of a certain stock was about to rise tomorrow, a profit
could be made by buying said stock today and selling it tomorrow.
This trade, however, would increase today’s demand and tomorrow’s
supply. Hence, if information about future values arrive at a highly
competitive market, the price should immediately change to reflect
them. Information that was already available should not lead to price
changes.
Similar arguments can be made in a variety of economic settings.
Yet, the descriptions in the previous two paragraphs are extremely
simplified. First, the arguments only hold under certain conditions:
besides neglecting friction, we implicitly assumed informed traders
and mutually interchangeable (fungible) goods. For now, we also
avoided the question how exactly price changes are caused. In fact,
many economic theories argue the other way around: they assume
that traders are price takers who accept the price as given and adjust
demand and supply accordingly. Processes for finding equilibrium
prices are discussed in section 10.6.
Moreover, trades at different points in time, as in the second exam-
ple, involve risk due to the uncertainty about future price movements.1
In these types of arbitrage opportunities, there is only an expected
positive payoff and losses may occur in practice. For example, a certain
trading strategy may be profitable on average over time.
As stated above, equilibrium theories assume the absence of arbitrage
opportunities. This implies that the current price of any traded asset i
can be written as the expectation value
pi (t )=E
(
m(t +1)xi (t +1)
)
(10.1)
1Many real trading strategies involve not just buying and selling stocks, but also
bonds, contracts on future rights or obligations, borrowing assets that are currently
not owned, and combinations thereof. Thereby traders can limit their risk (e.g. by
hedging), or magnify possible gains and losses (i.e. increase leverage). However,
as stated before, we only focus on very elemental properties of trading and forgo
evitable details in the following.
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of the next payoff xi (t + 1) discounted with a factor m(t + 1)
[otRSAoS13]. For stocks, the payoffs are defined as the next period
price plus dividends:
xi (t )= pi (t )+di (t ). (10.2)
The expectation value in (10.1) is calculated with respect to the possible
states of nature at time t+1, whichm(t+1) and di (t+1)may depend
on. The discount factor is the same for all assets and closely related to
the return rate r f for risk-free assets (safe interest rate):
E
(
m(t +1))= 1
1+ r f (t )
. (10.3)
In general, temporal discounting refers to the tendency of people to
discount the value of future rewards (see below).
Over a short time horizon we can neglect the safe interest rate and
dividends. Assuming that m also doesn’t vary much across different
states of nature amounts to m ≈ 1. Then [otRSAoS13],
E
(
p(t +1))= p(t ). (10.4)
In other words, the price follows a martingale. That is, future price
changes are unpredictable from available information. This suggests
that there are no traders who can always beat the market by taking
advantage of less informed ones. Beating the market refers to gen-
erating returns in excess of the market average. Equation (10.4) is
highly relevant for the following chapters since they are concerned
with models of speculative trading over short time horizons.
A market where price changes are unpredictable from available
information is called informationally efficient. The term “available
information”, however, leaves some room for interpretation. A com-
monly followed suggestion is to distinguish between three different
versions of the EMH [Fam70]. In its weak form, it is impossible to
systematically beat the market using historical prices. In the semi-
strong-form, it is impossible to systematically beat the market using
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publicly available information. In strong-form informational effi-
ciency, it is impossible to systematically beat the market using any
information. The last concept was generally deemed unrealistic and
more or less impossible to test [otRSAoS13]. Therefore, researchers
focused on the weak and semi-strong EMH.
Empirical findings in favour of the EMH include the general ab-
sence of exploitable autocorrelations among price changes in financial
markets [Fam98]. Some event studies further show that information
(e.g. the announcement of a stock split) is usually incorporated into
asset prices rapidly [otRSAoS13]. There also appears to be a gen-
eral consensus that stock prices are quite unpredictable in the short
term, even though predictability increases over longer time horizons
[otRSAoS13]. Consistently, fund managers generally don’t outper-
form markets [otRSAoS13], at least not repeatedly over longer periods
of time [Fam98]. Some evidence even suggests that active funds sys-
tematically underperform the market ([BGV00]; see also [Ode99],
and sec. 10.4).
Nevertheless, as mentioned before, not all empirical findings are
unproblematic for the EMH. For example, prices are not completely
random. Some predictable patterns in price movements of stocks and
other assets disappeared after being discovered, possibly because traders
began exploiting them. Other reliable patterns, however, did not
disappear even years after being published (see, e.g., [LM99a, FG09]).
Some investment strategies based on such patterns yield sustained
profits, seemingly challenging the EMH.2 Economists disagree on
2Instead of patterns, classical risk arbitrage strategies [Kue12] include e.g. merger
arbitrage where one company takes over an undervalued one. This bid is expected
to rise to its “true fundamental value”. Only the fastest traders can profit from
such opportunities. These strategies basically use equilibrium theory to determine
temporary misalignments of prices which are expected to vanish. Similarly, in
liquidation arbitrage breaking a company apart and selling its parts yields a profit.
In pairs trading, traders track highly correlated assets. If the prices drift apart,
they are expected to converge again in the future.
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whether the persistence of patterns represents a violation of market
efficiency [FL99].
The EMH (and many equilibrium models) face the problem that
empirical tests are necessarily joint tests that include auxiliary assump-
tions such as a particular asset-pricing model. A rejection of the joint
hypothesis may therefore be caused by a “bad model” [Fam91]. For
instance, apparent excess returns of a particular asset or strategy may
be due to unobserved risk factors [FG09]. Furthermore, if some in-
formation is costly to obtain, there should be an equilibrium state of
disequilbrium where small inefficiencies remain that don’t allow for
profits in excess of the costs [GS80]. As another example, (10.1) can
be iterated forward to yield the expected discounted value of future
dividends. Yet, directly testing such a prediction requires an explicit
model for the discount factor m(t ). One such model is the Con-
sumption Capital Asset Pricing Model (CCAPM) which assumes a
representative rational investor maximising utility (see also sec. 10.4).
Unfortunately, under this model, and especially on shorter time scales,
prices move far too much to be explained by changes in dividends
[Shi81]. Researchers remain divided over how to account for this
problem [otRSAoS13]. Some extended the model of rational agent
expectations to include more factors and therefore more parameters
that can be calibrated. Others considered results from psychological ex-
periments that showed how humans generally deviate from rationality
as it is defined by economic models (sec. 10.4).
The controversy around the EMH stems in part also from the in-
ability of equilibrium models to describe deviations from equilibrium.
Especially weak form efficiency in principle allows temporary devi-
ations from equilibrium prices as long as they cannot be exploited
systematically. The question how efficient a market or economy is
can, however, hardly be investigated within the mainstream frame-
work. Furthermore, economic experiments outside of small-scale lab
experiments are nearly impossible to conduct. In consequence, and in
contrast to established theories in the natural sciences, there appear to
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be few unambiguous empirical findings concerning economic theories
[FG09]. Even most stylised facts could hypothetically be consistent
with equilibrium if price fluctuations were reflecting only the statistics
of events external to the market, and if the resulting fluctuations could
not be exploited systematically.
Nevertheless, there is substantial direct empirical evidence against
markets in stable equilibria with fluctuations that are purely driven
by external factors. Most of the largest price movements cannot be
attributed to discernable news, and most news does not lead to large
price movements [JLGB08, CPS89, Fai02]. Large price changes also
occur far too often to be explained by new information on fundamen-
tals [JLGB08]. Price volatility when markets are closed is also much
lower than when they are open [FR86]. “Markets appear to make
their own news” [FG09].
We end this section with a few comments on the relevance of
efficiency for economics in a broader sense. Arbitrage equilibrium is a
precondition for general economic equilibrium. The latter can often be
shown to be either allocatively efficient, meaning that the economy is as
productive as possible, or Pareto efficient, meaning there is no change
in choices that would make everyone better off. Prices in an ideal
market provide accurate signals for resource allocation. The primary
role of stock markets in particular is allocation of ownership. That is,
it allows companies to raise money by selling shares of ownership. An
informationally efficient asset market, however, must not necessarily be
Pareto efficient or generate allocative efficiency in the economy. This
additional complication appears to leave ample room for speculation
on whether government intervention can possibly improve on a free
market economy or not. See also [FG09, BGV00], and the references
therein. Note that many economists caution against a normative
interpretation of efficiency.3
Despite all of the aforementioned controversies, general equilib-
rium theory helped transforming economics from a qualitative to a
3Such remarks are found, e.g., in [Sam65, FG09]. See also, e.g., [Sti02]
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quantitative and formally rigorous discipline. These models, however,
typically require very strong assumptions.4 Beyond that, arbitrage
efficiency and informational efficiency are particularly useful because
they allow to draw conclusions from fewer assumptions. For example,
no arbitrage and prices following a random walk are the only two
assumptions needed to calculate a unique risk neutral price for deriva-
tives in the Black-Scholes Model. In principle, this allows to identify
and eliminate mispricing, and to reduce risk [FG09].
As noted above, some information is actually incorporated into price
changes. For example, one study found orange prices to predict future
orange prices and even future weather better than weather reports,
although the variability of the prices was found to be inexplicably high
[Rol84]. Many useful properties, as well as the elegance of the EMH
and of equilibrium economics, make these theories highly appealing.
This might explain some of the impact neoclassical economics had also
on economic policy, for example in the form of market deregulation
[Kru09].
10.3. Stylised facts
Here two most prominent stylised facts are explained in detail, namely
the high frequency of extreme price changes and the clustering of
volatile and quiet phases. We first demonstrate these statistical reg-
ularities on the basis of daily price changes for stock- and Foreign
Exchange (FX) markets, and discuss similar findings for other quan-
tities in the literature. Overviews on this topic are also found, for
example, in [Far99, Lux09, Con01, GPL+00]. (See also table 1 in
[Lux06] for a compilation of explanations for power-laws in finance
and their respective shortcomings)
Our first three example data sets, daily closing values of stock market
indices, are shown in figure 10.1 (a). These indices are weighted
4The prototype for general equilibrium is the Arrow-Debrieu model which assumes
agents with rational expectations who maximise their own utility (see sec. 10.4),
perfect competition (price taking), and market clearing (see sec. 10.6) [FG09].
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Figure 10.1.: (a) Historic daily closing values of three stock market indices.
Dow Jones Industrial Average [Wil13] (black line), S&P 500 [Fed13a] (blue),
and Russel 2000 without dividends [Rus13] (green). (b) Daily logarithmic
price changes (log returns) for the DJIA .
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averages of stock prices. Since the Dow Jones Industrial Average
(DJIA) time-series is the longest one, we use it as a benchmark in the
following chapters. That is, we treat it like an idealised stock price,
the fluctuations of which give us an idea as to how realistic output of
stylised stock market models should look like. The other indices are
shown for comparison and to demonstrate that the features we are
interested in hardly depend on how an index is calculated in detail.5
The indices in figure 10.1 (a) exhibit a roughly exponential growth
(note the logarithmic scale). We therefore need a scale-free measure
to quantify price changes. The most natural choice is the log return
r (t +1)= lnp(t +1)− lnp(t ), (10.5)
where p(t ) is the price of an asset or the value of an index at a certain
point in time t . Note that the return of investment exp(r (t + 1))
measures the relative price change, and hence the profit at time t +1
in relation to capital invested at time t .
A log return can be calculated over different time periods. Its value
over a longer time period equals the sum over all logarithmic price
changes during that period. For example, the sum over all all hourly log
returns on one day is equal to the log return for the whole day. Hence,
log returns are sums over random variables. Therefore, one might
assume that the distribution of log returns should quickly converge
towards a Gaussian, especially for heavily traded assets (sec. 2.2). Many
economic models actually assume Gaussian log returns, including
the Black-Scholes model variations of which are still being used.6
5The value of the DJIA is the weighted sum of the prices of one share for each of
30 large publicly owned companies based in the U.S. Each price is weighted by
a divisor to compensate for stock splits or reinvested dividends. The S&P 500,
on the other hand, is the weighted sum of the market capitalisation of 500 large
U.S. companies. That is, the summand for each company is the total value of
its publicly available shares, again weighted by a divisor. The Russel 2000 is also
capitalisation weighted, but in contrast to the S&P 500 it comprises of 2000
companies with small market capitalisation.
6Note that even for log-normal returns the absolute price changes would exhibit
quite extreme jumps.
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Unfortunately, this assumption is false. Traders therefore use heuristic
corrections (e.g. volatility smile) to compute approximately correct
estimates of risk.7
Figure 10.2 (a) shows the CCDFs of the daily log returns for our ex-
ample indices and a Gaussian distribution. As one might have guessed
from the frequent occurrence of extreme price changes in figure 10.1,
the distributions are heavy tailed.8 These tails are well described by
a power law P (|r | > x)∝ x−ξ with an exponent ξ close to four. Log
returns therefore have a finite variance, but the kurtosis diverges (albeit
quite slowly for daily returns). This further implies that log returns
over increasing periods of time should converge towards a Gaussian
distribution if the log returns were Independent and Identically Dis-
tributed (IID).9 In reality, however, this convergence is extremely
slow: log return distributions are stable on time-scales from minutes
to many days ([GPL+00, PGA+99]). This topic is discussed in more
detail in section B.3.
Despite log return autocorrelations close to zero after 15−30min
([Far99], see fig. 10.2 (b) for daily returns), however, even longer-
term log returns are not independent. They exhibit higher-order
correlations that become visible in the so-called volatility clusters:
Large returns are likely to be followed by large ones, and small returns
are likely to be followed by small ones (fig. 10.1 (b)). This clustering is
7Analytical results for non-Gaussian fluctuations can be obtained as demonstrated
in [Bor02].
8Consider, for example, the biggest one-day drop in the history of the DJIA: Oct. 19
1987 (Black Monday). On that day, the DJIA dropped almost 25%, eliminating
hundreds of billions of dollars in stock value. No clear external event could be
identified to have caused the crash, but several, mostly internal, factors were
brought up that may have contributed [Shi87, Wal87].
9After the heavy tails of log return distributions were discovered [Man63], some
researchers initially assumed the distributions might be Lévy stable and hence have
a diverging variance. This would have been very problematic since most statistical
properties then would be ill defined. The finding that in contrast the variance
is finite might explain why many economists stuck with the mathematically
convenient Gaussian distribution. For a detailed discussion, see e.g. [Far99].
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Figure 10.2.: Analysis of log returns calculated for the stock market price
indices shown in figure 10.1. The different lengths of the three time series
account for most of the differences. (a) CCDF for the normalised log return
magnitudes. Red diagonal line: power-law fit for the DJIA (Hill estimator
with KS-optimal cutoff, see section 2.5). Grey dotted line: Gaussian with
unit variance. (b) Autocorrelations for the log return for the DJIA (solid
grey line), and for the log return magnitudes for all three indices (line colours
as in (a), methods as described in sec. 3)
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quantified by the autocorrelation of log return magnitudes as shown
in figure 10.2 (b). In fact, there is a whole spectrum of clusters on
very different time scales up to years. It has been suggested that the
slow convergence of log returns is closely related to these long-range
higher-order correlations.
Very similar results can be found in completely different data sets.
Figure 10.3 shows the pound sterling and the yen, both measured in
U.S. dollars, since the beginning formation of the modern FX market.
This is a market where currencies with freely floating exchange rates
can be traded under few conditions.10
In contrast to stock markets, the FX market is global and decen-
tralised: brokers/dealers negotiate directly with one another without a
central exchange or clearing house. Yet, after some initial transients,
log return distributions closely resemble those of stocks. Very similar
results are found for exchange rates measured in a different currency
than the U.S. dollar (not shown).
CCDFs for several exchange rates, as well as a Gaussian and the
DJIA since 1980 for comparison, are shown in figure 10.4. The
tail exponents show some variation with E(ξ) = 3.4, and Std(ξ) =
0.8. However, all distributions are clearly heavy-tailed. The average
exponent is close to the exponents for the indices discussed above.
The autocorrelations of the return magnitudes for the exchange
rates vary across currencies too, as shown in figure 10.5. Yet, all of
them exhibit positive correlations over hundreds of days. Time-series
variability is also discussed in section 11.3.
Results consistent with those reported above were found for many
different assets and for returns over different periods of time from
minutes to days [Far99, Lux09, Con01, GPL+00]. For example, one
10The daily global trading volume in the FX market is by far higher than the GDP
of national economies [KR10]. In 2000, the global daily turnover was 1.5 trillion
U.S. dollar per day. 40% of the trades involved round trips within two days or
less, and most of them were speculative [Ehr02]. By 2013, the daily turnover
had reached even 5.3 trillion U.S. dollar [KR13]. Most trades contain the U.S.
dollar on one side (ibid.).
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Figure 10.3.: Historic daily foreign exchange rates and corresponding returns.
(a), (b) British pound sterling per US dollar. (c), (d) Japanese yen per U.S.
dollar.
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dotted line: Gaussian with unit variance. (b) Autocorrelation of the log
return magnitudes.
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Figure 10.5.: Autocorrelations of the log return magnitudes for the same
exchange rates also shown figure 10.4. Colors are identical.
study of the stocks of 1000 U.S. companies reported CCDF exponents
2.5< ξ< 4 for returns over time scales from 5 minutes up to 16 days
[PGA+99]. On the time-scale of months, log return distributions
become more Gaussian.
Note that the stylised facts remained very stable over many decades
(see figs. 10.1, 10.3, and [Lux09]). Even stock and FX data sets
from the 18th century show the same properties [Har98]. Crashes are
even documented for the very first stock market, in the 17th century
[Pet11].
10.4. Rationality, heterogeneity, and behavioural economics
“ One of the things that microeconomics teaches youis that individuals are not alike. [...] If we didn’t have
heterogeneity, there would be no trade.”
Ken Arrow
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A core assumption in the theories presented above is the selfishness
of economic agents. For example, arbitrage opportunities are expected
to vanish because somebody will exploit them. Many problems, how-
ever, require more specificity. A very common assumption in economic
theories is that of a rational representative agent, sometimes called
“homo economicus”. Economists use the term “rational” to denote
selfishly maximising utility or profit using all available information.
Agents are often assumed to have rational expectations. That is, their
predictions of the future are unbiased. In addition, many models (e.g.
for general equilibrium) even require perfect information. These as-
sumptions contribute to succinct and unique equilibrium models (see,
e.g., foonote 4 in sec. 10.2), at the price of unrealistic requirements
for the agents’ abilities. Therefore, bounded rationality has been intro-
duced to some models to account for limited cognitive abilities, and
limited availability of information to individual agents. Unfortunately,
there are so many possibilities in which agents could deviate from
perfect rationality that additional constraints seem warranted. Such
constraints may be found by studying how humans actually behave as
opposed to how they should. [FG09, Sti02]
Behavioural economics studies bounds of rationality in economic
decision making. Thereby, many common assumptions in prevalent
economic models have been rejected based on behavioural experi-
ments [FG09]. For example, humans deviate from simplistic utility
functions, use possibly biased heuristics, and violate assumptions on
temporal discounting. Humans also tend to deviate significantly from
perfect selfishness. For example, they voluntarily share material pay-
offs with anonymous others or decline unfair splits. The extent of this
behaviour is culturally dependent [HBB+01].
Not all behavioural research has to take place in lab experiments.
Numerous studies investigated the real-world behaviour of economic
actors, often with less than flattering results. For instance, financial
analysts’ predictions are often worse than a simple “no change” forecast;
yet they agree with each other much more than with the actual result
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[GB05]. Investors also appear to trade much more than they should if
the market were in equilibrium [FG09]. This is reflected by the global
trading volume in financial markets which is two orders of magnitude
larger than global production (ibid., see also foonote 10 in sec. 10.3).
Investors even trade too much for their personal gain: trading less
would, on average, increase their returns [Ode99].
These findings, however, are more problematic for common equi-
librium theories than for the EMH on its own.11. As stated in sec-
tion 10.2, the martingale property of price changes only requires that
there is no systematic and predictable over- or underreaction. It was
further argued, that active (short term) fundmanagement is a zero-sum
game before costs: “Good (or more likely just lucky) active managers
can win only at the expense of bad (or unlucky) active managers”
[FL12]. After costs, a passive index fund becomes extremely hard to
beat in an efficient market.
If psychological biases that were found for individuals would system-
atically influence the market, this would create arbitrage opportunities
that traders performing more careful analyses could exploit. Addi-
tional limitations are necessary under which such biases survive in the
market [FG09]. Moreover, individual rationality or the lack thereof
does not imply the same is true collectively in the market, and vice
versa.12
While market psychology might actually explain some market fail-
ures, there is no known mechanism explaining how it could give rise to
the stylised facts we are interested in here. As we shall see in the follow-
ing, irrational behaviour per se is not sufficient to explain long-range
11This might, nonetheless, be due to the notorious difficulty to construct conclusive
empirical tests of efficiency (sec. 10.2). For instance, the no arbitrage condition
can be described without assumptions on utility. It thereby escapes the criticism
on utility arising from psychological experiments. However, auxiliary assumptions
necessary to test the EMH, like the CCAPM pricing model, often do depend on
assumptions on utility.
12This argument was brought up against representative agent models before [Kir92].
However, it will become relevant in a very different sense in the following chapters
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correlations and return power-laws. One might further argue that the
impact of psychological biases should have changed over time after
traders adopted more advanced theoretical methods, and especially
after most trading became algorithmic. Option prices, for example,
more closely match the predictions of the Black-Scholes model since
it is used actively [FG09]. Many professional traders today also make
conditional forecasts on possible future states of nature; they now
actually behave more like the assumptions in popular economic mod-
els (ibid.). The very limited variability of the stylised facts over time
and across markets implies that they are caused by some even more
fundamental properties of markets.
Nevertheless, the importance of one aspect of human behaviour
has to be reinforced at this point: individuals and their expectations
are different from each other. Otherwise, there would be no trade (see
e.g. [MS82], [Hom06, HB10] and the references therein). Already
Adam Smith argued that conflicting interests of individuals, and spe-
cialisation due to cognitive limitations are essential for cooperation in
the first place (as discussed in e.g. [FG09, Kir92]).
10.5. (Rational) bubbles
“ Markets can remain irrational far longerthan you or I can remain solvent.”
John Maynard Keynes
“ The word ‘bubble’ drives me nuts”
Eugene Fama
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A bubble is commonly used to refer to a “a period in which prices
exceed fundamental valuation” [Sch13]. As discussed above, however,
valuation is always a joint test that requires a pricing model. Valuation
is also often ex-post wrong. Some efficient market proponents argue
that the term “bubble” is misleading since it implies that one should
have known that an asset was mispriced given the then-available in-
formation. This is again very hard to prove, since a “bubble warner”
could be right by chance [Sch13, Kes13].
Nevertheless, the term “bubble” is used frequently by economists
and laymen. Famous historical examples include the Dutch tulip
mania (1634-7), the South Sea bubble (1719), or more recently the
dot-com bubble (ca. 1997-2000) and the housing bubble (ca. 2000-
2007) [Bru08, Sch13, Kru09]. There is considerable evidence that
asset prices may be significantly misaligned for extended periods of
time. For example, there appear to be no economic models which
can explain more than a fraction of the movements of stock prices
or foreign exchange rates (see, e.g., [BGV00, otRSAoS13], and the
references therein).
One might assume that bubbles are caused by psychological biases
or irrational herding (see [Kes13], and sec. 10.4). The opposite direc-
tion is pursued in the literature on rational bubbles. Here, situations
are investigated where current owners of an asset have good reasons to
believe they can resell the asset at a price above the fundamental value.
There are four main strands of such models [Bru08]. If all investors
have rational expectations and identical information, rational bubbles
cannot emerge within an asset-pricing model. Overpricing that is
present when the asset starts trading can persist under strict condi-
tions. In an asymmetric information bubble, investors have different
information and prices only partially reveal other traders’ aggregate
information. Then, under certain conditions like constrained short
selling, finite bubbles can occur. Another model type investigates ratio-
nal, well-informed traders who interact with biased ones. If arbitrage is
limited (e.g. due to risk factors), the rational investors cannot prevent
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the bubble by going against it. On the contrary, there is incentive
to “ride the bubble”. That is, to continue to buy an overpriced asset,
hoping that the already exuberant price will rise even further. Finally,
bubbles can also emerge in a market with heterogeneous beliefs and
short selling constraints. Then, even if traders are correct on average,
optimists can influence the market more strongly than pessimists.
There appear to have been very few attempts to directly link mecha-
nisms for bubbles with the stylised facts described above. The dynamics
of rational expectation bubbles were investigated in [LS02]. Equa-
tion (10.1) allows for prices that grow with a constant rate 1/m > 1.
To turn this explosively growing bubble into a stationary process, a
finite burst rate for an unexpected reset of the price is assumed. It
is therefore possible to define multiplicative stochastic processes for
prices that are consistent with rational expectations. These bubble
processes are very similar to the Kesten process (sec. 4.4). They exhibit
power-law tailed log return distributions, but the tail exponents ξ< 1
are far smaller than those for real log returns.
In one model with heterogeneous beliefs and short selling con-
straints, a bubble can form if the optimists have sufficient wealth
compared to the asset supply for some period [Sch13]. Such bubbles
are accompanied by large trading volume and volatility because the
imbalanced price during the bubble is sensitive to the supply: if the
latter is limited for some time, a bubble can form. Then, an unex-
pected increase in supply (e.g. due to sales from insiders) can cause the
bubble to implode. A different but related model includes a non-linear
market mechanic: the leverage cycle [Gea10, TFG11]. During good
times, high leverage13 allows those who value a certain asset more (for
whatever reason), to drive up the price. In fact, leverage increases the
profits of trend-following strategies during trending markets, creat-
ing evolutionary pressure towards even higher leverage. The problem
arises when prices drop unexpectedly. The wealth of the leveraged op-
13That is, the use of credit to trade assets, thereby increasing both potential profits
and risk.
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timists drops, forcing them to sell to meet their margin requirements.
Due to the crisis, margins are tightened, which further amplifies the
downward spiral. Similar problems were identified during the recent
economic crisis which followed leverage of up to 60 to one in 2006.
Return distributions under this mechanism have been investigated in
a multi-agent model implementation discussed in section 10.7. In the
same section, other models are discussed where bubbles occur together
with volatility clusters due to shifts in market ecology.
Bubbles and crashes consistently arise in laboratory double auc-
tions14 even if participants had sufficient information to compute the
fundamental value of the traded asset [SSW88]. Uncertainty about
dividends seems to have no effect on the bubbles [NRR01], but un-
certainty about the behaviour of others does: Repeated sessions of
the same group of subjects under stationary conditions reduces the
risk of bubble [PS03]. Other experimental paradigms focused more
on the subjects’ ability to predict future prices and used automated
synchronous trading. It was found that some groups slowly con-
verge towards fundamental prices while others fail to converge. This
behaviour is consistent with subjects using heterogeneous adaptive
learning strategies [HW09]. There seem to be no experiments in the
literature where the scaling of log returns and long-range correlations
were measured. Investigating these features in the existing paradigms
would be quite challenging: Subjects in all of the experiments cited
above had plenty of time to make their decisions. In consequence, only
short time series with e.g. 15 periods in [SSW88] or 50 in [HW09]
where recorded.
14That is, a process where potential buyers and sellers submit their bid- and ask prices
to an auctioneer. In the continuous (asynchronous / intertemporal) case used
in many experiments, trades are executed immediately if the highest bid price is
above the lowest ask. Other orders are stored in a queue. Dividends in typical
experiments are payed at the end of trading periods, which last several minutes.
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10.6. Price formation
So far, we have covered a number of observations and theories on
prices, but we have hardly discussed how prices actually form. A
price is essentially a conversion rate at which two parties agree to
exchange two different types of goods, one of which typically being
fiat money. Yet, standard economics (including neoclassical finance)
assumes “perfect competition” where all agents are price takers. That
is, no agent on its own can influence the price. At the same time,
equilibrium prices ensure market clearing. That is, demand and supply
always match. Standard microeconomics also identifies how prices
should move to eliminate excess demand: It is assumed that demand
decreases with increasing prices while supply increases with increasing
prices. Therefore, prices must increase to eliminate excess demand,
and decrease to eliminate excess supply. There is, however, no trading
at out of equilibrium prices since this would require at least one
irrational agent who accepts a “bad deal”.15 Who adjusts the prices is
not specified [Kir92].
One possibility to formalise a price finding process is the Walrasian
auction. The auctioneer suggests different prices, and agents submit
preliminary orders for each price. In a process called “tâtonnement”,16
the auctioneer keeps suggesting different prices and is thereby supposed
to move closer to the price at which the market clears. When the
equilibrium price is found, the actual trades take place. Unfortunately,
there are few situations where tâtonnement converges towards an
equilibrium even if it exists [FG09, Lyo00].
An alternative is to assume omniscient agents who can determine
the equilibrium themselves. The emergence of such an equilibrium is
analogous to a Nash equilibrium in game theory [FG09]. In a game,
each player’s payoff depends on all the other players’ actions. If each
15As stated above, homogeneous and rational traders would actually never trade.
The discovery of several no-trade theorems, however, seems to have done little to
discourage the use of the assumptions from which they follow.
16The English term for “tâtonnement” is “groping” and seems to be less popular.
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player knows the equilibrium strategies of all other players, there is at
least one self-consistent equilibrium where no player can gain from
switching their own strategy. Many models also use a representative
agent to provide the unique and stable equilibrium which cannot be
guaranteed by the underlying microeconomic structure [Kir92].
In practice, traders in financial markets are not omniscient, have
finite cognitive and computational capabilities, and submit real orders.
A stock exchange or a foreign exchange dealer matches buy- and
sell orders and acts as a buffer for unexecuted orders. Most modern
financial markets operate continuously and accept two basic order
types.17 Limit orders state the worst allowable price for the transaction.
If the highest buy order limit price exceeds the lowest sell order limit
price, the transaction is executed. Limit orders often fail to be executed
immediately and are then stored in an order book. Traders can also
submit market orders which are executed immediately at the best
available price. Most financial markets depend on market makers who
provide liquidity by accepting both buy and sell orders. On some
exchanges, market making is institutionalised. An open order book
allows any investor to effectively act as a market maker.18 19 For a
more detailed discussion on market microstructure see, for example,
[BFL09, Lyo00].
17Some financial markets determine the opening (and closing) prices in special
sessions (e.g. an auction). All orders are executed at the same price at the end
of the session. That is, at the opening (or closing) price. Orders submitted in
some pre-opening sessions can be retracted before the end of the session. See, e.g,
[BHS99, Smi13]
18Market makers profit from offering to buy at a lower price then they offer to sell.
If prices are not sufficiently mean reverting, however, market making strategies
generate losses. A designated market makers may be compensated for this risk
e.g. by charging fees.
19Some bilateral stock transactions are arranged outside of the open order book and
reported publicly later. The FX market lacks a centralised exchange in the first
place. These details, however, do not matter for the following more abstract view
on markets.
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In any case, each financial market has a clearly defined mechanism
which determines the price for each transaction based on the orders
submitted by the traders. The price at each point in time is therefore
determined by demand and supply. The price changes step by step as
orders are executed. In other words: prices emerge through trading,
and trading takes place while the prices change gradually. Therefore,
there has to be uncertainty and heterogeneity among the trading
parties–otherwise, as discussed above, there would be no trading.
Furthermore, for prices to carry information, orders have to carry
information too. Since the number of orders at any given point in time
is finite, so is the impact of a single order. In fact, the empirical market
impact of an order is a strongly concave function of its volume.20
Therefore, the relative impact of small orders diverges. [BFL09]
The mechanistic emergence of prices is clearly susceptible to any
sufficiently large group of traders who submit orders based on whatever
motivation, be it erroneous. To consolidate these results with the idea
of prices reflecting fundamental values, one might presume that only
accordingly informed orders have a permanent impact. A popular
assumption is that markets include a small fraction of “noise traders”
who submit random orders that can cause temporary deviations from
fundamental values [BFL09, Lyo00]. Well informed investors (e.g.
market makers), however, should then quickly identify and eliminate
the mispricing. If, however, new relevant information arrives at the
market, these smart investors should adjust their expectations accord-
ingly, which leads to a permanent price shift. This idea can explain
excess volatility and overreaction to news, while prices still should
reflect fundamentals on average [otRSAoS13]. A common argument
for as to why the “fundamentalists” should ultimately dominate the
prices is that they buy underpriced assets (thereby driving prices up)
and sell overpriced ones (driving prices down). This strategy is ex-
20Numerous studies of continuous double auction markets suggested the best fit for
the impact function (normalised by the liquidity) to be either a square root or
logarithmic.
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pected to be highly profitable. Noise traders or trend followers should
be less successful and therefore driven out of the market [BFL09].
On the other hand, as discussed in section 10.5, there are possible
scenarios where the situation is not as clear cut (see also footnote 18
in sec. 10.6).
Empirically, however, there is little evidence that the “noise” making
up the excess volatility is mean reverting. In contrast, there is no
sign of mean reversion of prices on shorter time scales, and only
weak evidence of mean reversion on the scales of years [BGPW04,
BGV00]. This suggests that there may be a band of uncertainty around
fundamentals as large as 100%; only larger deviations would lead
to reverting dynamics [Bou10, Bla86]. It was indeed found that
uninformed mechanical price pressure due to an imbalance of demand
and supply appears to have much larger impact on price movements
than information [Hop07].
These findings may be caused in part by the inherent difficulty to
identify and interpret the relevant news. This problem even affects
professional traders (see sec. 10.4). Furthermore, several surveys in-
dicated that on short time horizons, investors tend to use “chartist”
strategies that extrapolate short-term observations. Mean-reverting
“fundamentalist” investment strategies appear to only dominate on
longer time horizons [HW09].
Another problem was identified in the very trading mechanics of
financial markets [BFL09, BGPW04, Bou10, FGL04]. Since buy
orders lead to higher prices and sell orders lead to lower prices, market
impact always influences prices to a traders disadvantage. A large
buy market order, for example, would remove not only the lowest
sell order, but also those at higher prices. Therefore, traders split
up large transactions into so-called meta orders. These meta orders
are then spread over a longer time interval (up to months) to avoid
influencing the price adversely. Therefore, order flow is correlated
over long times and the market should almost never be in equilibrium.
Prices, however, appear to move unpredictably because traders try to
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conceal their true intents. Thereby, even highly liquid markets have a
low revealed liquidity. Because the unpredictability of prices in this
picture arises not from random orders but from a delicate balance
of antagonistic market forces, a sudden correlation of market orders
from different actors may lead to a liquidity crisis that cannot be
counterbalanced by market makers. There is some evidence indicating
that vanishing revealed liquidity may have a much larger effect on
price fluctuations than volume [BFL09]. Furthermore, “large returns
are not caused by large orders” [FGL04]. Note that these findings also
constitute strong evidence against the idea that insiders reacting to
private information cause large price jumps directly.
Summing up, information processing inmarkets may be slower than
anticipated, markets may respond highly nonlinear to fluctuations,
and market granularity may matter. Such microstructure implications
can be long-lived and relevant on large scales (see also [Lyo00]).
10.7. The rise of multi-agent models
As discussed above, equilibrium models fail to reproduce the magni-
tude, distribution shape, and temporal clustering of real price fluctua-
tions. The desire of practitioners for useful risk-assessment tools led
to the use of stochastic processes that can reproduce the statistics of
real returns. The most prominent example for such a process is the
Generalised Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH)
class of processes. They model log returns as a Gaussian white noise
process with a dynamic variance which depends on previous returns as
well as on its own previous states.21 [MS00] After careful calibration
these processes can, however, at best reproduce the stylised facts on
the phenomenological level; they cannot explain how these features
arise in marktes. For this purpose, models are required that include
actual market mechanisms and link them to the observed phenomena.
21To correctly reproduce the long-range correlations of volatility clusters, GARCH
processes require explicit dependencies on a large number of previous states.
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From the late 1980s on, the idea gained momentum that market
psychology, bounded rationality, and the interaction of different trad-
ing strategies may be responsible for excess volatility and overreaction.
This idea, which goes against mainstream neoclassical economics, led
to an explosion of multi-agent models which, in addition, was fueled
by the increasing availability of computing power during the 1990s.
In these models, market dynamics arise from the explicitly modelled
actions of boundedly rational heterogeneous agents.22 Trading activ-
ity usually falls in one of two broad categories: detailed modelling of
high-frequency trading using continuous double auctions, or more
simplified blockwise trading for models that investigate the interaction
of strategies on longer time scales. Prices are usually adjusted quickly
to ensure immediate market clearing, or more slowly in order to in-
crementally reduce excess demand. Due to the enormous diversity of
multi-agent models, we can only discuss a small fraction of examples
in the following. Some more discussion can be found, for example, in
[Hom06, Lux09, Con05, FG09].
Multi-agent models are imperfect information processing systems
with internal feedback loops and, as such, can overreact to changes in
externally provided fundamentals. In manymodels, clustered volatility
arises from switching between low and high activity regimes [Con05].
This is usually caused by shifts in the composition of agent strategies
in the market. A prominent example of this type of model is presented
in [LM99b]. It contains three types of trader strategies and one asset.
Fundamentalists buy the asset if the price is below the fundamental
value and sell otherwise. The volume of the fundamentalists’ orders
grows with increasing mispricing. The fundamental value of the asset
22Many phenomena in financial markets–especially in high frequency data–can
be quantitatively explained from structural constraints alone, even if orders are
placed at random. Examples include average volatility, the shape of the average
order book, anomalous diffusion, and market impact. These zero-intelligence
models may be considered the conceptual opposite of equilibrium models. The
resulting prices in these models, however, are not efficient. A more detailed
discussion of this topic can be found, for example, in [FG09, BFL09].
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itself is determined by Gaussian white noise. There are two types of
chartists, that is, traders who bet on trends: optimists, who always buy,
and pessimists, who always sell a fixed amount of the asset. Traders
stochastically switch between strategies and the transition probabilities
depend on momentary profits earned by the different strategies. The
price increases or decreases with a probability that depends on the
excess demand. When the price is close to the fundamental value, no
strategy has an advantage and a surplus of optimists or pessimists may
arise by chance. This destabilises the market and prices drift away from
the fundamental value. With increased mispricing, fundamentalists
increase their trading volume and counter the trend. The chartists are
then no longer successful and the mispricing collapses. Volatility and
trading volume are higher during these misalignment phases23 than
in a balanced market.
Log returns for this model exhibit volatility clustering and heavy-
tailed distributions. These reasonably realistic fluctuations do not
reflect external news without bias. Instead, they are substantially driven
by the endogeneous interaction of traders. This result was argued
to contradict the EMH.24 In fact, many similar models reproduce
the stylised facts to some extent, but they disappear in equilibrium.
The latter is often reached for special parameter choices or simply
after sufficient simulation time when all strategies become equally
profitable [FG09]. An important shortcoming of this class of models,
however, is that the stylised facts are usually finite size effects [Lux09,
Lux06]. Furthermore, many models feature several coupled equations
and many parameters that have to be adjusted (about a dozen in
[LM99b]). This impedes a detailed understanding of the mechanisms
generating the stylised facts and of the dependence on parameters.
Simpler models which depend on fewer parameters still exhibit several
23Misalignment can occur in the form of bubbles with exuberant prices or anti-
bubbles where the asset is undervalued.
24The authors, however, did not explicitly discuss which forms of the EMH (see
sec. 10.2) precisely this statement referred to.
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different dynamical regimes (see also sec. 10.9). Realistic intermittent
fluctuations may be very sensitive to parameters that balance stabilising
and destabilising strategies [GB03].
One particular critique of models with strategy switching is that the
latter would have to occur on a broad range of time scales, including
very short ones. In [TFG11], it was argued that strategy switching
on many different time scales may be caused by leverage instead of
a priory different trading strategies.25 As discussed in section 10.5,
unexpected price fluctuations can force traders who use credit to
increase the profitability of successful strategies to sell into a falling
market. This mechanism creates a highly nonlinear feedback loop.
Log return fluctuations of a corresponding multi-agent model are
highly asymmetric, apparently more so than those shown above. Their
magnitudes, however, can approximate real return distributions. It
is nevertheless not clear how specific asymmetries in some market
mechanisms might account for the prevalence of very similar stylised
facts in very different markets (e.g. in FX markets, or historic stock
markets). The authors in [TFG11] suggested that the leverage cycle is
only one example of how local risk regulation can generate systemic
risk–a point to which we will come back later.
At this point, it appears as though the emergence of collective
optimisation has almost been lost. Equilibrium models attempted to
find an overreachingmechanism that could cut through the complexity
of microscopic interactions. These models, however, demand much
more from individual agents than the ideas of Adam Smith. He argued
that selfish individuals unwittingly contribute to the common good
through cooperation. Equilibrium theories usually require almost
god-like agents (see sec. 10.4 or, e.g., [FG09]). Even “as-if rationality”
as an avenue to efficiency relies on at least some agents who effectively
behave close to rational. Only these agents are assumed to thrive
in a competitive market, causing other strategies to eventually die
out [LeB11]. Among the models discussed so far, however, only few
25See also [PS10] for an empirical study on trend switching on different time scales.
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can reproduce the stylised facts of section 10.3, In these models, the
rational behaviour of value investors (the fundamentalists) gets lost
in the complexity of agent interactions and market mechanics. In
the next section, we discuss a different class of models which bring
us closer to the idea that the whole can be greater than the sum of its
parts.
10.8. Minority games
The desire to better understand the complex dynamics of multi-agent
models sparked the creation of even more stylised toy models that can
be treated analytically. Themost prominent suchmodel is theMinority
Game (MG).26 Aiming to provide a stylised theory of speculative
trading and information flow, it has receivedmuch attention, especially
in the interdisciplinary physics community, since it can be studied
using methods from statistical mechanics. Some of its features, which
are introduced below, were carried over to other models, including
those presented in the next chapters. We therefore use, whenever
possible, a consistent notation throughout this work which slightly
differs from [CMZ05b].
In MGs, agents have to repeatedly make a binary choice. In each
round, the agents whose choice is in the minority win. A simple
intuition for this rule is that the two options may represent buying
or selling an asset. When the majority of agents want to buy, the
price is likely to be high and sellers may get the better deal. When the
majority wants to sell, buyers may get the asset at a low price. High
or low with respect to what? We will come back to this question in
sections 10.9, and 11.8.
The MG sacrifices realism for simplicity to allow for a thorough
understanding of very elemental dynamics. First, in high frequency
26An extensive overview is found in [CMZ05b]. For a brief introduction see e.g.
[Mor04]
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trading, not everyone can be a winner27: the MG is a model for com-
petition, and (geometrical) frustration. Initially, the MG was meant
to be played by an uneven number of agents such that there is no nash-
equilibrium. This requirement was dropped when it became clear that
it has no influence on the results for the prevailing implementations
of the game. It goes to show, however, that the MG is intended to
study a scenario where standard game theory fails; it is in this respect
diametric to equilibrium economics.
Another fundamental feature of MGs is heterogeneity of agent
strategies–otherwise, there would be no minority. Even though the
minority rule can be applied to different scenarios, the MG became
associated with heterogeneous boolean strategies which were used in
almost all studies (see below).
Finally, the minority game is a model for coordination and the
breakdown thereof. It is a prime example for a phase transition. That
is, a transition beyond which agents cannot be understood as indepen-
dent elements anymore, allowing for coherent collective behaviours.
However, as we demonstrate in the following, the mechanisms for
extreme events in common MGs are specific to the respective imple-
mentations. We therefore take a closer look at these models in the
following sections.
10.8.1. The Original Minority Game (OMG)
In the original formalisation of the MG, the two possible actions for
each agent i at time step t are represented by 1 and −1. Agents base
their decisions on public information states. In each time step one
of D possible states, which is denoted by an index µ(t ) ∈ {1, . . . ,D},
27This statement may appear to contradict the notion that markets contribute to
the common good, even though it is actually neutral in this respect. Trading
per se does not create any wealth, and speculators are interested in short-term
exploitation of mispricing, not long-term investments. Dividends and increased
productivity due to efficient resource allocation have little influence on speculative
trading with round trips within days or even less time. See also sec. 10.2 (eq. (10.4)
in particular), sec. 10.4, and footnote 10 in sec. 10.3.
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is conveyed to the agents. A strategy maps each state onto one of
the two possible actions. Hence, 2D different strategies exist. Each
agent, however, only “knows” about S strategies. At each point in
time, each agent i uses their so far most successful strategy denoted
by si (t ) ∈ {1, . . . ,S}. Most studies focus on the case S = 2 because the
qualitative results don’t change for larger S.
More precisely, the decisions for each agent i are determined by a
strategy vector whose elements σµi ,si initially are drawn randomly out
of {0,1} and then kept constant. That is, each agent’s decision (e.g. to
buy or to sell) is predetermined at random for each µ and s.
The actions of each agent at each point in time are
ai (t )= 2σµ(t )i ,si (t )−1. (10.6)
Distinguishing between decisions σ and actions a will be relevant for
model extensions below.
The outcome of the game at each time step is
A(t )=
N∑
i=1
ai (t ) (10.7)
where N is the number of agents. Each agent keeps track of the
predictive power of their strategies using a utility score U which is
updated according to
Ui ,s(t +1)=Ui ,s(t )−ai (t )A(t ). (10.8)
The active strategy s is determined by28
si (t )= argmaxs Ui ,s(t ). (10.9)
Note that agents update all of their strategy scores at each time step,
not just the score of the active strategy.
28For analytical treatment, s is usually determined probabilistically, which leaves the
general features of the game intact.
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We consider two different methods for the generation of the in-
formation states µ. For endogenous information, agents possess a
memory of the most recent K winning decisions which are indicated
by the step function Θ(−A). This information can take one out of
D = 2K possible states:29
µ(t +1)=
K−1∑
i=0
2i Θ
(− A(t − i ))+1. (10.10)
For example, if agents had a memory of the past K = 2 returns, they
could distinguish between D = 4 possible combinations of subsequent
winning decisions: (1,1), (0,0), (1,0), and (0,1). The public informa-
tion µ(t ) ∈ {1,2,3,4} then encodes which one of these 4 states describes
the immediate history of the system.
For exogenous information, the information states are determined
exclusively by factors that are external to the market (i.e. the states of
nature). The µ(t ) here are drawn randomly and independently with
equal probabilities Pext(µ)= 1/D.
For both types of information, moderate numbers of agents cooper-
ate despite selfishly following their utility score. Figure 10.6 (a) shows
the relative strength of outcome fluctuations Var(A)/N , which was
termed “global efficiency” in the literature [CMZ05b], for different
numbers of agents. If the latter were determining their actions in
each round by flipping a coin, Var(A)/N would be constant and equal
to one.30 However, starting with few agents and then incrementally
increasing their number actually reduces the relative fluctuations up to
a certain point. For even larger N , Var(A)/N rises again and eventually
surpasses one.
29This notation is used to clarify that the sequence of winning decisions
Θ(−A(t −K +1)), . . . ,Θ(−A(t )) is the binary representation of the integer
µ(t +1)−1. In numerical simulations, it is often more convenient to use the
equivalent form µ˜(t +1)= (2µ˜(t )+Θ(−A(t ))) modD, where µ˜(t )=µ(t )−1.
30This result follows from the variance of the binomial distribution which has to be
scaled to account for actions a ∈ {−1,1}.
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Figure 10.6.: Variance and kurtosis for different numbers of speculative
agents in several minority games for D = 29. 107 time steps were discarded
to remove transients. (a), (b) Original minority game with S = 2. Blue
dashed: extrinsic information. Green dotted: intrinsic information. (c), (d)
Minority game with dynamic capitals, Np = 16, and extrinsic information.
Green dash-dotted: S = 2, γ = 0.001. Solid red: S = 2, γ = .01. Dashed
cyan: S = 2, γ = 0.1. Dotted blue: S = 1, γ = 0.01. The latter model’s
variance levels around 10−30 for α< 0.5. The horizontal grey lines in (b) and
(d) indicate expected kurtoses for: a Gaussian (3, solid line), an exponential
distribution (9, dotted line), and a very rough estimate for a real daily return
time series of the same length (30, dashed line).
196
10.8. Minority games
It was found that this behaviour is characterised by the ratio α=
D/N of the number of information states D and the number of agents
N . When there are very few agents, they behave almost as if they
were flipping coins to make their decisions. As more agents are added,
the chance increases that agents can cooperate and counteract each
others actions. There is a reason for this behaviour: if many agents use
similar strategies, they will lose more often. Therefore, the minority
rule causes agents to differentiate. Beyond a critical point αc ≈ 0.34,
however, agents start to become correlated due to the limited number
of possible independent strategies.
We conclude that the MG is a minimal model for self-organised
cooperation among selfish heterogeneous agents. It further shows
how the ability to coordinate breaks down when the agents’ strategies
become too correlated. This phase transition can actually be treated
analytically [CMZ05b].
The game never settles into an dynamic equilibrium: Var(A) is
always finite. It can, however, be efficient according to a definition of
information efficiency that is especially tailored to the MG:
H = 1
D
D∑
µ=1
E(A|µ)2, (10.11)
which measures how well the outcome A(t ) can be predicted from µ(t )
on average. For fixed D, H is a decreasing function of N . Therefore,
even games with strong herding (α>αc ) are informationally efficiency
in this sense (not shown).
What the MG still lacks at this point is a link to observables in
financial markets. If agents were to submit only market orders, then A
would correspond to the excess demand. It was argued that if trading
took part via an order book which contained a logarithmically uniform
density of limit orders, execution of the excess market orders should
displace the log price by an amount that is linearly proportional to A
[CMZ05a]. In other words,
r (t )∝ A(t ). (10.12)
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For the OMG, however, these log returns do not reproduce the heavy
tails and volatility clustering of real log returns. Figure 10.6 (b) shows
the kurtosis of A (and therefore r ) which is very close to 3 for all
α. That is, return distributions are always very close to Gaussian
distributions.
It was argued that the reason why the OMG does not exhibit the
stylised facts is that the trading volume is always constant. Therefore,
two different mechanisms for volume fluctuations were introduced,
which we discuss in the next sections. Note that these extensions
predate the empirical evidence we cited above, indicating that volume
fluctuations alone are insufficient to explain the high frequency of
extreme price jumps (e.g. [BFL09] and the references therein). Fur-
thermore, note that many features in the OMG are independent of the
mechanism which generates the information states. We will, however,
show in chapter 11 that this statement doesn’t hold for other models
with similar agent strategies, including some extensions of the OMG.
10.8.2. Dynamic capital
One method to incite non-Gaussian log-return fluctuations in the
MG is to modulate the weight of the agents’ actions according to their
previous success [CCMZ01]. In this model, agents are endowed with
some capital ci , a fraction γ of which they “invest” at each t :
ai (t )= γci (t )
(
2σ
µ(t )
i ,si (t )
−1
)
, (10.13)
where the strategy vectors σµi ,s are defined as in the OMG. Positive
actions a are interpreted as buy orders, and negative a as sell orders.
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The outcome A is equal to the excess demand (eq. (10.7)). The log
returns for this model are defined as31
r (t )= A(t )
V (t )
, (10.14)
where
V (t )=
N∑
i=1
|ai (t )| (10.15)
is the trading volume.
Finally, we distinguish between two different types of traders. The
N =Ns+Np agents are divided into Ns speculators and Np producers.
The speculators’ utility scores and capitals adapt according to their
success:
Uk,s(t +1) = Uk,s(t )−ak (t )r (t )
ck (t +1) = ck (t )−ak (t )r (t ),
}
0< k <=Ns . (10.16)
The producers have only one trading strategy and their capital is
constant:
c j (t +1)= c j , Ns < j <=Np . (10.17)
The distribution of the producer capitals has little influence on the
game dynamics [CCMZ01]. We therefore only consider the case
c j = 1 in the following.
Due to the simplifications in this model, capital in the case with
only speculators is not conserved, but vanishes over time. Therefore,
producers are absolutely necessary to maintain a nonzero trading
volume. Furthermore, γ needs to be sufficiently small to ensure that
the agents’ capitals remain positive at all times. Consequently, previous
studies focused on the case γ¿ 1. The dependence of the game
dynamics on γ was, however, so far apparently not investigated in
31In [CCMZ01], the log returns are defined as r (t )=−A(t )/V (t ). This is a quite
peculiar choice since an a positive excess demand would then lower the price. We
therefore here adopted the convention used in [GZ09] for the log returns, utility
scores, and capitals (see below).
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detail. It was even claimed that γ has little influence as long as it is
small enough (without showing results to back this claim). This is
somewhat surprising, since the heavy return tails vanish for γ→ 0, a
case which has been investigated before [CCMZ01].
Figure 10.6 (c) shows the log return variance plotted against ratio
α of the strategy complexity and the number of speculators for four
different parameter combinations. Three curves were obtained for
S = 2 and different γ. All three exhibit a phase transition which is
shifted towards larger α compared to the OMG, and which lacks the
steep increase of fluctuations for small α. Strikingly, larger γ lead
to less variance for small α, that is, for large numbers of speculators.
For S = 1 the phase transition is less shifted, but α< 0.5 becomes an
absorbing phase even for small γ.
Figure 10.6 (d) shows the kurtoses for the same simulations also
shown in (c). For S = 2, the kurtoses exhibit maxima for α< 1. These
maxima are both higher and located closer to α= 1 for larger γ. For
S = 1, there is no notable excess kurtosis.
Several of these findings have not been reported in the existing MG
literature. On the contrary, several contradicting claims were made.
First, we have clearly shown that γ has a much stronger influence on
the game dynamics than claimed in [CCMZ01].32
Furthermore, it was claimed in [GZ09] that the model exhibits
heavy tailed log returns close to the phase transition also for S = 1.
The authors show two examples, at least one of which they admit
contains transients. This author was, however, not able to confirm
that the parameters in question, or any other set of parameters for
S = 1, give rise to any heavy log return tails that are not artefacts
due to transients or averaging over repeated simulations. There are
actually strong arguments why there should be no heavy tails for S = 1.
This discussion, however, requires the results from chapter 11. It
therefore has to be postponed. Either way, the Probability Density
32There, the log return variance was shown only on a linear scale, and the kurtosis
was not investigated.
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Figure 10.7.: Distribution of log returns for the minority game with dynamic
capitals at the critical point. D = 29, Ns = 1506, Np = 16, S = 2, γ= 0.01,
extrinsic information. 107 time steps were discarded to remove transients.
(a): PDF. (b): CCDF.
Functions (PDFs) shown in [GZ09] appear to resemble exponential
distributions much more closely than power laws. This impression
leads to another shortcoming of the existing literature: The log returns
in nearly all publications on MGs are investigated using PDFs in semi
logarithmic coordinates. This makes it very difficult to judge whether
the distributions resemble power-laws. Many of these PDFs don’t
exhibit strongly convex tails, which would be expected for power-laws.
Figure 10.7 shows both the PDF in semi logarithmic coordinates
and the CCDF in double logarithmic coordinates for the MG with
S = 2, γ= 0.01. The number of speculators maximises the kurtosis for
these parameters (see fig. 10.6 (d)). The return distributions are heavy
tailed and may exhibit a short scaling regime, but large returns are
exponentially truncated. When increasing the sample size, only the
truncated regime grows, not the power-law.33 Other parameter sets
did not yield more realistic results, except for very short time series
where the truncation is not as apparent. A pronounced truncation was
33In part II, we found the opposite result for true power-laws that only appear to
be truncated due to temporal correlations. See also fig. B.5 for an example of a
market model which generates power laws without severe truncation.
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not found for real returns in section 10.3. Nevertheless, the return
fluctuations for this model are quite promising when considered in
relation to the model’s simplicity. Note that Figure 10.7 (a) closely
resembles figure 3 in [CCMZ01]. Log returns for the parameters used
in figure 10.7 also exhibit correlated return magnitudes consistent
with [CCMZ01] (not shown).
As a preliminary conclusion, we found that strategy switching and
capital redistribution are distinct adaptation mechanisms with some-
how different properties. The latter mechanism seems to be more
capable at balancing the impacts of different strategies. Capital redis-
tribution on its own can also overcome the herding due to correlated
strategies in the OMG. However, heavy tailed log return distribu-
tions and volatility clustering in the MG presented in this section
only emerge for a combination of both mechanisms, and close to
the critical point. “What happens at the critical point awaits further
investigations.”[CCC+13] Note that we did not investigate intrinsic
information in this section, and neither did the authors in the existing
literature on MGs with evolving capital. We will discuss these models
again in section 11.8.
10.8.3. The Grand Canonical Minority Game (GCMG)
Another mechanism for volume fluctuations is to allow unsuccessful
agents to choose not to play. In distinction to the OMG, the agents’
in the GCMG [CM03] have only one strategy. Their actions are
determined by
ai (t )= θ(Ui (t ))
(
2σ
µ(t )
i −1
)
. (10.18)
The utility scores are
Ui ,s(t +1)=Ui ,s(t )−ai (t )A(t )−²i , (10.19)
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where ²i is a threshold below which agents don’t participate.34 The
agents are again divided into Ns adaptive speculators, and Np non-
adaptive producers:
² j = ², 0< j <=Ns (10.20)
²k =−∞, Ns < k <=Np . (10.21)
The return is defined as
r (t )= A(t ). (10.22)
That is, it is identical to the outcome given by equation (10.7). There-
fore, the log return in the GCMG is equivalent to the excess demand,
and the volume is equivalent to the number of participating agents.
Figure 10.8 shows the model dynamics after transients for the same
parameters used to showcase the models properties in figure 4.5 in
[CMZ05b]. The GCMG exhibits characteristic volatility clusters that
grow slowly and end abruptly. The return distributions for the GCMG
in the this dynamical regime exhibit power law tails [CM03].
The dynamics of the GCMG can be understood intuitively. First,
a very large number of agents is required.35 In each round, due to the
minority rule, most agents lose. This causes the speculators to leave
the market. Because the nearly empty market is highly predictable, the
inactive speculators begin to increase their scores again. This causes an
influx of many agents with correlated strategies who give rise to strong
fluctuations. The speculators start to lose again; the cycle repeats itself.
The GCMG is essentially a model for irrational fads. In fact, the
herding described above vanishes as soon as the speculators consider
that they themselves have an impact on the market [CMZ05b]. Does
34Similar to the OMG, analytical calculations are performed for probabilistic partic-
ipation.
35Several authors, e.g. in [CM03], have stated that the stylised facts emerge near the
critical point. Best results, however, require many more speculators. The reader
may confirm by e.g. comparing figures 1 and 2 in [CM03] that heavy tails start
to emerge approximately a factor 10 away from the phase transition.
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Figure 10.8.: Log return, trading volume, and log price for the grand canon-
ical minority game with D = 25, Ns = 9600, Np = 320, ² = 0.01, and
extrinsic information. 106 time steps transient were discarded. The smaller
right columns show 250 steps before and after an extreme price jump. Ver-
tical axes are shared along each row. The highest peaks for the return and
volume are cut off in order to keep smaller fluctuations visible.
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the model correctly capture empirical results? First, as discussed in
section 10.6, several studies found that volume alone is not a good ex-
planation for extreme price jumps. Second, in the GCMG, the volatil-
ity is high before new price extrema, and low afterwards (fig. 10.8).
This appears to be the opposite of the volatility profiles shown in
[PS10] (figs. 2 and 3 ibid.). Nevertheless, it might be possible that
the GCMG describes dynamics which do occur in real markets, but
don’t cause the majority of the extreme price fluctuations in the same
way as they do in the model.
The GCMG also suffers from several more formal problems. The
herding behaviour described above is only a finite size effect. It van-
ishes for D > 25, or if noise is introduced to the model [CM03]. Even
for small systems, the dynamics depend on the particular initialisation
of the agent strategies. For about half of the simulations, the spec-
ulators will stay inactive after they first left the market. This latter
problem, however, can be remedied by introducing a forgetting term
in the utility function [CDMMC06]. Yet, this author found that even
this latter model requires extensive parameter tuning to yield stable
dynamics. Furthermore, the return distributions in this model tend
to exhibit either early truncated tails, or bimodal price jumps. This
can also be seen clearly in figures 3 and 4 in [CDMMC06].
The literature contains few MGs where agents can choose to not
participate in addition to having dynamical capitals. These models
seem to be able to generate heavy tailed log return distributions and
volatility clusters. There appears, however, to be no detailed study
of the interaction of the different effects in these models [CCMZ01,
CMZ05a].
Despite certain problems with specific implementations, the MG
greatly advanced the field of multi-agent modelling. The MG with
dynamic capital seems to be a more promising starting point for a
minimalistic market model than the GCMG.
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10.9. Other statistical mechanics models
By demonstrating the applicability of statistical mechanics to socio-
economic problems, the MG inspired many similar models. The
first obvious variation is a majority game, which is highly unstable.
Such a game corresponds to a market consisting entirely of trend
followers. Therefore, several mixed minority-majority games were
investigated which exhibit complex dynamics with stable and unstable
phases [CMZ05a]. For some researchers, a major concern was that
the MG payoff
gi (t )=−ai (t )A(t ) (10.23)
might be too simple to characterise trading success. Here, ai (t ) is the
action of agent i at time t , and A(t ) is the outcome (see sec. 10.8).
Payoffs in real markets follow from transactions at different points in
time [AS03, CMZ05a] like, for example, buying an asset and selling it
at a higher price. No consistent single-round payoff was found unless
it is based on an agents expectation of future prices. Therefore, several
alternatives to the minority rule were proposed. One such payoff was
introduced in the $-game [AS03]:
gi (t +1)= ai (t )A(t +1). (10.24)
This model includes speculators and a market maker. In contrast to
the OMG, the $-game exhibits two phases: a majority phase where
speculators profit, and a mean reverting phase where the market maker
profits.
A much more complex model was introduced in [GB03]. It features
an intertemporal payoff, different trader species who may chose to
not participate or to temporarily act like a different species, dynamic
capitals, and a set of rules for market clearing and asset conservation.
The model dynamics exhibits three main regimes: oscillatory, stable,
and intermittent. The authors suggested that the many different
aspects of the model dynamics could be understood as thoroughly as
the MG by investigating simplified versions of the full model.
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Finally, the model investigated in [Bor01, KBF02, KB13, KBB12]
features a two-dimensional grid of interacting agents, similar to the
Ising model in solid state physics. These agents interact probabilisti-
cally via a “magnetic field”. The local field consists of a majority term
for the nearest neighbour interaction, and a minority term with re-
spect to the global magnetisation. The latter is essentially a normalised
excess demand. In addition, fundamentalist agents have knowledge
of a “fundamental price” which is determined by a random walk. The
fundamentalists have a stabilising effect on the price, and scale their
volume proportionally to the mispricing. This model exhibits quiet
phases with little magnetisation, and bubble phases with strong mag-
netisation and large fluctuations. These dynamics resemble those of
the model presented in [LM99b] (see also sec. 10.7). The spin model,
however, is formally much simpler. It is also one of the more robust
models for the generation of realistic stylised facts (as they are defined
above). However, since the spin model structurally is much closer re-
lated to physical models than to economic ones, it is somehow difficult
to interpret. For example, agents in this model have no real incentive
to act in a certain way since there is no payoff, utility, or capital. It
is also not clear to which real-world interaction the grid corresponds.
Nevertheless, there is a surprising connection between this model and
the results presented in chapter 12, which we discuss in chapter 14.
In the next chapter, we implement some elements from the MG
without an explicit minority rule. The resulting trading model im-
proves the realism of several aspects of the MG with minimal formal
complexity.
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11. An inherent instability of efficient
markets
“ Everything should be made as simple as possible,but not simpler.”
Albert Einstein1
In this chapter, we show that speculative markets which absorb self-
generated information can exhibit both evolution towards efficient
equilibrium states and their subsequent destabilisation. In other words,
we pursue the novel approach to modelling price fluctuations outlined
in section 10.1.3.
First, however, we briefly explain the motivation for this approach
based on the insights gained in the last chapter. We then introduce
a minimal agent-based market model where the impacts of trading
strategies naturally adapt according to their success. This model can
quantitatively reproduce the stylised facts introduced in section 10.3.
The model dynamics are investigated analytically and numerically
in great detail. These results were published in [PP13]. Finally, we
discuss similarities and differences compared to MGs.
11.1. Motivation
In chapter 10, we reviewed considerable evidence that financial markets
are approximately information efficient in the sense that prices adjust
1This may be a paraphrase [O’T14]
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to reflect certain information and cannot be easily predicted. Obvious
mispricing, e.g. between different markets, is eliminated rapidly. More
subtle statistical inefficiencies like predictable return patterns exist,
but they tend to be eliminated over time (although new ones may
appear).
The EMH, though, is commonly understood to imply much more.
Prices are also thought to reflect the “right information” in the “right
way”. That is, information on the future earning potential of an
asset, (eq. (10.1)) which depends on fundamental factors relating
to the real economy. Prices in an ideal market should rapidly relax
towards their equilibrium values, thereby absorbing the fundamental
information such that only relevant new information causes significant
price changes.
Attempts to explain prices from “fundamental values”, however,
were largely unsuccessful: Prices move too much and exhibit consid-
erable jumps far too often to represent the arrival of “fundamental”
information. These price jumps are not caused by single large orders
either. Traders–even those with private information–should avoid
such orders anyway in order to minimise market impact to their own
disadvantage.
Alternative explanations face several challenges. Collective dynam-
ics may emerge that don’t trivially follow from the behaviour of in-
dividual agents. On the one hand, if psychological biases and naive
trend following dominated the market, this should create arbitrage
opportunities. On the other hand, real traders are heterogeneous and
not hyper-rational, as assumed by many economic theories. Other-
wise they would not even trade. Furthermore, the “stylised facts” for
empirical log returns have been observed in very different present and
historical markets. They should therefore robustly emerge from very
elemental properties of speculative trading. Yet, they cannot be easily
explained by simple market failure.
Here we investigate whether the seemingly contradictory features of
price changes arise in speculative markets which absorb self-generated
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information. It was demonstrated in chapter 7 that adaptive control
of a dynamical system can generically lead to an instability where
the susceptibility to noise dramatically increases close to the point
of perfect balance. This principle would apply to markets if two
requirements were fulfilled: First, markets need to absorb information
about predictable price changes. As we discussed above, this is a
rather common view in economics. Ideally, this property should hold
independently of the rationality of the individual traders, which cannot
be guaranteed. Second, a self-referential market would have to become
susceptible to residual noise once all locally relevant information has
been exploited. This property is actually intuitive, too. As traders
try to detect trends or patterns in the price dynamics, they effectively
predict how the market will react to available information. However,
once the agents’ actions have led to a balanced equilibrium, it becomes
increasingly difficult to distinguish predictable price fluctuations from
random noise. If traders then continue to act upon the random
fluctuations as if they would hold meaningful new information, their
actions will not be balanced anymore. That is, it may be impossible to
predict whether a group of traders will overreact to the supposedly new
information and to attenuate the resulting price jump by exploiting it.
Therefore, atypically large price movements may become much more
likely than expected for a Gaussian distribution.
11.2. A minimal trading model
As a concrete example of the fundamental dynamical instability arising
from information absorption as it may be realised in financial mar-
kets, we introduce a minimal agent-based trading model. Each agent
i = 1, . . . ,N is representative of one trading strategy and possesses two
types of assets which are called money Mi (t ) and stocks Si (t ) in the
following. For simplicity, we consider a coarse-grained price time se-
ries where one step t could be considered as e.g. a day. In each trading
step, each agent either offers an amount of money to buy stocks or an
amount of stocks in exchange for money. The decision which action
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to take depends deterministically on a public information state, and
on the agent’s strategy. In each time step one of D possible states,
which is denoted by an index µ(t ), is conveyed to the agents.
In a speculative market, traders react to information that can orig-
inate from both past prices, and any kind of external news. Both
may potentially influence the agents’ behaviour and therefore might
ultimately lead to price changes which could be exploited. Therefore,
we use the same consistent representation for both endogenous and
exogenous information as in section 10.8.
Here, however, endogenous information encodes the most recent
K signs of the log returns which indicate whether the prices p(t −K ),
. . . ,p(t −1) decreased or increased with respect to their predecessors:
µ(t )=
K−1∑
i=0
2i Θ
(
r (t − i −1)+η(t − i −1))+1 (11.1)
where Θ is the step function, and η is an arbitrarily small symmetric
random variable with zero mean.2 3 This information is publicly
available and can be considered to provide an important information
about the state of the market.
For exogenous information we use the same notation but envision
a binary encoding of external information. For simplicity, the µ(t )
here are drawn randomly and independently with probability Pext(µ).
Unless stated otherwise, all µ have equal probabilities Pext(µ)= 1/D.
It is possible to generalise the encoding to allow for mixed information.
The results are similar to the endogenous case (sec. B.1.2).
2The noise term is included only to prevent the theoretical possibility of the game
“getting stuck” in one information state. Simulation results do not depend on
Var(η) as long as it is small enough.
3For an intuitive example, consider again the case K = 2. Agents could then
distinguish between D = 2K = 4 possible combinations of subsequent price
movements: (up, up), (down, down), (up, down), and (down, up). In other
words, the public information µ(t ) ∈ {1,2,3,4} encodes the direction of the price
change from time t −3 to t −2, and of the price change from t −2 to t −1.
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Each agent’s decisions are determined by a strategy vector whose
elements σµi initially are drawn randomly out of {0,1} and then kept
constant. These two possible decisions here correspond to trading an
amountmi (t ) of money or an amount si (t ) of stocks for the respective
other asset in the next time step. Orders are placed with a constant
use parameter γ:
Case σµ(t )i = 1 (agent i buys stocks):
mi (t ) = γMi (t ) (11.2)
si (t ) = 0
Case σµ(t )i = 0 (agent i sells stocks):
mi (t ) = 0
si (t ) = γSi (t ) (11.3)
Demand and supply are the sums of all buy and sell orders respectively
δ(t ) =
N∑
i=1
mi (t )+² (11.4)
ς(t ) =
N∑
i=1
si (t )+² (11.5)
where ²¿ 1 is a small positive number.4 At each time t the price p(t )
is determined from the ratio of demand and supply, respectively:
p(t )= δ(t )
ς(t )
(11.6)
with demand δ and supply of stocks ς. This price naturally has the
correct unit. Finally, all trades are performed at this price p(t ), similar
4This ensures that prices and returns are always well defined. The cases with zero
demand or supply are, however, irrelevant for all practical purposes. A sufficiently
small ²¿ 10−3 does not influence simulation results to a meaningful degree. All
figures were generated using ²= 10−10.
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to market orders except that here the exchange of money and stocks
is executed synchronously for all orders of all agents at the same
time t . This is a fair rule that could be used in a real market with
only market orders executed at distinct points in time. In contrast
to other minimalistic market models (secs. 10.8.2, and 10.9), this
simple trading rule conserves the total amounts of the assets that are
exchanged in a trade, as it should if trading fees can be neglected. 5 6
We focus on markets that are dominated by Ns ≤ N speculators
who can only win or lose assets by betting on price changes within the
market.
Mk (t +1) = Mk (t )−mk (t )+ sk (t )p(t )
Sk (t +1) = Sk (t )− sk (t )+mk (t )/p(t )
}
0< k <=Ns .
(11.7)
To investigate the effect of a small number of traders that convey new
assets to the market or draw out their profits, we further allow for
Np =N−Ns producers. In contrast to the set of agents representing the
speculators, the producers’ resources are defined to remain constant.
M j (t ) = M j (0)
S j (t ) = S j (0)
}
Ns < j <=Np . (11.8)
5Another rule with asset conservation is presented in [GB03], but it requires a much
more complex set of equations.
6This rule can be further justified by the following argument. For a market in-
cluding stochastic limit orders gathered over some period of time, consider the
hypothetical price p∗(t ) at which trades would take place if all agents scaled their
orders by a common factor. Then the volume would change, but to preserve
market clearing the price cannot be affected; that is p(t )∗ = p(t ). Therefore,
the price is a function of the ratio of demand and supply. After linearisation
of this function for small small excess demands the price is proportional to the
aforementioned ratio which justifies this choice of the pricing rule also as an
approximation of the mean prices obtained from limit orders. Note that the price
is also invariant against a fraction of unexecuted orders, if this fraction is the same
for demand and supply.
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Since the strategies of the producers are chosen in the same way as for
the speculators, they also deterministically depend on the information
state. Therefore, the producers contribute predictable amounts of
liquidity and stocks to the market. These demands and supplies
can then be exploited by the speculators, who are competitive and
redistribute their possessions. Initially, all agents are provided with
equal amounts of assets Mi (0)= Si (0)= 1.
11.3. Stylised facts
A log return time-series for the model with exogenous information is
shown in figure 11.1 (a). A strong reduction of initial fluctuations is
observed, leaving only a narrow band of Gaussian distributed returns
after the transient. Figure 11.1 (b) shows the endogenous case. Here,
in contrast, initial return magnitudes are reduced only in the mean.
The magnitudes of the few most extreme returns, however, are less
reduced. The remaining fluctuations are analysed in figure 11.2 (a),
where cumulative distributions of return magnitudes are shown for
both cases and compared to the DJIA. The latter serves as an example
for a typical price time series. For the endogenous case, the distribution
tail is well described by a power-law and in good agreement with the
DJIA. The latter exhibits a slightly steeper slope than the average
simulation for the model (dark grey area in figure 11.2 (a)), but this
may be a chance result.7 We don’t present more detailed significance
tests here, since we can at best expect a rough correspondence between
a real market index and a model at this level of abstraction anyway.
The distribution tails for the model are not truncated and are as stable
under accumulation as those for real log returns, as shown in the
section B.3.
7In [PP13], we used the DJIA time series obtained from [Dep08]. This time series
contains several presumably spurious extreme returns that are not present in any
other data source for the DJIA ([Wil13, Fed13b], and others). Therefore, we
here show the data obtained from [Wil13]. As a side effect, the very end of the
CCDF slope for the DJIA here is slightly steeper than [PP13].
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Figure 11.1.: Log returns for the tradingmodel. (a): Time series of the model
with uniformly distributed exogenous information. Parameters: Ns = 210,
Np = 0, D = 29, γ= 0.85. (b): Time series for the same model, but with
endogenous information.
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Figure 11.2.: Analysis of the log returns (methods as in sec. 10.3). (a)CCDF.
Dotted black: The same simulation as in fig. 11.1(a). Solid black: the same
simulation as in fig. 11.1(b). Dashed cyan: Daily returns for the DJIA. Short
red line: power-law fitted to the simulation. For a fair comparison, only
the last 3.5 ·104 of 107 total time steps were analysed for the simulations
to match the length of the DJIA time series. The dark and light grey areas
cover one and two standard deviations, respectively, around the average of
100 simulations with the same parameters. (b): Autocorrelations of the
log return magnitudes |r |. Line styles are identical to (a). Here, both the
example simulation and the DJIA stay within one standard deviation of the
model average (dark grey area).
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Return fluctuations in the endogenous case tend to form clusters
in time. This effect is quantified by long-range temporal correlations
of return magnitudes shown in figure 11.2 (b) and is also consistent
with the DJIA. The only systematic difference is the initial decay of
the correlations for lags of few days. This decay is slower for the DJIA
than for the model, which might be due to the synchronous trading
on each time step in the model.
11.4. Market efficiency as a form of collective learning
To understand the model dynamics, we first consider the exogenous
case, which is fully analytically tractable. As we show in the following,
the rules of asset redistribution by trading are equivalent to a learning
rule related to gradient descent where γ is a learning rate. Therefore,
the market as a whole minimises predictable price changes. The reason
for this stabilising control is that trading success increases the impact
of agents whose actions contribute to a reduction of price fluctuations.
Note that since agents represent trading strategies and not individual
traders, γ determines how fast relative impacts of different strategies
are adjusted; it does not necessarily reflect how much of their resources
actual traders would put at risk.
A phase transition with respect to the critical parameter α=D/Ns
is identified at α= 1/2, the point where random binary vectors (the
agents) with positive weights (the assets) form a complete basis in the
D-dimensional strategy space in the limit Ns→∞. Beyond this point,
a speculative market without producers evolves the distribution of
assets onto a manifold where the price is invariant to trading. That is,
agents still trade and exchange assets, but the price remains constant.
Markets that also include producers still exhibit finite returns for
α< 1/2. Otherwise, for Np ¿Ns , return distributions only depend
weakly on Np (see sec. B.1.1).
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11.4.1. Invariant Manifold
Here we show that if one distribution of resources (M ,S) = (M1,
. . . ,MN ,S1, . . . ,SN ) exists for which the price p(M ,S,µ) = p is inde-
pendent of the information µ, this price is invariant with respect to
any resource redistribution due to trading in a purely speculative mar-
ket. That is, there is a manifold Q = {(M ′,S′) | p(M ′,S′,µ)= p ∀ µ} of
distributions of stocks for which the price is independent of µ and this
manifold is closed with respect to trading according to equation (11.7).
For the proof, assume that at some point in time the system is in a
suitable state such that
δ(M ,µ)
ς(S,µ)
= p ∀ µ(t )⇔ (11.9)
δ(M ,µ)−p ς(S,µ) =
γ
N∑
i=1
(
σ
µ
i M i −p (1−σ
µ
i )Si
)
= 0 ∀ µ(t ). (11.10)
Then, denoting the distributions of stocks and money after trading by
M
′
i and S
′
i we obtain:
1
γ
(
δ(M
′
,µ′)−p ς(S′,µ′)
)
=
N∑
i=1
σ
µ′
i M
′
i −p
N∑
i=1
(1−σµ′i )S
′
i
=
N∑
i=1
σ
µ′
i
(
M i −γσµi M i +γp (1−σ
µ
i )Si
)
−p
N∑
i=1
(1−σµ′i )
(
Si −γ (1−σµi )Si +
γ
p
σ
µ
i M i
)
=
N∑
i=1
(
σ
µ′
i M i −p (1−σ
µ′
i )Si
)
−γ
N∑
i=1
(
σ
µ
i M i −p (1−σ
µ
i )Si
)
= 0−0= 0 
(11.11)
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Figure 11.3.: Average log return variances for different values of α=D/Ns .
The model with exogenous information and only speculators serves as a
reference. For comparison, simulations with a small numbers of either
deterministic (Np = 24) or random producers (Nn = 24, see main text) are
shown as well as as the model with endogenous information. Grey area:
Analytical upper and lower limit for exogenous information. Dark grey line:
heuristic interpolation.
11.4.2. Completeness of the Strategies
As shown above, finding a resource distribution (M ,S) for which the
price is independent of the information is a sufficient condition for
complete suppression of all price changes. That is,
p(µ,M ,S) = p ∀ µ (11.12)
which is equivalent to equation (11.10). To fulfil this criterion, we
need enough agents to form a complete basis in the strategy space,
which has D dimensions. Then, the deviation from p caused by each
agent can be cancelled by a superposition of the other agents for every
µ. This can be guaranteed if the number of speculators Ns exceeds
2D.
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For an insufficient number of speculators, we can still calculate an
upper and a lower bound for the variance of the log returns given
D and N for a perfect superposition of speculators with exogenous
information. Numerical and analytical results for this case are shown
in figure 11.3. The mean variance is found to drop dramatically at
α = D/Ns = 1/2, with an increasingly sharp transition for large D
(not shown). This phase transition can be understood by considering
the probability that a random binary vector can be cancelled by an
optimal superposition of N −1 random binary vectors with positive
weights.
As an interim step, consider superpositions of random vectors with
arbitrary weights. One such vector creates a one-dimensional subspace.
Adding a second vector expands the dimensionality of the subspace
to d2 = 2 if it is linearly independent of the first one. Adding further
vectors one by one, the probability that the i th vector does not lie in
a di−1-dimensional submanifold is
P (di = di−1+1)= 1−2di−1−D . (11.13)
We can therefore iteratively calculate the probability distribution
P (dNs−1) of d after adding Ns −1 agents and the probability
P (dNs = dNs−1+1)=
D∑
d=1
P (d = dNs−1) (1−2d−D ) (11.14)
that one out of Ns agents is linearly independent of the others. If a
vector is linearly independent of the other agents in d dimensions, it
cannot be cancelled by a linear combination of the other agents for all
µ. However, it may still be possible to cancel this agent’s impact for
a subset of all possible µ, i.e. for a smaller subspace. Therefore, the
probability that an agent cannot be cancelled in any given time step is
Pc.c. =
D∑
d=1
P (d = dNs−1)
(
1−2d−D
) (
1− d
D
)
. (11.15)
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The last term weights each summand with the fraction of dimensions
in which the agent’s impact is not cancelled. Finally, to relate the
fraction of not-cancelled agents to log returns, we need to consider the
fluctuations prior to any resource redistribution. Since all strategies
and µ are chosen randomly, agents initially contribute to the demand
or the supply at random. These fluctuations of demand and supply
then follow a binomial distribution with Ns trials and equal probability
for buying or selling:
δ∝B(Ns ,1/2) (11.16)
ς∝B(Ns ,1/2). (11.17)
Since
E(δ)=E(ς)=Ns/2, and (11.18)
Var(δ)=Var(ς)=Ns/4, (11.19)
we can approximate the price for small deviations:
p = N/2+∆δ
N/2−∆ς ≈ 1+2
∆δ−∆ς
Ns
. (11.20)
Therefore,
E(p(0)) = 1, (11.21)
Var(p(0)) ≈ 4/Ns , (11.22)
and finally
E(r (0)) = 0, (11.23)
Var(r (0)) ≈ 8
Ns
. (11.24)
Combining equations (11.15) and (11.24), we obtain the expected
variance of the log return for an optimal superposition of agents
without the positivity constraint on the resources
Var(r )=Var(r (0)) Pc.c.. (11.25)
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Since resources cannot be negative, they form a positive cone. Each
agent that is linearly independent of the others spans a half space.
Therefore, 2Ns agents are necessary to completely span the strategy
space. Yet for small numbers of agents, each agent still represents a
full degree of freedom, since the probability that two agents lie on
the same 1-dimensional submanifold is vanishingly small. However,
as the number of agents is increased such that α→ 1, an increasingly
large number of new agents only converts a halfspace into a full one.
Therefore, equation (11.25) represents a lower limit for the variance
of the log returns, which is a good description for Ns¿D. An upper
limit is obtained by changing equation (11.15) such that each agent
increases d by 1/2. This is a good approximation for Ns ≈ 2D. The
area in between these limits is shown in figure 11.3 (shaded grey). The
lower limit has a phase transition at α= 1 while the upper limit has
a phase transition at α = 1/2. A phase transition at α = 1 is already
present in equation (11.14). The gradual convergence for the true
variance of the system from the lower to the upper limit is captured by
a simple heuristic interpolation: for the dark grey line in figure 11.3,
the probability for a new linearly independent agent to increase d by
one is P1 =min(1,Ns/2m+1) while the probability to increase d by
1/2 is P1/2 = 1−p1. The presented theory describes the numerical
results (figure 11.3) for the model with endogenous information very
well for α≤ 1/2. For full markets, the residual error for simulations
with only speculators is determined by the numerical precision.
When producers are present, the residual error is noticeably higher.
This is due to the fact that producers push the system off the invariant
manifold. This error depends on the agents’ use and vanishes for
small γ. Still, predictable producers are cancelled much better than
chance because speculators can successfully predict their choices. For
comparison, in figure 11.3, results are shown also for Nn modified
“noisy” producers, who buy or sell randomly with equal probabilities.
For endogenous information (D = 2K ), the phase transition appears
smoother and slightly shifted towards larger α. A stronger reduction of
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average returns for α< 1/2 occurs due to the more localised adaptation.
That is, for prolonged periods of time, agents only have to adapt to
subsets of all possible µ. The phase transition is independent of γ and
the agents initial capitals, as shown in Figures 11.6 and B.4.
11.4.3. Gradient Descent
We now investigate how the system evolves towards the invariant
manifold. We focus on large numbers of agents and small γ. The
resource redistribution due to subsequently trading the two assets for
one another is found to be a special case of a learning rule which
minimises log return magnitudes. Even more generally, we consider
the error function
e = r 2 (11.26)
and show that its gradient
∂e
∂X
= 2r ∂r
∂X
, X ∈ {M1, . . . ,MN ,S1, . . . ,SN } (11.27)
with respect to the agents’ resources is dominated by terms with the
opposite sign as the change in the agents’ resources. Therefore, any
scaling of the agents’ resources, which keeps the sign of the return for
money and the opposite sign for stocks, corresponds to minimising
log return magnitudes similar to a gradient descent.
To begin with, consider two subsequent time steps where the in-
formation takes the states denoted by µ and µ′ respectively. We again
examine a market consisting of speculators only. The derivative of the
return with respect to the resources of an agent k is
∂r (M ,S,µ,µ′)
∂Mk
=
σ
µ′
k
δ′
−
σ
µ
k
δ
+O(γ) (11.28)
∂r (M ,S,µ,µ′)
∂Sk
=
1−σµk
ς
−
1−σµ′k
ς′
+O(γ), (11.29)
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with
δ= δ(M ,µ), δ′ = δ(M ′,µ′), (11.30)
ς= ς(S,µ), ς′ = ς(S′,µ′). (11.31)
The change in resources after trading twice is
∆Mk =M ′′k −Mk (11.32)
= γ
(
Sk
(
(1−σµk )p+ (1−σ
µ′
k )p
′)−Mk (σµ′k +σµk ))+O(γ2) (11.33)
∆Sk = S′′k −Sk (11.34)
= γ
Mk
σµ′k
p ′
+
σ
µ
k
p
−Sk (2−σµk −σµ′k )
+O(γ2). (11.35)
We are interested in
∆rk =
(
∆Mk
∂r
∂Mk
+∆Sk
∂r
∂Sk
)
(11.36)
and continue only with leading terms in γ.
For now, we also assume that agents can only perform round-trip
trades (indicated by “RT” in equations). The general case will be
discussed later. This means that agents buy in one step and sell in the
next or vice versa:
Case σµk (1−σ
µ′
k )= 1:
∆rRTk
γ
γ¿1≈ Mk −p
′Sk
δ
− Mk/p−Sk
ς′
(11.37)
= Mk
δ
(
1− ς
ς′
)
+ Sk
ς′
(
1− δ
′
δ
)
(11.38)
Case σµ
′
k (1−σ
µ
k )= 1:
∆rRTk
γ
γ¿1≈ pSk −Mk
δ′
+ Mk/p
′−Sk
ς
(11.39)
= Mk
δ′
(
ς′
ς
−1
)
+ Sk
ς
(
δ
δ′
−1
)
. (11.40)
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Above, we used p = δ/ς and p ′ = δ′/ς′. Then,
1
γ
N∑
k=1
∆rRTk =
ς′
ς
− ς
ς′
+ δ
δ′
− δ
′
δ
(11.41)
= ς
′
ς
(1− p
′
p
)+ ς
ς′
(
p
p ′
−1)
{
< 0, r > 0
> 0, r < 0 . (11.42)
Therefore, the change in the total error function
N∑
k=1
(
∆Mk
∂r 2
∂Mk
+∆Sk
∂r 2
∂Sk
)
RT≤ 0 (11.43)
can never be positive if agents only perform round-trip trades.
On average, this result holds even for the general case. The reason
we have to consider averages is that those agents who buy or sell
two times in a row always decrease the amount of money or stocks
they own after two time steps. These agents’ resources are therefore
expected to change in the opposite direction of the gradient half of
the time. That is, for every given pair of informations (µ,µ′), a quarter
of all agents is expected to have their resources evolve such that they
contribute to a future increase in r (µ,µ′)2. For large systems, however,
the actual influence of these agents is negligible. This is shown in the
next paragraph.
Demand and supply are well described by binomial processes for
sufficiently large systems, as shown above. Here, we express demand
and supply as:
δ= N
2
+∆δ, E(∆δ)= 0, E(∆δ2)≤ N
4
(11.44)
ς= N
2
+∆ς, E(∆ς)= 0, E(∆ς2)≤ N
4
. (11.45)
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The relative fluctuations around the mean demand N/2 are only
p
N/2
and hence small for largeN.We can therefore expand equations (11.28)
and (11.29) for small fluctuations:
∂r (M ,S,µ,µ′)
∂Mk
≈σµ′k
(
2
N
− 4∆δ
′
N2
)
−σµk
(
2
N
− 4∆δ
N2
)
(11.46)
∂r (M ,S,µ,µ′)
∂Sk
≈ (1−σµk )
(
2
N
− 4∆ς
N2
)
− (1−σµ′k )
(
2
N
− 4∆ς
′
N2
)
.
(11.47)
As the above equations show, agents who perform round-trip trades
contribute a term of order N−1 to the gradient with respect to each
asset. When agents buy or sell twice, they only contribute a term of
order N−1.5 for one asset. Therefore, the influence of these agents
vanishes for sufficiently large N . By a similar argument, approximately
a quarter of all agents performs either one of the actions (buy, sell),
(sell, buy), (buy, buy), and (sell, sell) and fluctuations can be neglected
for large N . As we have just shown, the impacts for the last two
actions vanish for N →∞. Even in finite systems, as discussed above,
these actions contribute towards increasing future returns only with
probability 1/2 and towards decreasing returns otherwise.
In conclusion, the expected change in r (µ,µ′)2 over repeated trades
with the same information
E
(
N∑
k=1
(
∆Mk
∂r 2
∂Mk
+∆Sk
∂r 2
∂Sk
))
(µ,µ′)
≤ 0. (11.48)
is always negative given a sufficiently large number of agents.
11.5. Information annihilation instability (part two)
The above results establish that the market as a whole tends to attenu-
ate its responses (i.e. the magnitudes of the returns) to information
states that are presented in random order, Independent and Identically
Distributed. Because this is straightforwardly related to learning via
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the adaptation of the agents’ possessions, we term this effect “informa-
tion annihilation”: a repeatedly presented information state no longer
carries information about exploitable price changes. The relation to
Shannon information is discussed in section 11.7.
When the µ(t ) are endogenously generated, the same mechanism
of information absorption present in the exogenous case ensures that
the system relaxes towards local price equilibria and returns vanish,
but only transiently. To illustrate this basic principle, figure 11.4 (a)
shows the price time series of a simulation with a very small use γ. At
any point in time, the system moves towards a certain price which
characterises a local equilibrium. As the system approaches this equi-
librium, price fluctuations are reduced. These fluctuations generally
consist of complex oscillations like the one shown in figure 11.4 (b).
The equilibria become unstable once all predictable information is
exploited by the speculators. Then, even little overshooting of the
adaptation dynamics or noise can lead to price changes corresponding
to information states that were not predicted by patterns in the imme-
diate past. Because the market is not well adapted to these new states,
the possibility of large price changes increases dramatically. Compared
to [PP11], we here discovered an instability due to information anni-
hilation in a mathematically different way, which demonstrates that
this concept is even more general.
For larger γ, this behaviour is not as obvious. This is shown in
figures 11.5 (a) and (b). Time series appear random and distinct
oscillations are rarely visually recognisable. Still, phase diagrams from
extensive simulations demonstrate that return distributions are largely
unaffected by these effects over wide ranges of γ. This is shown in the
next section.8 9
8In modified models which include a noise source, even price time series with small
γ appear much more similar to fig. 11.5 than fig. 11.4. That is, for example,
models with some agents who choose their action randomly, or models with
mixed information as it is defined in sec. B.1.2 (not shown).
9Volatility clustering, however, is influenced by γ, as shown in fig. 11.9.
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Figure 11.4.: (a): Price time series with a very slow rate of resource redistri-
bution (use) γ= 0.01. Other parameters: N = 210, Np = 24, D = 29.
(b): A zoom in on the time series shown in (a).
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Figure 11.5.: (a): Price time series with γ= 0.8, other parameters equivalent
to fig. 11.4 (a). (b): A zoom in on the time series shown in (a).
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11.6. Phase space
For exogenous information, figure 11.6 (a) shows the ratio of initial
and final mean log return magnitudes in simulations for different α
and γ. This measure of the attenuation of average fluctuations during
transients is invariant to the absolute amount of fluctuations.10 Results
reflect the phase transition identified above.11
Figure 11.6 (b) shows the impacts that infrequent extreme returns
have on the remaining variances, which are measured by kurtoses after
transients. Return distributions for exogenous information are close
to Gaussians12, except for γ slightly below one (this is explained later,
see footnote 14).
For endogenous information, the return attenuation is shown in
figure 11.6 (c). The results are similar to the exogenous case (see also
fig. 11.3). The kurtoses, however, show a very different behaviour.
For endogenous information, the stronger the reduction of return
magnitudes (fig. 11.6 (c)), the heavier tailed the return distributions are
(fig. 11.6 (d)). This establishes a clear link between local information
annihilation and extreme returns in our model for the whole parameter
space. The phase transition, however, is distinguished by a maximum
in the speculator income (sec. B.2). Perhaps not coincidentally, the
model best reproduces real data in the same parameter range.13
10The latter depends on the absolute number of agents, as discussed above.
11Values below one correspond to an increase in fluctuations during transients. This
is observed only for markets with few speculators and a large use (upper right
hand corner in figs. 11.6 (a) and (b)).
12The kurtosis for a Gaussian distribution is three, see sec. 2.1
13As one might expect from fig. 11.6(d), the shape of the log return distributions
depends on α. PDFs are close to exponential for empty markets. Around the
phase transition, power laws are observed. For overcomplete markets, results
depend on the presence of producers. Without them, prices in the over-complete
phase are constant (as proven above). Producers create a dense band of baseline
activity above which the heavy tailed fluctuations due to the speculators arises.
For very small alpha, return fluctuations visually resemble more of a sausage
with toothpicks in it. The activity of the producers also reduces long-range
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Figure 11.6.: left column: attenuation of average log return magnitudes
during transients for different α vs γ. Right column: kurtoses for the same
simulations. (a), (b): exogenous information with Pext(µ) = 1/D. (c),
(d): endogenous information according to eq. (11.1). The system size for all
simulations was constant atNs = 210 speculators andNp = 24 producers. For
each time series, 2 ·107 time steps were simulated. Reductions are measured
as the ratio between the mean log return magnitudes during the first 10 and
the last 107 time steps. The kurtoses were calculated for the last 107 time
steps. Simulations were performed on a grid. All axis ticks correspond to
node positions. For each node on the grid, 50 time series were analysed and
the results were averaged. Linear interpolation and colour mapping were
performed after logarithmising the values at each node; contour line labels
are the actual values for attenuations and kurtoses. For α≤ 1/2, the kurtoses
reach extreme values that can not be reliably estimated from finite time series.
Therefore, the colour scale in (b) was set to not extend to values above 100.
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Figure 11.7.: Correlation of return magnitudes |r | with the time τ since the
corresponding information states occurred last. Model parameters: D = 210,
Ns = 211, Np = 0, γ= 0.5. Simulation length: T = 2·107; the first T /2 time
steps were discarded for the analysis. Black line: Endogenous information.
Dashed line: Exogenous information with Pexo(µ)∝ exp(−0.02µ), leading
to P (τ)∝ τ−2. Both lines are averages over 10 simulations.
11.7. Returns encode surprise
The log return magnitudes can be quantitatively related to the novelty
of the corresponding information states. Intuitively, states which did
not occur in a long time are more surprising and therefore carry more
information than the ones visited more recently – a concept that is
closely related to Shannon information. We indeed find that large
returns are caused by information states that have not occurred for a
long time: the more surprising an information state is, the higher the
corresponding log return. The correlation between log return magni-
tudes and the times τ that have passed since the respective information
states occurred last is shown in figure 11.7 for endogenous information
(solid line).Here, the absorption of local information in combination
correlations. Over time, however, speculators become richer and therefore slowly
regain influence. See also sec. B.2.
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with rare jumps leads to a strongly inhomogeneous distribution of vis-
iting frequencies over the information set: the probability distribution
P (τ) is power-law tailed with an exponent of approximately 2.5 (see
sec. B.1.3).
This suggests that the self-reflexive dynamics for endogenous infor-
mation generates a characteristic distribution of information states
that ultimately underlies extreme price fluctuations. We tested this hy-
pothesis by using inhomogenously distributed exogenous information
states that lead to similarly distributed τ. Then, as in the endogenous
case, return magnitudes are strongly correlated with τ (figure 11.7,
dashed line).14
11.8. Relation to minority games
When an agent trades one asset for another, the total value of their
endowment has not changed. Only round-trip trades, where the assets
are traded again at a later point in time, permanently change the
wealth of an agent. At the very least, when evaluating the apparent
desirability of a trade, the prices at two points in time at which the
round trip could have been completed have to be considered. Buying
shares of a stock, for example, might be considered a good decision if
the price rises later on.15
As we have shown in section 11.4.3, round-trip trades over two
subsequent time-steps dominate the dynamics in the trading model.
Therefore, a minority rule with respect to the return (of investment)
R = exp(r ) can induce dynamics that minimise return fluctuations.
14For very large γ, even uniformly distributed µ are occasionally not repeated for a
sufficiently long time to be “surprise” the market (see fig. 11.6 (b))
15Note, however, that the profit has not been realised until the shares have actually
been sold at a higher price. An agent who keeps on buying assets in a market
with an upwards trend, for example, appears to be successful according to the
minority rule if it is applied to a short time interval. If the price suddenly falls,
however, the very same agent can loose everything. Therefore, the minority rule
holds only on the time scale of a round-trip trade.
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11.8.1. The MG approximation to trading
Consider a model where the information µ, strategy vectors σi , and
prices p are defined as in section 11.2, but only the total capital Ci (t )
of an agent is kept track of. Each time-step, each agent invests a
fraction γ of their capital:
ci (t )= γ Ci (t )
(
2σ
µ(t )
i −1
)
(11.49)
where we interpret positive ci as buying and negative ones as selling
an asset. Thus, demand and supply follow as:
δ(t ) =
N∑
i=1
ci (t )σ
µ(t )
i , (11.50)
ς(t ) =
N∑
i=1
ci (t ) (1−σµ(t )i ). (11.51)
Success, just like in the trading model, depends on the ratio
R(t +1)= p(t +1)
p(t )
, (11.52)
except for the simplification that only prices in direct succession are
considered. The trading model further conserves the total amount
of money and stocks individually, but not the combined value of all
assets measured in units of one asset. Therefore, when approximating
trading as an MG, the change in capital for speculators k = 1, . . . ,Ns
follows as
Ck (t +1)=Ck (t )+|ck (t )|
(
α(t )R(t +1)1−2σµ(t )i −1
)
. (11.53)
were the normalisation
α(t )= δ(t )+ς(t )
δ(t )/R(t +1)+ς(t )R(t +1) (11.54)
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ensures that each agent’s profit is in each time step is proportional to
the return, like in the trading model, and that trading also conserves
the total capital in the market.16
The MG described above exhibits similarities and differences when
compared to the trading model. Figure 11.8 shows the phase tran-
sition in α for different γ. In contrast to the trading model, the
over-complete phase for the MG is absorbing even when producers
are present. This finding can be understood intuitively. As shown in
section 11.4.1, trading in the absorbing phase without any producers
evolves the system onto an invariant manifold. On this manifold,
both assets are redistributed in each round due to trading, yet the price
remains constant. When producers are present, they push the system
away from this manifold. With just one asset, constant prices only
require one distribution of capitals for which the price is independent
of the information state. The manifold in the trading-like MG is
reduced to a point in asset space. The impact of noisy producers,
however, still cannot be cancelled (not shown).
Another difference from the trading model is that the MG rule
requires lower “learning rates” γ to work effectively. This is reflected
in the difference in return attenuation between figure 11.6 (c) and
figure 11.8 (a) for large γ. Furthermore, the MG only shows sig-
nificant excess kurtoses close to the phase transition. The log return
distributions on the critical point also follow power laws only for use
parameters up to approximately γ= 0.2.
Yet another difference is that the MG shows almost no long-range
volatility clustering. The autocorrelations of log return magnitudes
for both models are shown in figure 11.9.
11.8.2. Comparison of different MGs
In the MG approximation to trading, an agent i wins if
σ
µ(t )
i =Θ(−r (t +1)), and loses otherwise. This is clearly a minority
16Without normalisation, the total capital in the game diverges quite rapidly.
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Figure 11.8.: Analysis of log return fluctuations for the MG approximation
to the trading model. Parameters: Ns = 210, Np = 24, intrinsic information.
Figure generation like in figure 11.6. (a): log return attenuation during
transients. The over-complete phase is absorbing within the numerical
limitations: log return variances after transients are below 10−28. (b): log
return kurtoses after transients.
rule based on the change in price. Since we defined the latter as
the ratio of demand and supply, this minority rule is also based on
the change in demand and supply, and therefore on the change in
agents’ choices. In contrast, the common minority rule (sec. 10.8.2)
is based only on the outcome at a single point in time. The same is
true for the returns in these models. Therefore, prices changes in
common MGs happen even if no agents change their actions. Hence,
to minimise price changes in classical MGs, the sum over all actions
(which all have the same unit) has to be zero. There is no notion
of a price at which the market clears like in the trading model, or
as in economic theories. This characteristic appears quite peculiar
considering the argument that the minority rule is supposed reward
buying low and selling high (see sec. 10.8). Nevertheless, this type of
equilibrium can be learned by adjusting agent capitals according to
the minority rule as well.
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Figure 11.9.: Average autocorrelations of log return magnitudes for different
models at the critical point (D = 29, Ns = 210, Np = 0). The trading model
for γ= 0.2 (dashed) exhibits long-range correlations which are nearly absent
for the MG approximation (solid line). For γ = 0.85, the trading model
exhibits even more long-range correlations (dash-dotted). The MG in this
case, however, exhibits no long-range correlations at all (dotted). Averages
were calculated over 50 repeated siulations.
Figure 11.10 shows the dynamics for a price calculated from the
log returns for the minority game with dynamic capital discussed
in sec. 10.8.2, but with only one strategy. The model has a strong
tendency to get stuck in local attractors (this hardly happens in the
trading model even without noise). This problem can be resolved
with a few noisy producers. Then, however, the total capital in the
market vanishes over time due to the lack of asset conservation in
this model. Therefore, a small noise term in the information update
rule is a much better solution. Nevertheless, the accordingly modified
model exhibits information annihilation similar to the trading model
(figure 11.4). Adaptation is, however, slower than in the trading model.
High γ are not possible in this MG since they lead to negative capital.
Furthermore, prices over time can drift to arbitrary values since they
have no meaning in this model. In particular, many simulations
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Figure 11.10.: MG with dynamic capital like in sec. 10.8.2, but with only
one strategy, and information generation according to eq. (11.1). Other
parameters: D = 29, Ns = 210, Np = 24, γ = 0.1. This model does not
contain an explicit price. However, a relative logarithmic price is obtained
from the cumulative sum of the log returns. The result is shown above for a
short extract from the model time series after transients.
(except in the absorbing phase) show perpetual trends due to small
imbalances in the initialisation of the agent strategies.
The insights gained in this chapter further allow for a more intuitive
understanding of models with dynamic capital and strategy switching
like the one in sec. 10.8.2. In this case, unsuccessful agents will change
their strategy. The strategies, however, are the very basis functions
whose weights are learned by the market such that information is
absorbed. Changing the basis functions forces the whole system to
re-learn. Therefore, fluctuations in such systems, even in the over-
complete phase, never vanish completely. Average fluctuations are
smaller for larger γ because the system re-learns faster (see fig. 10.6 (c)).
In the next chapter, we investigate the behavior of actual human
subjects in the a MG paradigm where success depends on the change
in collective behavior.
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12. Bubbles and jumps from properly
anticipated prices
“ And now for something completely different”
Monty Python
A major obstacle to testing economic theories is that markets–let
alone economies–are intractable to strict scientific experiments. The
rules of a commercial exchange cannot be easily manipulated, and the
ongoing activities depend on abundant uncontrolled variables. Labo-
ratory experiments are a viable alternative. This method might be seen
as analogous to the Petri dish in biology. Such an experimental model
allows for studying fundamental elements of the system of interest,
yet greatly reduces uncontrolled interactions. There is a risk that the
elements in this model environment behave differently than outside of
the laboratory. If, however, the necessary interactions that give rise to
effects observed in the full system can also be included in the model,
these interactions become much easier to study. Thereby, experiments
can also help determine which elemental properties should be included
in computational models.
Today, behavioural experiments are an established method in (non-
orthodox) economics (see secs. 10.4 and 10.5). Such experiments,
however, are limited tomany fewer participants than real markets. This
restriction may appear to preclude the study of large-scale collective
phenomena in laboratory experiments.
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In the following, we study the behaviour of real human subjects
in experimental toy models of speculative markets. In particular, we
investigate whether subjects exhibit some form of efficiency, and which
information determines their behaviour. An intuitive visualisation
of MG-like interactions is presented, which greatly facilitates the
subjects’ understanding of the game dynamics after little training. A
modified minority rule based on the change in collective behaviour
(see sec. 11.8) is found to lead to both coordination and bubbles. Then
a multi-agent model is introduced where, in contrast to the models
discussed so far, the agents mimic the behaviour of real subjects. This
analytically tractable model exposes a systematic link between price
efficiency, bubbles, and crashes. It persist in large systems, where log
returns obtained from the pricing rule introduced in section 11.2
exhibit the notorious stylised facts (sec. 10.3). Finally, we briefly study
how the effects discussed in this chapter relate to the trading model of
chapter 11.
12.1. The seesaw game(s)
Economic group experiments commonly involve continuous dou-
ble auctions, which robustly exhibit bubbles and crashes (sec. 10.5).
These experiments, however, typically require substantial amounts of
time for each trading period. Therefore, it appears, little emphasis
was put on studying the statistics of the resulting price fluctuations.
Simpler models may help to facilitate the collection of data on more
trading periods. The MG might seem to suggest itself as such a mini-
mal experimental paradigm, but the literature on this topic appears
to be limited to few studies [CMZ05b]. In these experiments, sub-
jects were found to coordinate better than chance, leading to reduced
fluctuations. Their ability to exploit complex patterns as defined in
equation (10.10), however, appears to be limited to K ≈ 3. There seem
to be no reports of bubbles, extreme price changes, or phase transitions
in MG experiments.
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Figure 12.1.: The seesaw game (linear version). (a): A Minority Game is
visualised by a seesaw upon which agents place their bets. The winning side
goes up. With only the agents’ bets on the seesaw, the angle would indicate
the excess demand q . (b): As a modification, however, we balance the seesaw
after each game turn (i.e. trading period). (d): The seesaw is locked until
the bets for the next turn have been placed. The balancing weight remains
in place. (c): The minority rule, therefore, is applied to changes in excess
demand. After evaluating the outcome, the seesaw is balanced and locked
again for the next turn (not shown).
Here we investigate the dynamics in a modified minority game.
It was argued in section 11.8 that success in short-term speculation
should be based on changes in the collective behaviour and not on the
momentary state at just one point in time. Selling shares of a stock,
for example, is only profitable if the stock was bought at a lower price.
Figure 12.1 shows an intuitive visualisation of this rule. Note that
the game generates outcomes at discrete time steps, but several stages
lead up to each outcome. We therefore call the set of stages necessary
for a new outcome a (game) turn. At the end of each turn the results
for a new time step are appended to the respective time series for the
outcome, actions, etc.
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Agents in each turn place weights on either side of a seesaw.1 Those
agents win who put their weights on the side which goes up. In the
first time step, this is the side with fewer total weights. Before each
subsequent time step, however, the seesaw is balanced by an additional
weight. This weight contributes to the next outcome. Therefore, the
seesaw game implements a minority game with respect to changes
in collective behaviour. If we interpret the agents’ weights on one
side of the seesaw as demand and the others as supply, the outcome
∆q indicated by the seesaw angle corresponds to the change in excess
demand q.2
One interesting property of the seesaw game is that every outcome is
a Nash equilibrium. A single agent who changes sides loses. Therefore,
one might expect the seesaw to remain stationary after exactly one time
step.3 This, however, never happened during many experiments with
different variations of the seesaw game. Nevertheless, one pathological
case is possible. If all agents bet on one side of the seesaw and the
balancing weight mirrors this maximal excess demand in the next turn,
any agents changing their decisions will lose definitely. The only way
to resolve this deadlock without an extra rule is for some agents to not
play in the next step. Alternatively, to enforce a resolution, the turn
may be repeated or the balancing weight may be moved to a random
position.
1To be precise, subjects submit choices during a turn that determine which action
they will perform at the end of that turn. No agents knows about the choices of
the other agents before the turn is completed.
2One might argue that this implementation is technically very similar to a set of
scales. A seesaw, however, is much more fun. We furthermore assume a small
reverting force (as well as friction) such that the equilibrium angle of the seesaw
is proportional to the imbalance of the weights on the seesaw. This is the case
when the seesaw is, e.g., suspended below its pivot point or connected to a spring.
The latter is the case on many playgrounds.
3This might be one of the reasons why no one tried this paradigm before. The MG
was initially supposed to be a game without an equilibrium (sec 10.8).
244
12.2. A simple linear seesaw game
12.2. A simple linear seesaw game
In the most simple instantiation of the seesaw game, agents i at each
time step t chose an action ai (t )= 1 or ai (t )=−1 before a countdown
runs out. No decision is registered as ai (t ) = 0. The weight that
balances the excess demand q(t )=∑i ai (t ) after each time step is
moved according to
W (t )
{
=−q(t −1) for |q(t −1)| <N
∼ Ud(−n,n) for |q(t −1)| =N ,
(12.1)
where deadlocks |q | = N are resolved by moving W to a random
position drawn from the discrete uniform distribution. This case,
however, did not occur in the trials analysed below. The outcome is
A(t )=∑
i
ai (t )+W (t ). (12.2)
The agent payoff at the end of each time step is
gi (t )=Θ(−ai (t )A(t )). (12.3)
That is, the agents on the minority side win 1 point.4
We performed a series of experiments with voluntary naive subjects
recruited in the Center for Cognitive Sciences Bremen.5 Each subject
played the game on a separate laptop, where the current outcome,
all subjects’ scores, and all actions were displayed. The history of the
game was displayed for the past 20 time steps. For more details, see
chap. 13. All subjects were seated in a large room and sufficiently far
apart from each other to impede cheating. The game, including the
4If the payoff rule were symmetric, such that the majority would lose one point,
the average payoff would be negative. Most agents would then, after some time,
hold negative scores. During early tests, this situation turned out to be highly
discouraging for the subjects, who would stop playing to avoid further losses.
5Subjects received no payment but snacks were provided, as well as small prizes for
the top-scoring subjects.
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Figure 12.2.: Dynamics of the simple seesaw game with N = 11 subjects.
(a): Actions. Red and blue correspond to ai =±1, white to ai = 0. (b): Ex-
cess demand q =∑i ai (t ).
subjects’ scores, was also projected onto a large screen in front of the
subjects.
The results for the largest group are shown in figure 12.2. Most
of the time, the subjects seem to favour one side of the seesaw over
the other. Several sudden changes in preference are observed. No
deadlock occurred in this group. If the subjects had picked either side
with equal probabilities in each turn, large excess demands would be
less likely. Similar results were found for smaller groups (not shown).
Result statistics are discussed in more detail in section 12.3. First,
however, a model is introduced to explain the observed bubble-like
herding behaviour.
12.3. Modelling the subjects’ behaviour
If all agents flipped coins to determine their actions, the excess demand
would be unpredictable. Its change, in contrast, would be easy to
predict. If the expected excess demand was always zero, large demands
would typically be followed by smaller ones, and vice versa. Profit
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seeking agents should bet against this mean reversion. In an efficient
game, in analogy to equation (10.4), the expected new excess demand
for each time step should be equal to its predecessor:
E
(
q(t +1) |q(t ),q(t −1), . . .) != q(t ). (12.4)
The simplest way to fulfil this condition is to adjust the probability for
the agents’ actions in each time step accordingly. For such stochastic
agents, demands are binomially distributed. Hence, equation (12.4)
is fulfilled for each time t +1 if each agent chooses ai (t +1)= 1 with
probability 1/2+q(t )/2N , and ai (t +1)= 0 otherwise.
For comparison with the experiments, a few extensions are of in-
terest. First, subjects don’t participate in each time step. This is
captured by the probability to participate λ= P (ai 6= 0) (experiment:
λ= 0.955±0.007). Furthermore, we introduce a parameter o ∈ [0,1]
which interpolates between coin-flipping agents (o = 0), and perfectly
efficient ones (o = 1). We thereby obtain a measure for the efficiency
of real subjects. In conclusion, the probabilities for all possible actions
are
P
(
ai (t +1)= 0 |W (t +1)
) = 1−λ
P
(
ai (t +1)= 1 |W (t +1)
) = inf{λ, sup{0, λ
2
−oW (t +1)
2N
}}
P
(
ai (t +1)=−1 |W (t +1)
) = λ−P(ai (t )= 1|W (t +1))).
(12.5)
All other rules are identical to the experiment (see above).
Actions for real subjects, agents who flip coins if they participate,
and efficient agents are shown in figure 12.3. The experiment and
the efficient model show clusters where one choice is preferred. These
bubble phases are absent for coin flipping agents. The fluctuations
for the subjects, the two model extremes, as well as a marginally
inefficient case with o = 0.8 are analysed quantitatively in figure 12.4.
Efficient betting decreases in the outcome variance (fig. 12.4 (a)) and
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Figure 12.3.: Dynamics of a linear seesaw game for subjects and the two
extreme cases of the model. Red and blue correspond to the actions ai =±1,
white to not participating a time step. (a): An experiment with 11 Subjects.
(c): model with equal probabilities for ai ±1 (i.e. o = 0). (c): demand-
efficient model (o = 1). Agent participation in the models was equal to the
experiments.
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Figure 12.4.: Analysis and comparison of the choices in a linear seesaw game
experiment with 11 subjects, and the model (eq. (12.5)) for three different
efficiency parameters. Marginally inefficient: o = 0.8. Efficient: o = 1.
Coin flipping: o = 0. The number of agents and participation are equal
to subjects and simulations. For the subjects, bars represent the different
sample statistics for three combined trials. Error bars represent the respective
sample errors. For the simulations, the bars correspond to averages over
1000 simulations. No error bars are shown, since standard errors here are
very close to the line width. (a): Normalised variance of the outcomes
Var(A)/2N . The factor 1/2 reflects that outcomes range from −N to N . As
in the OMG, the normalised variance for coin-flipping agents is one. (b):
the Pearson correlation coefficient ρ
(−A(t ),∑i ai (t −1)) of the outcomes
and their preceding excess demands measures mean reversion. The sign of
the outcome is inverted such that a positive mean reversion corresponds to a
predictable drift towards the origin. (c): the probability that one choice was
made by at least twice as many subjects (agents) as the other choice.
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removes mean reversion (fig. 12.4 (b)), but increases the probability of
a bubble phase (fig. 12.4 (c)). The latter two statistics for the subjects
are very close to the marginally inefficient model. The variance for
the subjects is a bit closer to the perfectly efficient model. The coin-
flipping model can, however, be rejected with high significance. Note
that the real subjects are heterogeneous (figure 12.3 (a)) and may
use other information which is not captured by the simple model.
Nevertheless, subjects are very well described by stochastic agents that
are almost efficient with o close to one.
If the system size is increased, the bubbles in the efficient model
become even more extreme (not shown). The time scale of the dy-
namics increases with the system size, too. In the next section, we will
reformulate the model to allow for a comparison with real markets.
A pricing rule will be introduced to enable the study of log returns.
Thereafter, we will compare price- and demand efficiency, and study
the latter case analytically. Note that equation (12.5) does not depend
on the agents’ payoff at all. Therefore, a normative efficient model
can be formulated independently of the minority rule (or any other
payoff). Further simplifications are possible without changing the
fundamental dynamics of the model. First, the possibility for agents
to not participate can be dropped. Finally, including a very small
number inefficient agents, who generate mean reversion only for the
most extreme outcomes, removes the need for a special deadlock rule.
12.4. A minimal model for bubbles in efficient markets
Consider a market with N agents: Ns speculators and Nn noise traders.
At discrete times t each agent places a market order to either buy or
sell one unit of an asset (e.g. a stock). Thereby, agents contribute to
either the demand δ(t ) or to the supply ς(t )=N −δ(t ). We further
require: 1. Increasing δ(t ) increases the price while increasing ς(t )
decreases the price. 2. Scaling all orders by the same factor yields the
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same market clearing price. Therefore, like in chapter 11, the price
follows from the ratio of demand and supply
p(t )= δ(t )
ς(t )
= δ(t )
N −δ(t ) , (12.6)
which naturally possesses the correct unit.
Agents make their decisions stochastically like in section 12.3, but
we here postulate price efficiency: the probability for a speculator to
buy at each time t is chosen such that the expectation value of the
new price given all previous observations
E(pt |pt−1,pt−2, . . . ) != pt−1 (12.7)
is the same as the previous price. The correct buying probabilities can
be obtained by numerical optimisation or in analytically closed form
for large systems (see next section). This condition may be violated
only if δ(t −1)>Ns +Nn/2 or if δ(t −1)<Nn/2. In these cases, it is
impossible to be price efficient due to the discretisation of the traded
assets. For NsÀNn and NsÀ 1, however, we consider this boundary
effect acceptable.
A model time series is shown in figure 12.5 (a). Large returns
coincide with bubbles (fig. 12.5 (b)), or anti-bubbles (not shown).
The distribution of log returns is power-law tailed (fig. 12.5 (c)). The
exponent in the cumulative distribution approaches ξ = 2 for large
systems, which is proved below. Finite size effects or large Nn/Ns
increase ξ and may also truncate the log-return tails (not shown). Log
returns are nearly uncorrelated6 while their magnitudes are correlated
for long periods of time (fig. 12.5 (d)), reflecting volatility clustering.
A striking feature of efficiency bubbles is that the absolute scale of
the fluctuations stays extremely high even for large systems, because a
finite system without mean reversion will eventually reach its limits
with probability one.
6There is a minuscule amount of anti-correlation, due to the mean reversion on the
system boundaries, which is not visible here
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Figure 12.5.: price-efficient model with Ns = 104 speculators and Nn = 10
noise (coin flipping) traders. (a): Log return time series. (b): Price time
series. (c): CCDF of normalised log return magnitudes (solid black line)
and a normal distibtion (dashed gray line). Straight line: analytical result.
(d): Average autocorrelation of the log returns (dashed line) and of their
magnitudes (solid line). The lengths of the averaged segments matched those
in fig. 11.2.
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12.4.1. Analytical treatment
To obtain an explicit solution to equation (12.7), a good approxima-
tion for large N is to require efficient demands instead of efficient
prices:
E
(
δ(t ) |δ(t −1),δ(t −2), . . .) != δ(t −1). (12.8)
Since agents choose stochastically, the demands generated by the
speculators and random traders each are binomially distributed. Equa-
tion (12.8) is fulfilled, where possible, if the probability for each
speculator to buy at time t is
P
(
buy |δ(t −1))= 1
2
+ δ(t −1)−N/2
Ns
(12.9)
for δ(t −1) ∈ [Nn/2,Ns +Nn/2] (see above).
Figure 12.6 (a) shows a comparison of equation (12.9) with a nu-
merical optimisation with respect to equation (12.7). For efficient
prices, there is a slight drift away from the system boundaries that is
not present for efficient demands. This difference, however, decreases
with an increased system size N .
12.4.2. Stationary solution
For large Ns , we can neglect the random agents and the difference
between price- and demand efficiency. We thus consider N agents
who buy at each time t with probability δ(t −1)/N . The stationary
demand distribution pi then satisfies
pi j =
N∑
i=0
pii pii j , pii , j =
(
N
j
) (
i
N
) j (
1− i
N
)N− j
(12.10)
where the probability to move from state i = δ(t −1) to state j = δ(t )
is given by the transition matrix pii j . For large N , equation (12.10) is
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Figure 12.6.: (a): Probability that an agent buys at time t for different previ-
ous demands δ(t −1) normalised by the system size N =Ns +Nn . Fraction
of noise traders: Nn/Ns = 0.1. The demand-efficient solution is given by
eq. (12.9) (dotted black). The price-efficient solutions for N = 22 (solid
blue) and N = 110 (dashed red) were obtained by numerical optimisation.
(b): Distribution of demands in a simulation of Ns = 1000 speculators and
Nn = 1 noise trader for 108 time steps.
satisfied by the uniform distribution. To show this, we first divide by
pii =pi j = const, and obtain
1=
1∑
x=0
(
N
j
)
x j (1−x)N− j , with x = i
N
. (12.11)
For large N , we can replace the sum over x¿ 1 with an integral. The
right hand side of equation (12.11) then reads(
N
j
)
N
∫ 1
0
x j (1−x)N− jdx =
(
N
j
)
N
Γ( j +1)Γ(N − j +1)
Γ(N +2) (12.12)
= N
N +1
NÀ1−→ 1  (12.13)
Figure 12.6 (b) shows the demand distribution for a simulation of the
price-efficient model. It is uniform except for the very edges where
it drops sharply. For higher ratios Nn/Ns , the edges can also exhibit
peaks.
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12.4.3. Tail Exponent
The log return for two subsequent demands δ and δ′ can be expressed
as
r = ln
(
δ′
N −δ′
N −δ
δ
)
≈∆
(
1
δ
+ 1
N −δ
)
, where ∆= δ′−δ.
(12.14)
The approximation is obtained by expanding for small ∆ up to the
first order. This is possible, because the standard deviation for the
binomial distribution is proportional to
p
N and further vanishes for
demands close to zero or close to N . Hence, the distribution of ∆ will
be very localised for large N . Fluctuations in r are then dominated by
fluctuations in δ, especially for δ¿N , and N −δ¿N . By the same
argument, the exact shape of p(∆) is negligible for the scaling of the
tail of the return magnitudes. Due to the symmetry with respect to
N/2, we now analyse only the case δ¿N where r ≈ ∆
δ
. The expected
fluctuations in r can be expressed by
E
(
r 2 |δ)≈ (E(∆)
δ
)2
≈ 1
δ
:= r˜ 2. (12.15)
Using the probability integral transform, and p(δ)= const. yields
p(r˜ )∝|r˜ |−3, and therefore p(r )∝∼ |r |−3 (12.16)
for sufficiently large N and r , and in agreement with simulations
(fig. 12.5 (c)).
12.5. Learning price efficiency
The above results raise the question of why similar bubbles didn’t arise
in the trading model of chapter 11. The answer is that these trading
agents did not receive any information on absolute prices. Therefore,
no strategy could exploit predictable drifts that arise for high or low
prices. We here briefly demonstrate that the trading model will learn
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Figure 12.7.: Analysis of log return fluctuations for a trading model with
absolute-price information with Ns = 210 speculators and Nn = 24 noisy
producers. Figure generation like in figure 11.6. (a): log return attenuation
during transients. (b): log return kurtoses after transients.
to exploit and thereby countervail also this type of predictability. For
simplicity, however, we will not pursue the question which strategies
enable perfect price efficiency. Instead, a small but significant change
in the definition of endogenous information with respect to (11.1) is
studied.
Allowing agents to distinguish between prices above and below one
yields
µ(t )=
K−1∑
i=0
2i Θ
(
p(t − i −1)−1+η(t − i −1))+1. (12.17)
Figure 12.7 shows the phase space for the trading model with the above
method of information generation. As in the minimal bubbles model,
a small number of coin-flipping agents is required to allow the system
to recover from extremely high or low prices. In contrast to return-
based endogenous information, we here observe an interaction of the
phase transition with respect to the completeness of strategies, and a
dependence on the use parameter γ. For use parameters γ≈ 0.1, the
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phase transition along the α-axis is similar to return-based endogenous
information. For smaller γ, the kurtoses are maximal close to the
phase transition because overcomplete markets are dominated by the
noisy producers. For γ→ 1, the log returns exhibit both large average
fluctuations and heavy tailed distributions for all γ. This result can be
understood intuitively. For small γ, there is a competition between the
predictability due to complex patterns, and short-term mean reversion.
The latter type of predictability mainly depends on the latest bit of
information, that is, on p(t−1). For large γ, the time scale of resource
redistribution becomes shorter than the length of the bit sequence
encoded by the information index µ. The system is then dominated
by short-term destabilisation while the older bits mainly contribute
noise. The completeness of strategies with respect to these bits is
therefore less important. This effect is even more pronounced for
mixed endogenous information with several return-based bits and one
bit of absolute-price information (not shown).
In contrast to return-based information, equation (12.17) gives
rise to the most realistic results for smaller use parameters. This the
case particularly for γ≈ 0.1, where the dynamics in (over-) complete
markets do not appear to depend on α at all. Figure 12.8 shows an
example where agents only act on the most recent two prices. Clusters
with large returns coincide with phases where average prices are either
particularly high or low. For return-based information, only the
novelty of information states and not the absolute price determines
the local volatility (for comparison, see e.g. fig. 11.5).
In contrast to the minimal bubbles model of section 12.4, prices
here don’t wander arbitrarily far away from unity since agents only
learn whether prices are above or below one (fig. 12.8(a)). There
appears to be no reason why trading with a more nuanced encoding of
prices should not yield results that are more similar to figure 12.5. A
very simple example is presented as a part of the next chapter. There,
however, we focus on an extended and more realistic seesaw game
experiment, as well as ways to collect the choices of more subjects.
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games
In the previous chapter, group experiments revealed dynamical princi-
ples that persist in large-scale theoretical models where they give rise
to the notorious “stylised facts” introduced in section 10.3. In this
chapter, we investigate whether extreme price fluctuations can also
emerge in moderately sized groups of real subjects. For this purpose,
the seesaw game introduced in the last chapter is extended. The new
version encompasses many of the previous chapters’ results. An in-
tuitive web-browser-based implementation enables laboratory- and
classroom experiments. Nearly arbitrary numbers of subjects can play
the game online at seesaw.neuro.uni-bremen.de. Bubbles, local price
patterns, power-law distributed price changes, and also, to a smaller
extent, volatility clusters emerge for real subjects, for virtual agents
that follow simple strategies, and in scenarios where both interact.
Since the experiments continue as of this writing, this chapter only
represents an overview of the project and a snapshot of the results so
far.
13.1. The logarithmic seesaw
The seesaw game was introduced in chapter 12. A simple linear game
was studied where all agents have the same impact and where the
outcome is the change in excess demand between two subsequent time
steps (game turns). Realistic log return distributions were obtained
in a theoretical model of the subjects’ behaviour in combination with
the pricing rule introduced in section 11.2. This exact pricing rule
can be calculated by the seesaw after a minor modification.
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211/2 41/4
10–1 2–2
Bets
Figure 13.1.: Instead of each agent placing their own weight on the seesaw,
coloured weights may be used to indicate the total demand and total supply.
This representation allows for continuous bets, and also for different scales.
For the linear scale (upper axis), two weights represent demand and supply
(i.e. negative demand). A third weight balances the excess demand after
each turn. Given a small reverting force, the angle of the linear seesaw
after each round is proportional to the change in excess demand. For a
logarithmic scale (lower axis), the physical positions of the weights on the
seesaw are proportional to to ln(demand), and -ln(supply). Hence, the
balancing weight here represents the logarithm of the previous price. The
angle of the logarithmic seesaw after each turn is proportional to the log
return.
Figure 13.1 shows a realisation of the seesaw where the totality of
the weights bet on either side are embodied by a large coloured weight,
respectively. These two weights representing demand and supply are
moved along the seesaw in order to apply the correct forces, as is the
balancing weight whose dynamics remain unchanged. This allows
for the flexibility to change the scale which links demand and supply
to the physical positions of the respective weights. For a linear scale,
the effective torques are equivalent to figure 12.1. For a logarithmic
scale, the angle of the seesaw after each turn is proportional to the log
return.
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Another advantage of the mechanism with three weights is that any
number of agents can place arbitrarily heavy bets. This enlarges the
space of possible outcomes for a given number of agents. Therefore,
fewer agents are required in order to allow for a wide range of different
possible returns. Furthermore, the situation on the seesaw becomes
more transparent for large numbers of agents.
In the following, we focus on a logarithmic seesaw game where
agents in each step place a fraction γ of their capital on the seesaw. The
payoff consists of two components. Wins and losses from speculation
follow the MG approximation to trading described in section 11.8. It
turned out, however, that a controlled growth of the total capital in the
market is necessary to keep subjects motivated. Since the majority loses
in each turn, most of the the players would eventually hold a negative
capital and stop playing. A growing capital in the market successfully
motivates subjects to increase their trading frequency even though their
relative performance is unchanged.1 In the current implementation of
the game, a small risk-free interest is paid on the capital that subjects
place on the seesaw. This is equivalent tomultiplying the normalisation
factor in equation (11.53) with a constant.2
1As discussed in sec. 10.4, speculative trading in real markets is, on its own, a zero-
or even negative-sum game as well.
2We tested several other ways to implement capital growth. For a moderately sized,
closed group of subjects, one easily predictable producer (or market maker) with
a fixed income is a viable solution. When subjects can freely enter and leave
the market, however, additional complications arise. Successful subjects will
start to lose more often when their impact becomes too high. They, therefore,
consistently withdraw capital (liquidity) from the game. During times where
the website was highly frequented, the game would often be dominated by the
producer after too much capital was withdrawn from the game. This scenario,
where subjects for prolonged periods of time have to bet just against the producer
until liquidity is restored, does not reflect the intention behind the game, to study
the interaction of subjects. Another idea was to include virtual speculators (bots,
see sec. 13.4) who leave after they lost capital and return with new capital. This
solution required a rather extreme flow of bots, since the subjects were highly
successful at exploiting them.
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13.2. The seesaw browser game
All seesaw game experiments (including those in chap. 12) were per-
formed using a custom browser-based implementation. Subjects can
therefore participate on any computing device with a relatively modern
web browser connected to the internet.3
The website currently comprises several sections. Content was
added incrementally over time. To play the game, subjects have to
create an anonymous account with a user name and a password. No
personal information is stored. The game rules are explained concisely
on the index page and again on a landing page that is displayed to new
subjects who just signed up. A special section features more detailed
explanations, as well as links to an interview with the radio station
“Deutschlandfunk” and to scientific publications.
Subjects in the open online game are therefore not necessarily naive
about the project. This is intentional since informed subjects may
be considered the equivalent of informed traders in real markets. If
required, however, the game can always be modified without revealing
the true intent behind the changes. Furthermore, closed lab experi-
ments were performed with naive subjects who were educated on the
scientific background only after they played the game.
To increase long-term motivation, the website features a cumulative
global high score. When subjects feel that their impact in the game is
too high (or they just want to secure their profits), they can update
their high score. Thereby, their in-game capital is set to ten points and
the difference in capital is added to their cumulative high score. The
cumulative score for a subject can become negative.
The seesaw game itself is presented on a single page shown in fig-
ure 13.2. The seesaw is displayed in the upper right corner. Below the
3Modern, as of this writing, refers to Firefox 3.5+, Chrome 4+, Safari 3+, Opera
11+, or IE9+. Therefore, only computers are excluded that, for security reasons,
should have long been disconnected from the internet anyway. No plugins are
required. The game is also playable on many touch-based mobile devices, but
further optimisations should be made in the future.
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Figure 13.2.: The online seesaw game at seesaw.neuro.uni-bremen.de. The
interface is divided into three main containers separated by whitespace:
seesaw status (i.e. collective status, top), private status (middle), high score
status for all players (bottom). Past results (outcomes, choices) are displayed
on the left hand side of each container. The view scrolls to the right where
new results are added. The oldest results disappear on the left hand side.
The current state of the game is displayed on the right hand side of each
container. The remaining time until the end of each turn is indicated by
a pie timer, which is displayed in the center of the seesaw (top container).
The weights which still indicate the preceding demand and supply are faded.
Each subject can enter their choice by clicking on the buttons below the
seesaw (middle container), or by using the arrow keys on a keyboard.
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seesaw, buttons are displayed that allow subjects to submit choices at
any time during the countdown for each game turn. Alternatively, the
arrow keys on a keyboard may be used. Subjects can adjust their use
parameter γ ∈ [0.1,0.25,0.5] which determines the fraction of their
capital (points) that they place on either side of the seesaw. The capital
of the subject is displayed right next to the buttons. At the end of
each turn, the seesaw is animated to indicate the outcome as is shown
in figure 13.3. The choices of each subject are revealed to the other
subjects only at the end of the turn.
The majority of the screen area is dedicated to providing full trans-
parency about the course of the game. This includes the most recent
history of the outcomes and of all subjects’ choices, as well as the cur-
rent capital of each player. After each turn, the displayed list of active
agents is sorted by capital in descending order to increase competition.
Since the placement of a subject in this in-game high score might be
below the content displayed in the browser window (fig. 13.2), the
personal performance is also shown directly below the seesaw. Only
subjects who were active during the visible game history are included
in the list. The names of disconnected subjects are displayed in a
lighter colour. Inactive yet connected spectators are listed at the very
bottom of the page (fig. 13.3). Connection and disconnection events
trigger asynchronous display updates. Special events are explained
in-game as shown in figure 13.4.
The implementation as a browser game is much less controlled
than typical psychophysical experiments, but offers the opportunity to
experiment with many more subjects. The uncontrolled nature of this
experiment may also be seen as an opportunity because it complements
the perfectly regulated dynamics of artificial multi-agent systems. Two
main aspects of the game need to be regulated tightly: the information
to which subjects have access, and the choices which subjects can
submit. Both requirements are ensured by architecture of the system.4
4It is very important in any web application that the server never trusts the client.
Subjects can (and did) try to manipulate their web browsers.
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Figure 13.3.: A classroom experiment using the seesaw browser game. At
the end of each turn, all subjects’ choices are revealed and the weights on the
seesaw are moved accordingly.
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Figure 13.4.: Certain rare events are explained by overlays, which disappear
automatically before the end of the next turn.
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The server-side implementation currently runs on two servers in par-
allel to ensure redundancy and scalability. David Rotermund greatly
assisted with the hardware setup, the installation of the Open BSD
operating system, and the local networking setup. The real-time com-
munication and game logic is implemented in separate processes using
node.js [Joy]. The application state is stored redundantly in several
instances of the redis data structure server. This setup allows for a
lightweight, fast, reliable, and scalable distributed network applica-
tion. The results of each game turn are also immediately written to
disk in machine- and human readable form. The (near) real-time
communication with the clients is performed using socket.io [Rau].
13.3. Results for a closed group
Results for a classroom experiment with naive subjects (students) are
shown in figure 13.5. The payoff followed from equation (11.53)
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except for an additional 2% risk-free interest on the capital placed on
the seesaw as discussed above. The log returns unambiguously deviate
from Gaussian white noise (p¿ 0.01 for both the Shapiro-Wilk test
and for the one-sided KS-test). Despite the small number of samples,
the distribution tail is clearly consistent with a power law. Log return
fluctuations exceeding three standard deviations were also robustly
observed in experiments with fewer subjects after less than half an hour
of playtime (not shown). Significant results for the autocorrelation
would require more samples (not shown).
13.4. Results for the open online experiment
To allow subjects to play the game on the public website at any time,
virtual players (bots) were included. These bots are slightly predictable
even collectively, and not perfectly price efficient for most of the time.
This choice was made to motivate subjects to participate. Bots always
bet 25% of their points. They can choose between three different
strategies: Betting on the side opposite to the balancing weight, betting
on the same side where the balancing weight is located, or flipping a
coin. Bots stochastically switch to a random strategy, or, with a slightly
higher probability, to the historically most successful one. In practice,
one of the bots switches to a different strategy every few time steps.
This setup leads to quite realistic return fluctuations for simulations
with bots only, and for experiments where the bots interact with real
subjects. The results are not very parameter dependent if the same
bots stay in the game for a sufficiently long time. The game is stopped
when no real subjects are logged in.
The game exhibits complex dynamics with volatility clusters and
also sudden price jumps. Sometimes, local oscillations or patterns
emerge. Examples are shown in figure 13.6.
Initially, the game was played only by a few subjects and the number
of bots was kept constant. During this phase, no risk-free interest was
necessary to stabilise the liquidity of the game. Instead, the capital
of the bots was renormalised when no subjects were online. Results
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Figure 13.6.: Outcomes sometimes appear to follow patterns which are
damped away or become instable. Note that there are several ambiguous
possibilities to define sequences of repeating patterns in the topmost example.
The three above screenshots, like figure 13.2 which exhibits less obvious
oscillations, were taken when subjects and virtual players were active at the
same time.
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Figure 13.7.: An early online experiment with the logarithmic seesaw where
1-3 real subjects were logged in at each point in time. The number of virtual
players (bots) was held constant at 15. (a): A part of the log return time
series. (b): Price time series. (c): CCDF of log return magnitudes (solid
black line) and a Gaussian with the same variance (dashed gray line). Straight
line: analytical result.
are shown in figure 13.7. The log returns are power-law distributed
and some volatility clustering is observed. The significant correlation
length is limited which is to be expected for small systems and given
the number of analysed time steps. The prices exhibit several bubbles
(and anti-bubbles since the game is symmetrical).
After some media coverage on the website, the number of subjects
increased dramatically. Renormalising the capital of the bots during
breaks is no longer an option since the game is often actively played for
hours with only short interruptions during the night. Therefore, the
small risk-free interest on the capital that is placed on the seesaw, which
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was discussed above, was implemented. The number of bots was made
adaptive such that the number of active agents stays approximately
constant unless more than 15 subjects are playing. At this point, bots
that leave the game are not replaced and eventually only real subjects
are active. This change decreases the influence of the bots if a sufficient
number of subjects is active. Bots also stochastically leave the game
(and are replaced shortly thereafter) when the total number of agents
is not too high. This contributes to stabilising the total capital in the
game.
Unfortunately, the collective dynamics of the bots is more parameter
dependent when the bots are replaced too frequently. To turn this
problem into an advantage, however, we can test whether the power
law distribution of log returns is imposed by the bots. For several
months, the game operated in a regime where the bots on their own
would generate log return distributions whose tails decay slightly faster
than in figure 13.7 (c). The log returns and prices for a part of the
time series with moderate subject activity are shown in figure 13.8 (a)
and (b), respectively. The log return distributions for high and low
subject activity are compared in figure 13.8 (c)
The average number of total actions of all agents was 14±1 per
time step. Subject activity is characterised by the average number of
subject actions per time step, estimated from a gliding window with a
width of 20 time steps. We distinguish two cases in the following: Low
participation (LP) where the activity is below 7, and high participation
(HP) where the activity is at least 7. Results are robust with respect to
changes of the window width and the threshold.
Since there are less samples for (HP) than for (LP), the latter were
split into subsets that match the sample size for (HP). The CCDF
average along the |r |-axis and the corresponding one- and two standard
deviation intervals for (LP) are shown in figure 13.8 (c) as shaded
areas. In comparison to the average for (LP), the CCDF for (HP)
is significantly less concave: It is more than two standard deviations
lower around |r |/Std(r )≈ 1.4, and more than two standard deviations
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Figure 13.8.: Online experiment over several months where the number of
subjects Ns varied substantially. The number of bots Nb was increased if
Nb+Ns < 15 and decreased if Nb+Ns > 15. The bots’ parameters here were
adjusted such that the log return distribution tails decay slightly faster than
in fig. 13.7 (c) if no subjects participate. (a): Log return time series (excerpt).
(b): Price time series. (c): CCDFs of log return magnitudes for two cases.
Solid grey line: average for low subject participation (see main text). The
dark and light grey areas cover one and two standard deviations, respectively,
around the average. Solid dark red line: high subject participation. Straight
red line: the high participation case is significantly better described by a
power law than the low participation case (see main text). Green dashed line:
normal distribution. (d): autocorrelation of the log returns (dashed line)
and of their magnitudes (solid line) for the whole time series. The minimum
for the former (−0.38) was cropped to improve the visibility of the positive
correlations for the latter. Methods: sec. 10.3
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higher for |r |/Std(r ) ≈ 5. Consistently, the CCDF for (HP) is also
significantly better described by a power law than for (LP) (p> = 0.003,
that is, the probability that the KS statistic for the fit for (HP) exceeds
that for a fit to a subset of samples for (LP)).The log return variance for
(HP) is 0.62±0.08. This is lower than the average log return variance
for (LP), which is 1.4± 0.2. Since large kurtoses are very difficult
to estimate from small samples, we only find a low presumption
(p = 0.07) against the null hypothesis that (HP) does not exhibit a
higher log return kurtosis than (LP).
Since splitting up the returns strongly affects autocorrelations, only
the whole continuous time series was analysed. The results are shown in
figure 13.8 (d). Subsequent log returns are short-range anti-correlated.
The log return magnitudes exhibit a small amount of positive long-
range correlations. Data collection continuous as of this writing.
Possible future developments for the seesaw game are discussed in the
next chapter, which concludes this thesis part.
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14. Summary and Discussion
In the past chapters, seemingly contradictory features of financial
markets were reconciled. On the one hand, considerable evidence
suggests that financial markets satisfy some of the predictions of the
EMH. Asset prices adjust, often rapidly, to reflect certain fundamental
information. Remaining price fluctuations–at least on short time
horizons–cannot be predicted easily. On the other hand, the vast
majority of price fluctuations cannot be plausibly explained post-hoc
by the arrival of new information about fundamentals. Logarithmic
price returns further deviate from expectations according to the central
limit theorem. Their statistics reveal ubiquitous scaling laws across
very different markets and epochs that resemble critical phenomena in
the natural sciences. This suggests that some elementary properties of
speculative trading evolve markets into states of extreme susceptibility.
This apparent antinomy is resolved by considering the dynamical
consequences of information efficiency with respect to self-generated
(endogenous) information, that is, information on predictable dynam-
ics within the market itself. At first, it might seem surprising that this
approach leads to novel results. Even weak-form market efficiency
implies that future price changes are nearly unpredictable from past
prices. The (neo-) classical argument why this should be the case,
however, is that significant price movements should always reflect the
arrival of new fundamental (exogenous) information. Accordingly,
any remaining fluctuations should be insignificant amounts of struc-
tureless noise. This point of view, while influential, is inconsistent
with a growing number of empirical findings.
In this work, theoretical and experimental market models were
presented which comply with empirical findings that contradict many
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existing economic theories. First, trades have a finite market impact.
Second, the majority of trades do not arise as a reaction to new exoge-
nous information, but predictable trends or patterns cannot endure
nevertheless. The minimisation of arbitrage, therefore, reflects a dy-
namical balance of market forces. As a main result, this state was
shown to robustly emerge from self-organisation based on simple ele-
mentary market mechanisms. Even more importantly, the successful
elimination of predictable trends and patterns was found to leave
highly information-efficient markets particularly susceptible to price
bubbles and dynamical instabilities. Self-organised efficiency might
have been expected according to established economic theories, but
the latter result identifies a new and comprehensive explanation for
the characteristics of financial markets described above. Existing expla-
nations, in contrast, focus on specific inefficiencies as mechanisms for
market failures. While we identified two different mechanisms that
are plausibly relevant in real markets, results suggest the possibility of
a convergence of the different models. They, furthermore, contribute
to deeper understanding of several preexisting models as well. The
main findings and their implications are discussed in more detail in
the following.
14.1. Trading is collective learning and control
The parsimonious models and experiments presented in the previous
chapters explain different aspects of information-efficient markets. In
chapter 11, it was demonstrated that the simple yet plausible mecha-
nism of success-dependent order size adaptation suffices to coordinate
the impacts of diverse strategies such that information becomes ab-
sorbed in the price. The proof that the trading rules in our model
correspond to an efficient gradient-based learning rule that minimises
predictable return magnitudes provides a rigorous link of a funda-
mental market mechanism to adaptive control. It may therefore be
considered highly plausible to prevail in real markets, despite the com-
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plexities of real pricing mechanisms and order size adaptations, as long
as the latter correlate with trading success.
“Rationality”, in the sense of an efficient adjustment of prices to
new information, emerges in this model from the collective behaviour
of many heterogenous traders. This differs from typical notions of
rational markets in the literature. “As-if rationality” is commonly used
to describe the idea that markets appear efficient because only “good
strategies” are successful while the others eventually die out [LeB11].
This implies that trading success rewards agents who are “rational” in
absolute terms and on their own, rather than trading success emerging
only in relation to the behaviour of others. This neoclassical perspec-
tive has become increasingly criticised, especially from proponents of
behavioural economics (sec. 10.4). Wealth evolution on its own also
does not select for individual utility maximisation, which economists
typically equate with rationality [LeB11]. We will come back to this
point later.
A minority rule with respect to the returns is a dominating factor
in the trading models’ dynamics. That is, those traders profit most
whose actions counteract the change of the actions of the majority.
It was claimed in [CCC+13] that the trading model is equivalent
to an existing MG with capital redistribution, which is incorrect.
Even though the trading model and several MGs share a number
of characteristics, there are many subtle and also some substantial
differences between these models. Most importantly, the mechanisms
for extreme events discussed for previous MGs are based on market
failure and not on efficiency. Therefore, the results presented here are
at least complementary to the published findings based on common
MGs in several respects. We first discuss the differences between
several payoff rules and means of order adaptation (see also sections
10.8 and 11.8.2).
277
14. Summary and Discussion
14.1.1. Differences between payoff rules
A minority rule based on the sign of the log return is a good approxi-
mation of trading success in a roundtrip trade on the time-scale over
which the return was calculated (sec. 11.8). Adjusting the impacts of
traders accordingly minimises the log return magnitudes (sec. 11.4.3).
This connection of trading and learning has not been demonstrated
before.
The payoff in previously established MGs, however, is based on the
excess demand, which in these models is assumed to be proportional to
the log return. Learning based on either payoff optimises for different
pricing rules. Furthermore, equation (11.6) adjusts the price such
that demand and supply match in every time step. Prices only change
if the agents change their orders. If the MG outcome defined by
equation (10.7) is interpreted as a log return, there is no price in the
model. It is implied, however, that prices change ad infinitum if all
agents resubmit the same orders, except for the case where a set of
orders is submitted that matches perfectly at any price. This is possible
because all orders in the MG have the same unit.
Furthermore, the comparison of trading with two assets and the
MG-approximation with just one asset revealed several differences.
The trading model evolves onto a manifold of asset distributions where
the price becomes invariant to the information states that are frequently
conveyed to the market and therefore expected (sec. 11.4.1). The two
assets, however, are still redistributed. For one asset, a single stationary
asset distribution suffices for a state-invariant price. The latter model
exhibits almost no volatility clustering and a significantly altered phase
space in markets that include producers (sec. 11.8). Capital redistribu-
tion with just one asset furthermore violates the conservation of assets
in a trade and therefore necessitate measures for compensation (see
secs. 10.8.2 and 11.8.2, as well as eq. (11.54)). Moreover, it has been
thoroughly discussed in the literature that a single-step payoff cannot
be defined consistently (sec. 10.9). In conclusion, attempts to further
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simplify the trading model cause side effects that should be considered
carefully when choosing a particular model for future research.
14.1.2. Differences between scaling and switching strategies
In common MGs, agents adapt either exclusively or at least predom-
inantly by switching between different strategies. They therefore in-
teract similarly to (frustrated) spins in solid-state physics. This differs
substantially from agents with dynamical capital, who form basis func-
tions for collective learning similar to neurons in a neuronal network.
Many of the consequences are revealed in figure 10.6. Foremost, the
phase transition for common minority games [CMZ05b] differs from
the one for capital reallocation (sec. 11.4.2).
Further differences are most apparent in the over-complete phase.
In the OMG, herding emerges due to correlated strategies with a
fixed impact. If the impact of strategies is scaled instead, no herding
emerges. The excess volatility in the OMG is therefore a result of the
artificial lack of an appropriate mechanism of order adaptation that
would allow for a coordination of correlated agents. The minority
rule furthermore creates frustration. Agents who lose frequently will
change their strategies. This eventually causes previously successful
agents to switch their strategies too, since it is impossible for all agents
to belong to the minority most of the time.
Frustration also explains why switching strategies increases fluctua-
tions in models with dynamic capital: the very basis functions required
for collective learning are replaced, necessitating re-learning. Faster
capital redistribution reduces average errors because the re-learning
is more effective. At the same time, the kurtosis is increased because
the relative increase in fluctuations when a strategy is replaced is more
severe. Whether this mechanism, which was not identified in the
MG literature, is relevant for real markets possibly depends on the
time-scale of interest. Do complex trading strategies suddenly appear
and vanish completely, or does the market reallocate resources between
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strategies more smoothly? Note that even intra-day price jumps of
several standard deviations occur frequently.
14.2. Dynamical instabilities
The trading model can reproduce important “stylised facts” of financial
markets quantitatively to a surprising extent. Possibly more important,
however, is how the extreme events in this model emerge. The fact
that efficient information annihilation does not result in a unique and
stable equilibrium, but instead can lead to local states that perpetually
become unstable, refutes the prominent notion that these properties
are mutually exclusive [LM99b].
While Information Annihilation Instability (IAI) was demonstrated
in section 11.8 to also emerge in appropriately constructed MGs, the
mechanisms for extreme events in common MGs are quite different.
First, the OMG does not generate non-Gaussian fluctuations at all.
It was argued in the established literature that a modulation of the
trading volume is the crucial ingredient for reproducing the stylised
facts [CMZ05a]. More recent empirical findings in real markets,
however, challenge this view (sec. 10.6). As discussed in the previous
section and section 10.8, extreme events in common MGs are caused
by a breakdown of the efficient coordination of agents in over-complete
markets where they become too correlated. This leads to an increase
of average fluctuations and does not depend on how the information
conveyed to the agents is generated. The detailed mechanisms, some
of which are finite size effects, differ substantially among the different
MGs (sec. 10.8).
In contradistinction, instability due to locally adaptive control is a
unifying macroscopic principle that is not tied to specific microscopic
interactions. In fact, it was first realised in a one-dimensional random
map ([PREP07], sec. 7.3). The heavy-tailed distributions here are
a direct consequence of the elimination of local trends or patterns
which yields a net decrease in average fluctuation magnitudes. These
fluctuations are therefore a sign of high efficiency and do not signal its
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breakdown. Instead they reflect surprising information to which the
system is the more succeptible, the better it is locally adapted. Then,
a closed loop involving endogenous information creates a dynamic in-
stability leading to extreme fluctuations that are not caused by external
events.1 2 This distinct role of endogenous information is not found
in common minority games. On the contrary, many publications
explicitly emphasised that the method of information generation is
largely negligible (e.g. [CMZ05b]). The reason for this discrepancy is
that IAI only becomes apparent in systems capable of highly efficient
control in the first place.
14.3. Bubbles in efficient markets
In chapter 12, subjects in a toy market experiment were found to
exhibit a tendency for herding caused by collective efficiency with
respect to past outcomes. An analytically tractable model that mimics
this behaviour relates price efficiency to bubbles, power-law log returns,
and volatility clusters. This result is based on two factors. First, the
lack of mean reversion in a simple bidding process leads to a uniform
demand distribution. This bubble process incorporates no trading or
payoffs: it simply implements price efficiency according to (10.4) (or
alternatively demand efficiency) for a finite number of agents. Second,
a non-linear pricing rule causes the system to be more susceptible
in bubble phases. This is analogous to, for example, many buyers
betting up the price of a scarce resource. Then, in absolute terms small
fluctuations in the supply may lead to large relative price changes. The
1As shown in secs. 11.7 and B.1.2, surprising exogenous information causes large
returns, too. Extreme market reactions to extreme external shocks, however, are
expected from basic economic arguments. The main problem we solved here is
the empirical finding that most extreme price jumps are not caused by external
news (chap. 10).
2The “encoding” of surprise in the return is another parallel to a hypothesised
neuronal code in the brain. See sec. B.4 for more details.
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same effect, however, is also present for moderate imbalances of buyers
and sellers in arbitrarily large systems.
While the model is rather abstract and currently tied to a specific
pricing rule, many qualitative and quantitative features of real returns
are captured both numerically and analytically. For example, real prices
are approximately diffusive over many time scales (sec. 10.6). Weak
mean reversion on very long time scales (i.e. years in real markets)
should not fundamentally change the results. The bubbles model
actually exhibits mean reversion on time scales that are long compared
to the time required to traverse the state space, and therefore much
longer than the time scale on which speculation takes place.
Empirical studies (e.g. [BFL09]) indicated that diffusive prices
indeed lead to states where market granularity matters due to micro-
crises in revealed liquidity (sec. 10.6). There also appear to be examples
for major bubbles with high volatility like the “dot-com bubble” in the
late 1990s [PV04, Sch13], even though mixed opinions exist on the
question which of the alleged bubbles exhibited increased volatility
[AS04].
Furthermore, most existing models other than MGs that can gener-
ate clustered volatility and non-Gaussian log returns rely on a hidden
variable that shifts between low and high activity regimes (sec. 10.7). In
[LM99b], for example, the trading volume is coupled with the volatil-
ity and scales with price imbalance. The spin model from [Bor01]
implements a similar principle in a much simpler way (sec. 10.9),
and also involves a nonlinear pricing rule. Another nonlinearity with
respect to market imbalance is a the leverage cycle (sec. 10.7). Price-
efficient bubbles could potentially provide a unifying framework for
many similar models. The bubbles model of chapter 12 may not be
the most realistic market model, but it might be the “hydrogen atom”
of the aforementioned model class. Another advantage of the efficient
bubbles model over many others is, that the “stylised facts” here are
no finite size effects3.
3Prominent examples for finite size effects are found in secs. 10.7 and 10.8.3
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While optimism, trend following, or “riding a bubble” were fre-
quently blamed for market destabilisation (secs 10.5 ff.), no model
seems to have systematically and consistently linked the non-vanishing
impact of these strategies to the martingale property of prices before.
Since price efficiency, given the necessary input, is readily learned from
trading- or minority payoffs (sec. 12.5 and chap. 13), it may eliminate
the need to manually tune the balance of different market forces in
multi-agent models.
14.4. Experiments
In chapters 12 and 13, collective phenomena that also persist in large-
scale models were demonstrated in group experiments with moderate
numbers of interacting subjects. In particular, the seesaw game was
introduced, which makes (modified) minority games highly accessible.
The game combines information efficiency as in minority games with
bubbles as in majority games in a simpler way than the $-game [AS03]
[GB03], and without the necessity to fine tune to a phase transition.
The version presented in chapter 13 exhibits many features of the
theoretical models in this work, including self-organised efficiency,
bubbles, local return patterns, power-law distributed log returns, and
some volatility clustering even in small systems.4
The seesaw game combines many approaches towards understand-
ing price fluctuations in a mathematically precise, particularly simple,
and very illustrative way. Since it is entertaining, it not only serves
as a scientific tool to investigate group dynamics, but also proved to
be attractive for laymen to whom it playfully conveys basics of multi-
agent modelling of extreme events. We also used the game successfully
as an educational tool for students in a lecture on non-equilibrium
systems in statistical physics. The game can be played online at see-
saw.neuro.uni-bremen.de. Experience so far indicates the potential
4In many multi-agent models, including the trading- and the bubbles model pre-
sented above, the time scale of the collective dynamics increases with the system
size.
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to collect even more data by including achievements to increase long-
time motivation, further optimising the game for mobile devices, and
especially by encouraging more international coverage.
14.5. Two answers to the same question?
The IAI of market equilibria and bubbles from price efficiency describe
two distinct aspects of information efficient market models. Argu-
ments were made above why both mechanisms are plausible in real
markets. Curiously, a true martingale precludes return patterns. These,
nevertheless, exist in real markets. An intuitive explanation is that
the martingale property in a market must emerge from the balance
of heterogeneous strategies. The result may be marginal inefficiency
with subtle dynamical patterns that may be more difficult to detect
or to exploit (e.g. because of costs or risks). Examples for the seesaw
game are shown in figure 13.6. Even a combination of simple forces
like fast diffusion and slow reversion creates complex patterns (see e.g.
the references in [HB10]).
Both mechanisms scale volatility with an “imbalance” of market
forces. In the trading model, this is a sudden reduction of decorrela-
tion of the strategy impacts following surprising information states.5
In the bubbles model, the imbalance applies to demand and supply,
and extreme fluctuations require an additional nonlinearity. Whether
such a nonlinearity could also stem from the a lack of decorrelation
of agents in bubble states might be a worthwhile question for future
research. As of yet, in particular the emergence of similar “stylised
facts” from different mechanisms is formally a coincidence. This may
indicate at least one of the following. On the one hand, power-law
CCDFs and long-range correlations might under-determine the prob-
lem. Additional testable parameters could then be used to narrow
down the true mechanism. On the other hand, there might be univer-
5See also [Sor03] for a slightly related hypothesis on correlations, or “pockets of
predictability”.
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sal features of information-efficient control that explain why similar
results should emerge in formally different processes. We will come
back to this idea in the final discussion (part IV).
14.6. Outlook
Future research should investigate information efficient control in
more different model classes. A related question with respect to collec-
tive learning is: what can be learned under which conditions? Trading
strategies without fixed thresholds might improve learning price effi-
ciency, allow for bubbles superimposed with local patterns, and yield
an invariance with respect to noise similar to the balancing models of
part II.6 Another important task is a clear characterisation of the pay-
off in continuous double auctions and its approximation by simpler
rules like the ones considered in this work. Furthermore, since the
minority rule was found to be most consistent on the time scale of
roundtrip trades, maybe it should be considered in a paradigm where
agent decisions correspond to going long and short.
Continuous-time martingale processes with limits may lead to a
generalisation of the results of chapter 12. A particularly intriguing
question is whether efficiency with respect to different nonlinearities in
the price in the end leads to the same or to different return distributions.
Obvious candidates are the nonlinearities of other models with high-
and low activity regimes (see above). Another possible direction,
related to the suggestions in the previous paragraph, is the question of
how price efficiency may emerge in continuous double auctions (e.g.
in an extension of zero intelligence models).
6For example, strategies could be constructed from linear combinations of lagged
log prices or as linear predictors of returns like in [RP03]. Alternatively, a binary
encoding may also feature several thresholds. Scale-free binary indicators could
be constructed from the sign of the difference of two moving averages with
differently decaying weights or simply from returns over different time periods.
It may be worthwhile to research what kinds of strategies are actually used or
have been used historically in practise.
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A reoccurring motive throughout this work is that pure speculative
trading and the minority payoff in particular are problematic when
agents are not considered to be pure strategies, but utility optimisers.
In the context of the trading model, agents that correspond to actual
traders might be introduced as an additional model layer. These agents,
or possibly even just one super agent, would then distribute their
capital among the different trading strategies, similar to a portfolio.
Success-dependent asset reallocation might then be consistent with
both utility maximisation and collective learning. A relevant question
is furthermore how the number of strategies can self-organise towards
the phase transition. A possible objective function for such a process
is average income per strategy (sec. B.2).
In the seesaw-game experiments with real subjects, the importance
of a small risk-free growth of capital became apparent. Otherwise,
most agents in a purely speculative market will lose and therefore, if
possible, leave the market.7 A promising perspective is the inclusion
of dividends for this purpose, creating a controlled linear growth
of capital which could potentially also be offset by consumption.
First, different dividends or risks on multiple assets could be used
to model asymmetries that are found in real prices. Furthermore, time
dependent dividends that correlate with some information conveyed
to the agents (e.g. a bit that indicates rising or falling dividends) allows
to investigate how far multi-agent models collectively anticipate profits.
This would also create a meaningful reference for bubbles in systems
with more than one asset, and allow to discuss model dynamics in
more traditional economic terms. It would, for example, allow to
asses how far local price efficiency dominates and at which point going
against a bubble becomes profitable. If the minority effect is offset
by capital growth, a self-organisation of strategies, trading volume,
or leverage based on trading success or expected profit may become
viable.
7The trading model is robust with respect to a moderate adaptations of individual
agent use parameters. Residual errors, nevertheless, increase.
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An advantage of models with a pricing rule is that realistic costs
like a transaction tax can be investigated. This was attempted before
in GCMGs [BGMP09], where no price is defined. Therefore, the
threshold for participation was raised to simulate a tobin tax (the
basic model is explained in sec. 10.8.3). If the threshold is raised
significantly, speculators stop trading. This reduces the volatility be-
cause the return in this model is equal to the sum of all actions. In
particular, changing the threshold can move the system out of the
GCMG’s critical region where the finite size effect of volume herding
emerges. A realistic transaction tax was tested briefly in the trading
model of chapter 11 (not shown). The general effect is a gradual
increase of average fluctuations without a significant change in the size
of the most extreme ones. This is consistent with standard economics
[GS80] and empirical data [Hau06]. The reason is that the model
stops “learning” earlier which affects the minimal achievable volatility
in local attractors. This result, however, may depend on specific model
assumptions. In particular, the effect on bubbles was not tested as
of yet. Further research is necessary to make statements that might
potentially be valuable for economic policy. Note that transaction
taxes might also serve other purposes such as financing bailouts.
Whether the mechanisms described in this work are indeed among
the main causes of the notorious large jumps in real price time series
can in principle be tested empirically. This would require identifying
the information states that cause large price changes in a given market.
Instead of the classic question, “What fraction of price movements can
be explained by information on fundamentals?”, the question would
be, “Which information can explain most of the price movements and
their statistics?” (and on which time scales). Further expanding the
use of metaphors from neuroscience, this project may be considered
as finding the “receptive field” of a market.
Difficulties may arise because any random variable could drive
price fluctuations if agents expect it to be relevant. This problem of
self-fulfilling expectations is known as “sunspot equilibria” [MS92].
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One possible solution would be to use machine learning techniques
to extract information that causes large returns from real price time
series and various news sources. This would require access to high
quality data sources, some of which may be expensive. A way to test
appropriate methods in more controlled settings would be to use data
from behavioural experiments, for example based on the seesaw game.
In the final part, we compare the results of part II and III, and
discuss them in an even more general, interdisciplinary context.
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B.1. Trading model: additional figures
B.1.1. Speculators and Producers
Figure B.1 shows the phase diagram for α versus the amount of
producers in the market. As it turns out, a second phase transition
with respect to the number of producers is found. This transition is
independent of the one for the speculators. Small Np < 0.5 ·D only
weakly influence return distributions.
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Figure B.1.: (a): Reduction of average return magnitudes during transients,
and (b): kurtosis of log-returns of the model with endogenous information
for different numbers of speculators Ns and producers Np for constant
memory K = 10 (i.e. D = 210) and use γ= 0.5. Otherwise, the figure were
generated exactly as fig. 11.6.
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B.1.2. Mixed Information
For a combination of endo- and exogenous information, results are
similar to pure endogenous information as long as the endogenous
part dominates. Generally, more exogenous information leads to
a stronger reduction of fluctuations, less pronounced volatility
clustering, and random time series without visible patterns even
for small γ. The scaling of the remaining extreme returns remains
unchanged. An example is shown in figure B.2.
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Figure B.2.: Simulation for a trading model with 3 bits of uniform exoge-
nous information and 6 bits of endogenous information. Ns = 210, Np = 0,
γ= 0.1. The first 27 time steps were discarded. Log returns rn are normalised
by their standard deviation. (a): Time series (b): Solid black line: comple-
mentary cumulative distribution function. Short Red line: Hill estimator
for the scaling exponent. Dashed grey line: normal distribution.
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B.1.3. Distribution of Information Ages (Surprise)
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Figure B.3.: CCDF of the times τ(t ) since the informations µ(t ) occurred
last. Solid black line: Model with intrinsic information and D = 210,
Ns = 211, Np = 0, γ= 0.5. Short red line: Hill estimator. Dashed line: Ex-
ogenous information with Pexo(µ)∝ exp(−0.02µ), leading to P (τ)∝ τ−2.
B.2. Trading model: income and the critical point
Figure B.4 shows the phase transition with respect to α in more detail.
As in figure 11.3, we take one parameter set as a reference to which we
compare simulations after initial transients for different parameters.
For orientation, the log-return variances (figure B.4 (a)) and kurtoses
(figure B.4 (b)), which have been discussed earlier, are shown again.
Mean speculator capitals
Cs(t )= 1
2Ns
Ns∑
k=1
Mk (t )+Sk (t ). (B.1)
are not constant over time in markets that include producers. For
empty markets, the ratio of average speculator and producer capitals
quickly evolves towards an equilibrium. The more agents are added,
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Figure B.4.: Properties of log-return and resource distributions for different
α=D/Ns , and endogenous information. Solid line: The model with unity
(initial) speculator and producer capitals Cs and Cp , and a small number
of producers serves as a reference. For each other line or symbol, only one
model parameters has been changed, respectively. Shown are averages from
50 simulations for each of which only the last T = 107 out of 2T time steps
have been analysed. (a): variances and (b): kurtoses were calculated from
log-returns. (c): income factors a according to equations (B.1) and (B.2).
(d) Gini indices for speculator capitals after 2T time steps.
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the longer it takes for Cs to saturate. In critical or crowded markets,
a positive speculator income persists over long times. Then, average
speculator capitals after transients are well described by:
Cs(t )
2 =Cs(t0)2+a t , t0 < t . (B.2)
This result reflects that the impact of the speculators increasingly dom-
inates the impact of the producers over time because the speculators
get richer. It therefore becomes increasingly difficult to exploit the
producers.
The income factor a is shown in figure B.4 (c) and quantifies how
well the speculators can exploit the producers. a is found to be indepen-
dent of the initial ratio between speculator and producer capitals. a is
maximal close to the critical point which can be intuitively understood:
For empty markets, there is a finite chance for a producer strategy to
lie outside of the space spanned by the speculators. Therefore, increas-
ing the number of speculators increases their average income. For
crowded markets, producers are already optimally exploited. Then,
adding more speculators just distributes the maximal total income
over more of them. An analogous maximum can be found in MGs
[CMZ05b].
Figure B.4 (d) shows the Gini index, a common measure of wealth
inequality.1 Increased incomes coincide with increased capital inequal-
ity among speculators: the gini-index shows a maximum at the critical
point. Thus, only a few speculators are most successful in exploiting
the producers.
B.3. Trading model: volatility and distribution tails
From a purely descriptive point of view, the distribution and autocor-
relation of a random process are mathematically distinct features. For
example, two processes can have the same probability distribution,
1A Gini index of zero corresponds to all agents having equal wealth. A Gini index
of one corresponds to one agent owning everything.
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but different autocorrelations. However, there are various ways of
generating a random process where these two features are closely inter-
dependent. Log returns in particular are sums over many logarithmic
price changes. Therefore, if those price changes were IID, it would
follow from the generalised central limit theorem that returns over
longer time intervals should follow either a Gaussian or a Lévy stable
distribution (sec. 2.2). Yet, returns have been found to be outside of
the Lévy regime and still non-Gaussian, as well as remarkably stable as
time intervals are increased [GPL+00, PGA+99, Lux09]. Since sub-
sequent return magnitudes are not independent, it seems natural to
assume that a dynamic volatility is to blame for the slow convergence
of long-term returns towards the Gaussian distribution. A possibly
related finding is that return distributions become less heavy tailed
after normalisation by an estimate of the volatility at each point in
time. The extent of this effect depends on the assumptions made about
a hidden stochastic volatility process [ABDL00, FGV09].
In the model described in sec. 11.2, jumps to a “surprising” part of
the information (attractor) space creates large returns. Such events in-
crease the probability for more large jumps while the market adapts to
the new environment. Therefore, volatility in our model is a stochastic
variable, and connected to non-Gaussian returns, but this connection
is more complex than simply Gaussian noise with a time dependent
amplitude. However, a detailed analytical characterisation of this
volatility process is outside of the scope of this work. Here, we present
two numerical analyses of the model returns.
First, distributions for the model are very stable when returns over
more than one time step are calculated. Figure B.5 shows a comparison
of single-step returns and cumulated returns over 1000 time steps for
the model, and for similarly distributed independent random variates.
The return distributions for the model are found to be more stable
than the independent ones. Therefore, one time step in the model
could also be interpreted as a shorter time interval than one day. This
holds especially when increasing Ns which leads to a slower decay of
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Figure B.5.: Comparison of log returns (black line) and cumulated log re-
turns over 1000 time steps calculated from the same time series (red line).
In both cases, the distributions have been normalised to unit variance. A
normal distribution (dashed grey line) is shown for comparison. (a): Log
returns for the model (sec. 11.2) with D = 211,Ns = 212, Np = 0, γ= 0.8.
Transients were discarded. (b): As surrogate log returns (black line), indepen-
dent random variates were generated using inverse transform sampling. The
distribution was chosen such that it follows a Gaussian below a threshold
and a power law with a slope of 2.5 above the threshold. At the threshold,
the PDF and its derivative are continuous.
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Figure B.6.: Normalisation of log returns with a sliding window reduces the
heavy distribution tails for the model (red lines, D = 29,Ns = 210, Np = 0,
γ = 0.8), and for the DJIA (black lines). The reduction is not sufficient
to make the distribution perfectly Gaussian (dotted grey lines). For inde-
pendent surrogate returns generated as in figure B.5, the normalisation has
no effect (green lines). (a): Kurtosis of the log returns for different sizes
of the normalisation window. (b): CCDFs for the original (solid lines),
and normalised (dashed lines) returns for the window sizes which minimise
the respective kurtoses. All distributions are normalised to unit variance
independently of the sliding normalisation to unit volatility.
correlations of magnitudes over time. For a comparable analysis of
high frequency returns, see e.g. [GPL+00].
Second, we consider a simple analysis for as to how the CCDF
and local volatility interact. Returns are normalised by using sliding
windows of different sizes (similar to [ABDL00]). The model behaves
very similar to the DJIA in this analysis (figure B.6): Normalisation
to constant estimated volatility reduces the kurtosis, but not enough
to yield a Gaussian process. This effect is not found for independent
surrogate returns.
In conclusion, simple model-free tests show that the model captures
observed features of volatility clustering in real stock market returns
very well, and that simulated time steps do not necessarily have to be
interpreted as trading days.
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B.4. Market surprise vs. predictive coding in the brain
As shown in chapter 11, the success dependent redistribution of assets
in a financial market is equivalent to a collective learning algorithm.
Price returns were found to encode how surprising an information
state (or state of nature) is to the market. This can be considered a
predictive code.
Here we briefly substantiate the analogy to the nervous system. We
argue, in particular, that the brain may utilise IAI to its advantage.
Because neuronal coding is technically outside of the scope of this
thesis, the introduction to the topic, the examples, and the discussion
are kept to a minimum.
Neurons generate stereotypical electrical pulses, called “spikes” or
“action potentials”, which travel down axons (nerve fibers) to propagate
signals. Information is encoded in sequences of action potentials, so
called spike trains. A neuron’s axon is connected to other neurons via
junctions called “synapses”. The arrival of an action potential on the
pre-synaptic side causes the release of neurotransmitter molecules that
trigger a post-synaptic potential in the post-synaptic neuron.
Most of the time, there is an excess of negatively charged ions inside
a neuron. The neuron’s cell membrane is essentially impermeable to
most ions, except at specific ion channels, some of which are actively
regulated. The membrane therefore acts like a combination of a capac-
itor and a resistor. Input spikes that increase the membrane potential
are called “excitatory” and those that decrease the membrane poten-
tial are called “inhibitory”. If a neuron’s combined inputs during a
small time window lead to a strong increase of its membrane potential,
the neuron “fires”, that is, it generates an action potential. Neurons,
therefore, are often described as threshold elements.
For most parts of the brain, it is unknown how exactly information
is encoded. Spike trains in the cortex are typically described as highly
irregular and statistically very similar to a Poisson process [DA01].
A proposed cause for these firing statistics is a detailed balance of
excitatory and inhibitory inputs close to the threshold such that firing
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depends on small fluctuations in the input [SN94]. Excitation and
inhibition were experimentally found to be closely balanced not only
on average but also during ongoing activity [OL08]. This raises the
question of the functional role of the detailed balance. If only the
firing rate were relevant, there would appear to be no functional reason
to operate at the point with the highest output variability.
A related hypothesis is that spikes, in some conditions, signal un-
expected stimuli or unexpected stimulus variations [Den08]. This is
called predictive coding. Spikes then appear, by definition, unpre-
dictable. Advantages of such a sparse use of action potentials include
energy savings and data compression. A related finding is that bal-
anced excitation and inhibition emerge for model neurons where
spikes report unpredictable deviations from the mean input (ibid.).
We here show that the balance of excitation and inhibition may
lead to a predictive code with high sensitivity to unexpected stimuli.
We proceed in two steps. First, it is illustrated how spike trains can
encode the degree to which excitation and inhibition are balanced. We
then demonstrate that that a neuron which learns to balance excitation
and inhibition for a specific predictable stimulus becomes a highly
sensitive detector for unpredictable (i.e. unknown) stimuli.
First, consider an ordinary leaky integrate-and-fire neuron [DA01].
The sub-threshold membrane potential is described by
τmV˙ (t )=Vr−V +R(Ie+ Ii), V (t )<Vth, (B.3)
where τm is the membrane time constant and R is the membrane
resistance. When V reaches the threshold Vth = 1, an action poten-
tial is fired and V is reset to the reset potential Vr = 0. The neuron
receives an excitatory input current Ie > 0 and an inhibitory input
current Ii < 0. We use normalised units for simplicity. Both inputs are
modelled as Gaussian white noise. The effective input is the sum of
these two signals. Therefore, the average effective input is determined
by the sum of the mean signals. The effective variance of the input
depends on the cross correlation of the inputs. It vanishes for perfectly
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Figure B.7.: Leaky integrate-and-fire neuron with time-dependent balance
of excitation and inhibition. Parameters (in normalised units): membrane
resistance R = 10, membrane time constant τ= 20ms, firing threshold Vth =
1. Excitatory input current Ie ∼ N (0.195,1). Inhibitory input current
Ie ∼ N (−.1,1). Correlation coefficient ρ(Ie(t ), Ii(t ))=−0.99 for t < 0.5s
and ρ(Ie(t ), Ii(t ))=−0.1 for t ≥ 0.5s (a): membrane potential. (b) inputs
Ie (blue) and Ii (green). (c) effective input.
anti-correlated (i.e. balanced) excitation and inhibition. Figure B.7
shows the model results for an effective input with a constant mean
and a time dependent variance. The mean input alone is just below
the firing threshold. At first, Ie and Ie are highly anti-correlated. Then
the correlation is reduced, leading to a sharp increase in the effec-
tive input variance that drives the neuron across the firing threshold.
Therefore, a neurons firing rate in the balanced state is highly sensitive
to fluctuations in the degree to which excitation and inhibition are
balanced.
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For the second part of the argument, consider a neuron which learns
to balance excitatory and inhibitory inputs for a certain predictable
input. If the degree of balance for an unpredictable input remains
higher than for a predictable input, the resulting spike train after intro-
ducing a threshold will encode how surprising an input is–according
to the previous paragraph. Figure B.8 (a) shows the sub-threshold
membrane potential for a neuron which receives inputs from two neu-
ronal populations. One input population provides excitatory inputs
and the other one provides inhibitory inputs. The connections to all
input neurons have random, none-negative synaptic weights. The two
lines correspond to two different input spike patterns. Figure B.8 (b)
shows the membrane potential after the synaptic weights were opti-
mised to balancing excitation and inhibition for one input pattern.
The fluctuations for the second pattern are actually increased. This
result is robust over repeated simulations, for different parameters and
optimisation methods.
Taken together, it follows from very basic neuronal principles that
neurons which learn to balance excitation and inhibition become
highly sensitive detectors to stimuli that are unpredictable from what
the neuron has learnt. In a neuronal population, the “surprise” should
be encoded in the population variance. Encoding signals in a popu-
lation variance facilitates a much better response at high frequencies
than encoding the signal in the population mean [SBM+04]. There-
fore, fast predictive codes should robustly emerge in the brain. Even
though the above arguments belong to a rather common ground in
neuroscience, it appears as if this whole line of reasoning had not
made as clearly and concisely before. For some further discussion, see
chapter 16.
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Figure B.8.: A leaky neuron without a threshold, which recieves inputs from
50 excitatory and 50 inhibitory neurons. We compare two input patterns
p1 and p2. For each pattern, each input neuron provides a frozen Pois-
sonian spike train with a firing rate of 1Hz. Output neuron parameters
(in normalised units): membrane resistance R = 10, membrane time con-
stant τ= 20ms. (a): the relative membrane potential after initialising the
synaptic weights for the inputs from a uniform distribution between 0 and
0.03. (b) the membrane potential after learning to suppress membrane po-
tential fluctuations for p1. Starting from the initialised weight vector, the
MSE was minimised using the downhill simplex method, while keeping all
weights non-negative. Qualitative results do not depend on the particular
optimisation method.
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Part IV.
Conclusions

15. Summary
“ Though this be madness, yet there is method in ’t.”
William Shakespeare
In this work, we investigated apparently unreasonable outliers in
the variation of two types of human behaviour. The largest outliers,
however, are not singular, isolated events. Instead, they are the most
visible extensions of self-similar event distributions spanning several
scales. The underlying causes were investigated experimentally and
theoretically using models that can explain the empirical event distribu-
tions, as well as important characteristics of their temporal structures.
These models were constructed to account for the domain-specific
requirements, yet share a novel overreaching principle which can be
intuitively understood in terms of the behaviour investigated in part II.
Consider the task of balancing a stick on a finger tip. It is only
possible to predict where the stick is going to fall once it starts falling.
In other words, the more successfully a system is stabilised, the less
its visible dynamics reveal about its structure. This Information An-
nihilation Instability (IAI) can induce self-similar fluctuations in an
adaptive control system.
A model based on this principle with a realistic reaction time and
smooth movements can quantitatively reproduce many details of the
spatio-temporal structure of the movements of real subjects in a Virtual
Stick Balancing (VSB) task. Furthermore, specific empirical measures
can be directly linked to model properties. According to this theory,
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subjects predict how the stick is going to fall based on the most recently
observed trend. They then move their hand slightly faster towards the
anticipated location.
The model further reveals a trade-off between typical balancing
errors and rare, extreme ones. This prediction was tested in a newly
developed VSB task featuring a high score to impose different cost
functions onto the subjects. Results are consistent with the model
predictions while several alternative explanations have to be rejected:
Subjects neither add multiplicative noise to stabilise an otherwise un-
stable system, nor is most multiplicative noise inherent to movement
execution. It was furthermore demonstrated for the first time that
subjects in this task can optimise their behaviour for distinct cost
functions, leading to pronounced qualitative differences in behaviour.
In part III, financial markets were investigated. Here, individual
and collective behaviour has to be distinguished. In chapter 11, a
parsimonious market model was introduced where the impacts of
trading strategies naturally adapt according to their success. This
implements a learning rule for the whole market that, as we proved,
minimises predictable price changes. Large price changes therefore
reflect surprising information that reaches the market. When the
trading strategies are based on past price patterns, however, equilibrium
states become destabilised after the market has absorbed all predictable
information. In fact, self-referential markets were found to generate
surprising information by changing between attractors such that the
consequent price changes quantitatively match the distribution and
temporal structure of price changes in real markets very well.
In chapter 12, we introduced the seesaw game as a paradigm for
group experiments. It was found that subjects were nearly information-
efficient with respect to a simple type of information: the preceding
price at each time step. This elimination of predictable trends was
found to induce long-range correlated dynamics that resemble bubbles.
This finding could be reproduced in a very simple and analytically
tractable model. The difference between this type of instability and
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IAI of a fixed point can be understood intuitively in terms of stick
balancing.
A model that adapts to complex return patterns evolves towards
equilibrium prices. A dynamical instability arises when all observable
information has been absorbed. This can be thought of as a high-
dimensional analogue to the situation during stick balancing. When
using absolute prices as information, however, the market cannot
evolve towards an equilibrium price because mean reversion is elim-
inated. This corresponds to a stick-balancing controller that would
eliminate predictable velocities and never decisively move the stick
back towards the upright position. The stick’s angle, after a sufficient
amount of time, would then diffuse towards arbitrary values where the
system behaves nonlinearly. Eventually, the stick will fall unless some
additional control mechanism steps in. In a real market, both types
of information are likely to be used by traders. The emergence of a
combination of bubbles, patterns, and realistic log-return distributions
was observed in an extended seesaw game presented in chapter 13. It
was further demonstrated that the emergence of large-scale collective
phenomena can be studied in group experiments even with moderate
group sizes.
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16. Discussion and outlook
We presented a spectrum of results ranging from contributions to
technical and field-specific discussions to potentially far-reaching and
very general findings.
16.1. Balancing
The main findings on motor control provide a new view on the origin
of movement variability and on internal models used by the Central
Nervous System (CNS). The results indicate that the latter are highly
adaptive and reconfigure on short time-scales to reflect task-relevant
information, which is extracted from observations only as immediately
needed.
Similar strategies were found in very different tasks before
(secs. 9.6.3 and 9.6.4), but the concept was apparently never discussed
as a dynamical source of movement variability. The reason why
this didn’t happen may be that motor control experiments often
involve tasks such as pointing or throwing, where the subjects is not
interacting with an unstable object. While the temporal structure
of postural sway shares a number of features with stick balancing, it
involves reflexes that actively stabilise joints. Humans may also priori-
tise minimising effort over minimising movements. While humans
may use similarly adaptive strategies in many different tasks, this
might not always manifest in very pronounced power-law-distributed
fluctuations.
Additional findings include explanations why the movement of a
balanced stick appears highly damped without a plausible physical
mechanism (sec. 7.8) and why distributions in difficult balancing tasks
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are less heavy-tailed than in easy ones (sec. A.6), as well as results on
significance tests for power laws in time series where subsequent events
are not independent (sec. A.1).
A possible long-term goal for future research is a complete theory for
learning and performing motor control which explains experimental
findings across different tasks. IAI may contribute pieces to this puzzle
on different levels, which will be discussed further below.
16.2. Markets
The main findings on speculative trading are consistent with the hy-
pothesis that information efficiency is at least a good first-order approx-
imation of the dynamics of financial markets. It was, however, also
found that information efficiency can be a double-edged sword, de-
pending on which information a market adapts to. Three main types
of information were investigated. For extrinsic information about
states of nature that do not depend on the market, heterogeneous
multi-agent models based on common and reasonable assumptions
on speculative trading were found to self-organise towards efficient
equilibrium states, as predicted by classical economic theories. These
markets may react sensitively to arriving information, but only if the
information is surprising (sec. 11.7). However, markets cannot be
fully efficient with respect to their own past if no one exploits patterns
that arise as epiphenomena of the interaction of dynamics on different
time scales.
When markets adapt to self-generated information, equilibria can
become destabilised. Dynamical instabilities were found in markets
that adapt to local patterns in recent price changes (sec. 11.5). The
absorption of mean reversion, which was observed in real markets on
short to intermediate time scales, was found to facilitate the formation
of bubbles (sec. 12.3). This principle was implemented in a model
which might turn out to be the simplest incarnation of a basic principle
behind many more complicated models that link market imbalance
to bubbles and crashes (sec. 12.4). However, even though the models
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in chapters 11 and 12 generate similar log return distributions, there
are some conceptual differences.
It was found that an invariant manifold in the space of asset distri-
butions is a characteristic feature of trading (sec. 11.4.1). This finding
gives insight into why real markets might be in a state of high ex-
citability even if they appear calm. Consider that in some markets,
the number of traded assets can exceed the number of existing assets
after mere days, yet prices on average change less then one percent
per day. Therefore, market forces are apparently in a delicate balance
which can be disturbed suddenly by unexpected, possibly minor and
market-internal events.
In contrast, the nonlinearity in theminimal bubbles model explicitly
depends on the pricing rule. In reality, however, this rule arises from
microscopic principles, the investigation of which may clarify whether
there are any hidden connections between the mechanisms. After
all, both mechanisms exhibit an increased volatility for imbalanced
markets. It may also be possible that the “stylised facts” can arise in
different ways and that more empirically measured quantities have to
be included in future analyses to distinguish between them. If so, the
next question would be whether the “stylised facts” in real markets can
be attributed to one mechanism, or whether markets exhibit many
different instabilities that somehow lead to similar price fluctuations.
Note that if IAI is indeed a “universal” principle, it could even occur
on different levels of the same system.
Additional findings include a clarification of the properties of differ-
ent means of adaptation in multi-agent systems (sec. 14.1). It was
shown that IAI can be found in suitably designed Minority Games
(MGs). Nevertheless, we identified some differences between models
where one versus two resources are adapted. More traditional MGs,
however, where strategies are exchanged faster than their impact is ad-
justed, or where the impact is not adjusted at all, were found to behave
completely differently because they cannot reach market equilibria at
all.
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Future research might concentrate more on identifying common
phenomena among different models. A related question is: what can
a market “learn” under which conditions? Another possible topic,
that is particularly important for open (e.g. grand canonical) markets,
is the influence of dividends and consumption (see chap. 14 for an
explanation). Finally, identifying relevant information states and
imbalances in real markets should become a main focus of future work.
Besides the analysis of large data sets from real markets, behavioural
experiments may serve as a semi-controlled testing ground. As we have
shown, the emergence of extreme collective phenomena can be studied
even in moderately sized groups. Such experiments can furthermore
serve a double purpose as an educational tool.
16.3. Predictability
This work focused on the mechanism behind crises, but not on their
prediction. Nevertheless, the presented models exhibit certain reg-
ularities that in principle allow for predictions. In section A.13, it
is shown that the minimal balancing model can be predicted nearly
perfectly by an external observer. All other models, however, are more
complicated. While the trading model is completely deterministic, the
naive approach to prediction requires the knowledge of all strategies
and the distribution of assets. Furthermore, a prediction method most
likely becomes less useful if it becomes widely used in a real market.
Nevertheless, informed statistical risk prediction based on knowl-
edge of fundamental system dynamics might be a worthwhile topic for
future research. Many systems exhibit “warning signs” near tipping
points. One such sign is critical slowing down where a system recovers
more slowly from perturbations while autocorrelation and variance in-
crease. This phenomenon was reported for systems as diverse as lasers
and neurons [SBB+09]. Similar effects are observed in bubble states in
the model introduced in chapter 12, and also for the two-dimensional
spin model briefly discussed in section 10.9 [KBB12].
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16.4. Optimality and universality
Whether a controller is “truly optimal” is ill-posed question. Opti-
mality can only be defined with respect to certain assumptions and
limitations. The minimal balancing model is optimal given the re-
striction to a memory of two time steps. In the continuous balancing
model, the reason why an infinite memory is not optimal lies in the
restriction to smooth and cautious movements. The latter were found
to be optimal, for example, under certain assumptions on movement
execution noise (sec. 5.3). However, there may be other real-world
advantages to fast adaptation. Furthermore, there is probably little
evolutionary pressure to perform optimally in stick balancing. In more
complex tasks, high performance with little effort and behavioural
flexibility might favour parsimonious and adaptive internal represen-
tations of task-relevant features even more.
Nevertheless, the balancing model suggests that error distributions
between the Lévy- and Gaussian regimes may reflect a nearly optimal
compromise between the elimination of random local trends and
rare large errors (sec. 7.6). A similar effect was reported in portfolio
optimisation where “minimizing ‘small’ risks can lead to an increase
of ‘large‘ risks” [AS01]. In some sense, the trade-off is also analogous
to the bias-variance dilemma that is well known in machine learning:
models that reach a very low error in some training data are often bad
predictors for unseen data due to overfitting (i.e., the model “learned
the noise”).
This raises the question whether the observed range of power-law
exponents can be justified from some general optimisation. A slightly
less exciting explanation, at least for the lower bound of observed
exponents, may be that power laws outside of the Lévy-regime (ξ> 2)
still feature a finite variance. If the variance were infinite, certain types
of systems might not survive very long.
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16.5. IAI and the brain
If IAI is indeed a fundamental instability in complex adaptive systems,
similar phenomena should be observed in different contexts. One
may ask in particular how the results relate to neuronal activity. After
all, we likened resource redistribution among trading strategies with
learning in neuronal networks. Furthermore, returns in the trading
model effectively represent a predictive code. As it turns out, there are
very self-evident arguments for the hypothesis that the brain might
use IAI to its advantage. As shown in section B.4, it is even possible
to construct neuronal models for predictive coding based on this
principle. Instead of buy and sell orders, neurons balance inputs that
increase or decrease their membrane potential. The output spikes of
these neurons encode inputs that have not yet been learned, in other
words: surprise. This furthermore raises the question whether similar
mechanisms might be generally useful for rapid data processing with
limited resources.
16.6. Information and the critical point
A thermodynamic system at a critical point is in equilibrium, and an
external parameter is tuned to critical value. Self-organised critical
systems, where a critical point is an attractor, are typically neither
closed nor in equilibrium: they are slowly driven from the outside
(sec. 4.2). Here, we investigated systems where internal interactions
that annihilate predictable information create attractors that are crit-
ical points. In most presented models, equilibria are destabilised by
IAI. While this might be considered a new type of Self-Organised
Criticality (SOC), the underlying principle is distinct from previous
instantiations since it also occurs in low-dimensional systems.
The phase transitions that occur in heterogeneous multi-agent mod-
els usually differ from those in thermodynamic systems. The latter
mark a change in the spatial order of a system, while most market
models have no spatial dimensions. In common MGs, the phase tran-
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sition marks the boundary between phases of independent and linearly
dependent agent strategies. Non-Gaussian returns and long-range
temporal correlations only occur in combination with secondary mech-
anisms that are not directly related to the phase transition. In models
with resource redistribution, the phase transition separates the phases
where trading strategies form an either incomplete or (over-)complete
basis. In the trading model, the critical point at the phase transition is
important because there the market “forgets in the right way”. There
are, however, many possible reasons why a real market might adapt
locally even though it is not exactly at such a phase transition. The
critical point at the phase transition is furthermore different from the
dynamical critical point where equilibria become unstable.
The impact of locally minimising fluctuations in a SOC sand pile
was investigated in a recent study [NBD13]. A trade-off was found
between the control of common, small avalanches and inevitable rare,
extreme ones. Preventing small avalanches can even make a subcritical
sand pile critical.
These findings raise the question whether the description of (self-
organised) criticality as information processing may lead to a unifying
framework for some phenomena that currently appear unrelated. After
all, information (entropy) is already fundamental to several physical
theories and not exclusive to brains or computers. A major problem
for such an endeavour, however, would be to first find a suitable gen-
eral formalisation of information. IAI can be expressed for any system
that can be linearised around a fixed point using Fisher information
to naturally measure locally observable information (sec. 7.2). Shan-
non information (i.e. entropy) is a global measure of the absence of
predictable structures in a signal. It is closely related to surprising
information which, however, in market models is best characterised
by a local measure (sec. 11.7). A more general theory would probably
be based on a very general information measure. Nevertheless, if one
is searching for a comprehensive information-based principle for crit-
icality, then this work offers several examples for limiting cases that
should be included.
315

Bibliography
[ABDL00] T. G. Andersen, T. Bollerslev, F. X. Diebold, and P. Labys.
Exchange rate returns standardized by realized volatil-
ity are (nearly) gaussian. Multinational Finance Journal,
4(3&4):159–179, 2000.
[AMS98] A. Arnéodo, J.-F. Muzy, and D. Sornette. “direct” causal
cascade in the stock market. Eur. Phys. J. B, 2:277–282,
1998.
[AS01] J. Andersen and D. Sornette. Have your cake and eat it,
too: Increasing returns while lowering large risks! J. Risk.
Financ., 2(3):70–82, 2001.
[AS03] J. V. Andersen and D. Sornette. The $-game. Eur. Phys. J.
B, 31:141–145, 2003.
[AS04] J. Andersen and D. Sornette. Fearless versus fearful spec-
ulative financial bubbles. Physica A, 337(3-4):565–585,
2004.
[ATN13] Y. Asai, S. Tateyama, and T. Nomura. Learning an intermit-
tent control strategy for postural balancing using an emg-
based human-computer interface. Plos One, 8(5):e62956,
2013.
[BCME04] R. Bormann, R., J. L. Cabrera, J. Milton, and C.W. Eurich.
Visuomotor tracking on a computer screen—an experi-
mental paradigm to study the dynamics of motor control.
Neurocomputing, 58(60):517–523, 2004.
[BFL09] J.-P. Bouchaud, J. D. Farmer, and F. Lillo. How markets
slowly digest changes in supply and demand. In T. Hens
and K. R. Schenk-Hoppe, editors, Handbook of Financial
Markets: Dynamics and Evolution. North-Holland, Elsevier,
2009.
317
Bibliography
[BGMP09] G. Bianconia, T. Galla, M. Marsilia, and P. Pin. Effects
of tobin taxes in minority game markets. J. Econ. Behav.
Organ., 70:231–240, 2009.
[BGPW04] J.-P. Bouchaud, Y. Gefen, M. Potters, and M. Wyart. Fluc-
tuations and response in financial markets: the subtle
nature of ‘random’ price changes. Quantitative Finance,
4:1–15, 2004.
[BGV00] M. Beechey, D. Gruen, and J. Vickery. The efficient market
hypothesis: A survey. Technical report, Economic Research
Department, Reserve Bank of Australia, 2000.
[BHS99] B. Biais, P. Hillion, and C. Spatt. Price discovery and
learning during the preopening period in the paris bourse.
J. Polit. Econ., 107(6 pt. 1):1218–1248, 1999.
[Bla86] F. Black. Noise. J. Financ., 41(3):529–543, 1986.
[Bor01] S. Bornholdt. Expectation bubbles in a spin model of
markets: Intermittency from frustration across scales. Int.
J. Mod. Phys. C, 12, 2001.
[Bor02] L. Borland. Option pricing formulas based on a non-
gaussian stock price model. Phys. Rev. Lett., 89(9):098701,
Aug 2002.
[Bou10] J.-P. Bouchaud. The endogenous dynamics of mar-
kets: price impact and feedback loops. ArXiv, pages
arXiv:1009.2928 [q–fin.ST], 2010.
[BP95] P. Bak and M. Paczuski. Complexity, contingency, and
criticality. PNAS, 92:6689–6696, 1995.
[BP03] J. M. Beggs and D. Plenz. Neuronal avalanches
in neocortical circuits. The Journal of Neuroscience,
23(35):11167–11177, 2003.
[Bra97] D. H. Brainard. The psychophysics toolbox. Spatial Vision,
10:443–446, 1997.
[Bru08] M. K. Brunnermeier. Bubbles. In S. N. Durlauf and L. E.
Blume, editors, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics.
Palgrave Macmillan, 2 edition, 2008.
318
Bibliography
[BS14] M. K. Brunnermeier and Y. Sannikov. A macroeconomic
model with a financial sector. Am. Econ. Rev., In Press,
2014.
[BTW87] P. Bak, C. Tang, and K. Wiesenfeld. Self-organized crit-
icality: An explanation of the 1/f noise. Phys. Rev. Lett.,
59(4):381–384, Jul 1987.
[CAS06] M. M. Churchland, A. Afshar, and K. V. Shenoy. A central
source of movement variability. Neuron, 52:1085–1096,
2006.
[CB09] T. Cluff and R. Balasubramaniam. Motor learning char-
acterized by changing le vy distributions. Plos One, 4(6),
2009.
[CBE+04] J. L. Cabrera, R. Bormann, C. W. Eurich, T. Ohira, and
J. G. Milton. State-dependent noise and human balance
control. Fluct. Noise Lett., 4:107–117, 2004.
[CC95] C. C. Chow and J. Collins. Pinned polymer madel of
posture control. Phys. Rev. E, 52(1):907–912, 1995.
[CCC+13] A. Chakraborti, D. Challet, A. Chatterjee, M. Marsili,
Y.-C. Zhang, and B. K. Chakrabarti. Statistical me-
chanics of competitive resource allocation. ArXiv, page
arXiv:1305.2121, 2013.
[CCMZ01] D. Challet, A. Chessa, M. Marsili, and Y.-C. Zhang. From
minority games to real markets. Quantitative Finance,
1(1):168–176, 2001.
[CDL93] J. J. Collins and C. De Luca. Open-loop and closed-loop
control of posture: a random-walk analysis of center-of-
pressure trajectories. Exp. Brain Res., 95(2):308–318, 1993.
[CDL94] J. J. Collins and C. J. De Luca. Random walking during
quiet standing. Phys. Rev. Lett., 73(5):764–767, 1994.
[CDMMC06] D. Challet, A. De Martino, M. Marsili, and I. P. Castillo.
Minority games with finite score memory. J. Stat. Mech.,
(3):P03004, 2006.
319
Bibliography
[CFH+09] D. Colander, H. Föllmer, A. Haas, M. D. Goldberg,
K. Juselius, A. Kirman, T. Lux, and B. Sloth. The fi-
nancial crisis and the systemic failure of academic eco-
nomics. Univ. of Copenhagen Dept. of Economics Discus-
sion Paper No. 09-03 http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1355882, March 2009.
[CH12] M. Carandini and D. Heeger. Normalization as a canon-
ical neural computation. Nature Reviews Neuroscience,
13:51–62, 2012.
[CHM11] J. D. Crawford, D. Y. Henriques, and W. P. Medendorp.
Three-dimensional transformations for goal-directed action.
Annu. Rev. Neurosci., 34:309–331, 2011.
[CLM06] J. Cabrera, C. Luciani, and J. G. Milton. Neural control on
multiple time scales: Insights from human stick balancing.
Condens. Matter. Phys, 9(2):373–383, 2006.
[CM02] J. L. Cabrera and J. G. Milton. On-off intermit-
tency in a human balancing task. Phys. Rev. Lett.,
89(15):158702–158706, Sep 2002.
[CM03] D. Challet andM.Marsili. Criticality andmarket efficiency
in a simple realistic model of the stock market. Phys. Rev.
E, 68:036132, 2003.
[CM12] J. L. Cabrera and J. G. Milton. Stick balancing, falls and
dragon kings. Eur. Phys. J. B, 205:231–241, 2012.
[CMZ05a] D. Challet, M. Marsili, and Y. Zhang. Minority games:
interacting agents in financial markets, chapter 4. Minority
games as Market Models. Oxford University Press, 2005.
[CMZ05b] D. Challet, M. Marsili, and Y. Zhang. Minority games:
interacting agents in financial markets. Oxford University
Press, 2005.
[Con89] A. Coniglio. Fractal structure of ising and potts clusters:
Exact results. Phys. Rev. Lett., 62(26):3054–3057, 1989.
[Con01] R. Cont. Empirical properties of asset returns: stylized
facts and statistical issues. Quantitative Finance, 1:223–236,
2001.
320
Bibliography
[Con05] R. Cont. Volatility clustering in financial markets: Em-
pirical facts and agent–based models. In A. Kirman and
G. Teyssierre, editors, Long memory in economics. Springer
Berlin / Heidelberg, 2005.
[CPS89] D. M. Cutler, J. M. Poterba, and H. Summers, Lawrence.
What moves stock prices? Journal of Portfolio Management,
15(3):4–12, 1989.
[CS89] J. Y. Campbell and R. J. Shiller. The dividend-price ratio
and expectations of future dividends and discount factors.
Rev. Financ. Stud., 1(3):195–228, 1989.
[CSN09] A. Clauset, C. Shalizi, and M. Newman. Power-law dis-
tributions in empirical data. SIAM Rev., 51(4):661–703,
2009.
[DA01] P. Dayan and L. F. Abbott. Theoretical neuroscience. Cam-
bridge, MIT Press, 2001.
[Den08] S. Deneve. Bayesian spiking neurons I: Inference. Neural
Comput., 20:91–117, 2008.
[Dep08] Department of Statistics at Carnegie Mellon
University. Dow Jones history. Data source.
http://www.analyzeindices.com/dowhistory/
djia-100.txt, Accessed Jan. 14, 2008.
[Don68] F. C. Donders. On the speed of mental processes. In
W. Koster, editor, Attention and Perfomance II, volume 30
of Acta Psychchologica, pages 412–431. North-Holland Pub-
lishing Company, Amsterdam, 1969 (1868).
[DW96] A. Devenow and I. Welch. Rational herding in financial
economics. European Economic Review, 40:603–615, 1996.
[Ehr02] G. Ehrenstein. Cont–bouchaud percolation model includ-
ing tobin tax. Int. J. Mod. Phys. C, 13(1323), 2002.
[EP05] C. W. Eurich and K. Pawelzik. Optimal control yields
power law behavior. In W. Duch, J. Kacprzyk, E. Oja, and
S. Zadrozny, editors, Artificial Neural Networks: Formal
Models and Their Applications - ICANN 2005. Springer
Berlin / Heidelberg, 2005.
321
Bibliography
[ES00] K. C. Engel and J. Soechting. Manual tracking in two
dimensions. J Neurophysiol., 83:3483–3496, 2000.
[Fai02] R. C. Fair. Events that shook the market. J. Bus,
75(4):713–731, 2002.
[Fam70] E. Fama. Efficient capital markets: A review of theory and
empirical work. The Journal of Finance, 25(2):383–417,
1970.
[Fam91] E. Fama. Efficient capital markets II. J. Financ.,
46(5):1575–1617, 1991.
[Fam98] E. F. Fama. Market efficiency, long-term returns, and
behavioral finance. Journal of Financial Economics, 49,
1998.
[Far99] J. D. Farmer. Physicists attempt to scale the ivory towers
of finance. Computing in Science Engineering, 1(6):26 –39,
nov/dec 1999.
[Fed13a] Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. FRED (Federal Reserve
Economic Data). Data source. http://research.
stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/SP500, Accessed
Nov. 26, 2013.
[Fed13b] Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. FRED (Federal Reserve
Economic Data). Data source. http://research.
stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/DJIA, Accessed
Nov. 26, 2013.
[Fel08] M. Felsenthal. Greenspan “shocked” at
credit system breakdown. Reuters http:
//www.reuters.com/article/2008/10/23/
us-financial-greenspan-idUSTRE49M58W20081023,
Thu Oct 23 2008.
[FG09] J. D. Farmer and J. Geanakoplos. The virtues and vices of
equilibrium and the future of financial economics. Com-
plexity, 14(3):11–38, 2009.
[FGL04] J. D. Farmer, L. Gillemot, and F. Lillo. What really causes
large price changes? Quantitative Finance, 4(4):383–397,
2004.
322
Bibliography
[FGV09] M. A. Fuentes, A. Gerig, and J. Vicente. Universal behavior
of extreme price movements in stock markets. PLoS ONE,
4(12), 2009.
[Fit54] P. Fitts. The information capacity of the human motor
system in controlling the amplitude of movement. J. Exp.
Psychol., 47(6):381–391, 1954.
[FL99] J. D. Farmer and A. W. Lo. Frontiers of finance: Evolution
and efficient markets. PNAS, 96:9991–9992, 1999.
[FL12] E. F. Fama and R. I. Litterman. An experienced view on
markets and investing. Financ. Anal. J., 68(6):15–19, 2012.
[FP10] M. P. Fay and M. A. Proschan. Wilcoxon-mann-whitney
or t-test? on assumptions for hypothesis tests and multiple
interpretations of decision rules. Stat Surv., 4:1–39, 2010.
[FR86] K. R. French and R. Roll. Stock return variances: The
arrival of information and the reaction of traders. Journal
of Financial Economics, 17(1):5 – 26, 1986.
[FS95] B. R. Frieden and B. H. Soffer. Lagrangians of physics
and the game of fisher-information transfer. Phys. Rev. E,
52(3):2274–2286, Sep 1995.
[FS01] T. Flash and T. Sejnowski. Computational approaches to
motor control. Curr. Opin. Neurobiol., 11:655–662, 2001.
[FSS05] J. D. Farmer, M. Shubik, and E. Smith. Is economics
the next physical science? Physics Today, pages 37–42,
September 2005.
[FSW08] A. A. Faisal, L. P. J. Selen, and D. M. Wolpert. Noise in
the nervous system. Nat. Rev. Neurosci., 9:292–303, 2008.
[FTM92] R. C. Fitzpatrick, J. L. Taylor, and D. McClosky. Ankle
stiffness of standing humans in response to imperceptible
perturbation: Reflex and task-dependent components. J.
Physiol., 454:533–547, 1992.
[FW11] D. W. Franklin and D. M. Wolpert. Computational mech-
anisms of sensorimotor control. Neuron, 72(3):425–442,
2011.
323
Bibliography
[Gar90] P. M. Garber. Famous first bubbles. J. Econ. Perspect.,
4(2):35–54, 1990.
[GB03] I. Giardina and J. Boucheaud. Bubbles, crashes and inter-
mittency in agent based market models. Eur. Phys. J. B,
31:421–437, 2003.
[GB05] O. Guedj and J.-P. Bouchaud. Expert’s earnings fore-
casts: Bias, herding and gossamer information. IJTAF,
8:933–946, 2005.
[Gea10] J. Geanakoplos. The leverage cycle. Cowles Founda-
tion Discussion Paper No. 1715R, Yale University, http:
//dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1441943, July 2009
(Rev. Jan. 2010).
[GPA+99] P. Gopikrishnana, V. Plerou, L. Amarala, M. Meyer, and
H. Stanley. Scaling of the distribution of fluctuations of
financial market indices. Phys. Rev. E, 69(5):5305–5316,
1999.
[GPL+00] P. Gopikrishnana, V. Pleroua, Y. Liua, L. Amarala,
X. Gabaix, and H. Stanley. Scaling and correlation in
financial time series. Physica A, 287:362–373, 2000.
[GS80] S. J. Grossman and J. E. Stiglitz. On the impossibility of
informationally efficient markets. The American Economic
Review, 70(3):393–408, June 1980.
[GVA+99] P. Gopikrishnan, P. Vasiliki, L. A. N. Amaral, M. Meyer,
and H. E. Stanley. Scaling of the distributions of
fluctuations of financial market indices,. Phys. Rev. E,
60(5):5305–5316, November 1999.
[GZ09] T. Galla and Y.-C. Zhang. Minority games, evolving capi-
tals and replicator dynamics. J. Stat. Mech., (11):P11012,
2009.
[Har98] P. Harrison. Similarities in the distribution of stock mar-
ket price changes between the eighteenth and twentieth
centuries. J. Bus, 71(1):55–79, 1998.
324
Bibliography
[Hau06] H. Hau. The role of transaction costs for financial volatil-
ity: evidence from the paris bourse. J. Eur. Econ. Assoc.,
4(4):862–890, 2006.
[HB10] D. Helbig and S. Balietti. Fundamental and real-world
challenges in economics. Science and Culture, 76(9-10
Special Issue on 15 Years of Econophysics Research), 2010.
[HBB+01] J. Henrich, R. Boyd, S. Bowles, C. Camerer, E. Fehr,
H. Gintis, and R. McElreath. In search of homo economi-
cus: Behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies. Am.
Econ. Rev., 91(2):73–78, 2001.
[HFW12] J. N. Howard, Ian S. AN Ingram, D. W. Franklin, and
D. M. Wolpert. Gone in 0.6 seconds: The encoding of
motor memories depends on recent sensorimotor states. J.
Neurosci, 32(37):12756–12768, 2012.
[Hom06] C.H.Hommes. Heterogeneous agent models in economics
and finance. In K. J. Arrow and M. D. Intriligator, edi-
tors,Handbook of Computational Economics Volume 2, chap-
ter 23, pages 1109–1186. North-Holland, Elsevier, 2006.
[Hon90] J. Honerkamp. Stochastische Dynamische Systeme: Konzepte,
numerische Methoden, Datenanalyse. VCH Verlagsge-
sellschaft mbH Weinheim, 1990.
[Hop07] C. Hopman. Do supply and demand drive stock prices?
Quantitative Finance, 7(1):37–53, 2007.
[HPH94] J. F. Heagy, N. Platt, and S. M. Hammel. Characterization
of on-off intermittency. Phys. Rev. E, 49(2):1140–1150,
1994.
[HS09] V. S. Huang and R. Shadmehr. Persistence of motor memo-
ries reflects statistics of the learning event. J. Neurophysiol.,
102:931–940, 2009.
[Hun92] S. Hunter, Ian W. ANS Lafontaine. A coparison of muscle
with artificial actuators. In Solid-State Sensor and Actuator
Workshop, volume 5th Technical Digest. IEEE, 1992.
325
Bibliography
[HW98] C. M. Harris and D. M. Wolpert. Signal-dependent noise
determines motor planning. Nature, 394:780–784, 1998.
[HW09] C. H. Hommes and F. Wagener. Complex evolutionary
systems in behavioral finance. In T. Hens and K. R. Schenk-
Hoppe, editors, Handbook of Financial Markets: Dynamics
and Evolution. North-Holland, Elsevier, 2009.
[IMS13] T. Insperger, J. Milton, and Stépán. Acceleration feedback
improves balancing against reflex delay. J. R. Soc. Interface,
10, 2013.
[JdCHW02] K. E. Jones, A. F. de C. Hamilton, and D. M. Wolpert.
Sources of signal-dependent noise during isometric force
production. J. Neurophysiol., 88:1533–1544, 2002.
[JLGB08] A. Joulin, A. Lefevre, D. Grunberg, and J.-P. Bouchaud.
Stock price jumps: news and volume play a minor role.
Wilmott, Sep. / Oct., 2008.
[JMY+85] R. C. Johnson, G. E. McClearn, S. Yuen, C. Nagoshi,
F. Ahern, and R. Cole. Galton’s data a century later. Am.
Psychol., 40(8):875–892, 1985.
[Joy] Joyent, Inc. Node.js. http://nodejs.org.
[JW88] R. Johansson and G.Westling. Coordinated isometric mus-
cle commands adequately and erroneously programmed
for the weight during lifting task with precision grip. Exp.
Brain Res., 71:59–71, 1988.
[KB13] S. M. Krause and S. Bornholdt. Spin models as micro-
foundation of macroscopic market models. Physica A,
392:4048–4054, 2013.
[KBB12] S. M. Krause, Böttcher, and S. Bornholdt. Mean-field-like
behavior of the generalized voter-model-class kinetic ising
model. Phys. Rev. E, 85:031126, 2012.
[KBF02] T. Kaizoji, S. Bornholdt, and Y. Fujiwara. Dynamics of
price and trading volume in a spin model of stock markets
with heterogeneous agents. Physica A, 316:441–452, 2002.
326
Bibliography
[Kes73] H. Kesten. Random difference equations and renewal the-
ory for products of random matrices. Acta Math., 131(1),
1973.
[Kes13] D. Kestenbaum. What’s a bubble. OBP/NPR (Phone
Interview) http://www.opb.org/news/article/
npr-whats-a-bubble/, Nov. 17 2013.
[Kir92] A. P. Kirman. Whom or what does the representative
individual represent? J. Econ. Perspect., 6(2):117–136,
1992.
[KK11] M. Kibbe and E. Kowler. Visual search for category
sets: tradeoffs between exploration and memory. J. Vis.,
11(3):14–21, 2011.
[KR10] M. R. King and D. Rime. The $4 trillion question: what
explains fx growth since the 2007 survey? BIS Quarterly
Review, December 2010.
[KR13] M. R. King and D. Rime. The anatomy of the global fx
market through the lens of the 2013 triennial survey. BIS
Quarterly Review, December 2013.
[Kru09] P. Krugman. How did economists get it so wrong? The
New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/
09/06/magazine/06Economic-t.html, September 2
2009.
[Kue12] J. Kuepper. Trading the odds with arbitrage. In-
vestopedia http://www.investopedia.com/articles/trad-
ing/04/111004.asp, May 01 2012.
[KW04] K. P. Körding and D. M. Wolpert. The loss function of
sensorimotor learning. PNAS, 101(26):9839–9842, 2004.
[KZJ11] T. Kiemel, Y. Zhang, and J. J. Jeka. Identification of
neural feedback for upright stance in humans: Stabi-
lization rather than sway minimization. J. Neurosci.,
31(42):15144–15153, 2011.
[LB10] R. Li and B. Bowerman. Symmetry breaking in biology.
Perspect. Biol., 2(3):a003475, 2010.
327
Bibliography
[LeB11] B. LeBaron. Active and passive learning in agent-based
financial markets. Eastern Econ. J., 37(1):35–43, 2011.
[LGLG11] I. D. Loram, H. Gollee, M. Lakie, and P. J. Gawthrop.
Human control of an inverted pendulum: Is continuous
control necessary? is intermittent control effective? is inter-
mittent control physiological? Plos Comput. Biol., 5(12),
2011.
[LM99a] A. W. Lo and C. MacKinley. A Non-Random Walk Down
Wall Street. Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, 1999.
[LM99b] T. Lux andM.Marchesi. Scaling and criticality in a stochas-
tic multi-agent model of a financial market. Nature, 397,
Feb. 1999.
[LS02] T. Lux and D. Sornette. On rational bubbles and fat tails.
J. Money, Credit Bank, 2002.
[LS09] J.-Y. Lee and N. Schweighofer. Dual-adaptation sup-
ports a parallel architecture of motor memory. J. Neurosci,
29(33):10396–10404, 2009.
[LSB77] F. Lestienne, J. Soechting, and A. Berthoz. Postural read-
justments induced by linear motion of visual scenes. Exp.
Brain Res., 28:363–384, 1977.
[Lux06] T. Lux. Financial power laws: Empirical evidence,
models, and mechanism. Christian-Albrechts-
Universität Kiel, Economics Working Paper No 2006-12
http://www.bwl.uni-kiel.de/gwrp/files/
papers/financial_power_laws_emp_evid.pdf,
2006.
[Lux09] T. Lux. Stochastic behavioral asset-pricing models and the
stylized facts. In T. Hens and K. R. Schenk-Hoppe, editors,
Handbook of Financial Markets: Dynamics and Evolution.
North-Holland, Elsevier, 2009.
[Lyo00] R. K. Lyons. TheMicrostructure Approach to Exchange Rates,
chapter 1. MIT Press Cambridge, 2000.
328
Bibliography
[Man63] B. B. Mandelbrot. The variation of certain speculative
prices. Journal of Business, 36(4):392–417, 1963.
[MFC+11] J. G. Milton, A. Fuerte, B. Christophe, J. Lippa,
A. Kamimura, and T. Ohira. Delayed pursuit–escape as
a model for virtual stick balancing. NOLTA, 2(3):1–10,
2011.
[Mor04] E. Moro. The minority game: an introductory guide. In
E. Korutcheva and R. Cuerno, editors, Advances in Con-
densed Matter and Statistical Physics. Nova Science Pub-
lishers, chapter also available as arXiv:cond-mat/0402651,
2004.
[MS82] P.Milgrom andN. Stokey. Information, trade and common
knowledge. J. Econ. Theory, 26(1):17–27, 1982.
[MS92] R.Marimon and S. E. Spear. Expectationally-drivenmarket
volatility: An experimental study. Institute for Empirical
Macroeconomics. Discussion Paper 73., Aug 1992.
[MS00] R.Mantegna andH. Stanley. An introduction to econophysics:
correlations and complexity in finance. Cambridge Univ. Pr.,
2000.
[MS02] B. Mehta and S. Schaal. Forward models in visuomotor
control. J. Neurophysiol., 88(2), 2002.
[MTW03] G. Marsaglia, W. W. Tsang, and J. Wang. Evaluating
kolmogorov’s distribution. J. Stat. Softw., 8(18):1–4, 2003.
[NBD13] P.-A. Noël, C. D. Brummitt, and R. M. D’Souza. Control-
ling self-organizing dynamics on networks using models
that self-organize. Phys. Rev. Lett., 111(7):078701(5), 2013.
[NBW09] A. Nagengast, D. Braun, and D. Wolpert. Optimal con-
trol predicts human performance on objects with internal
degrees of freedom. Plos Comput. Biol., 5(6), 2009.
[NIS14] NIST/SEMATECH. Kolmogorov-smirnov goodness-
of-fit test. in: e-handbook of statistical methods.
http://www.itl.nist.gov/div898/handbook/
eda/section3/eda35g.htm, 2012, last accessed April
17, 2014.
329
Bibliography
[NRR01] C. Noussair, S. Robin, and B. Ruffieux. Price bubbles in
laboratory asset markets with constant fundamental values.
Exp. Econ., 4:87–105, 2001.
[OBD09] I. O’Sullivan, E. Burdet, and J. Diedrichsen. Dissociating
variability and effort as determinants of coordination. Plos
Comput. Biol., 5(4), 2009.
[Ode99] T. Odean. Do investors trade too much? Am. Econ. Rev.,
89(5):1279–1298, 1999.
[OKI+04] R. Osu, N. Kamimura, H. Iwasaki, E. Nakano, C. M. Har-
ris, Y. Wada, and M. Kawato. Optimal impedance control
for task achievement in the presence of signal-dependent
noise. J. Neurophysiol., 92:1199–1215, 2004.
[OL08] M. Okun and I. Lampl. Instantaneous correlation of exci-
tation and inhibition during ongoing and sensory-evoked
activities. Nat. Neurosci., 11(5):535–537, 2008.
[oS14] T. R. S. A. of Sciences. The nobel prize in physics 2008.
See http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/
physics/laureates/2008/press.html, and the ref-
erences therein., Oct. 7 2008, last accessed Apr. 19 2014.
[O’T14] G. O’Toole. Everything should be made as sim-
ple as possible, but not simpler. Quote Inves-
tigator http://quoteinvestigator.com/2011/05/
13/einstein-simple/, Accessed Feb. 25 2014.
[otRSAoS13] E. S. P. C. of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences.
Understanding asset prices. Nobelprize.org. Nobel Media
AB 2013. http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_
prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2013/
advanced.html, Oct. 14 2013.
[PA05] K. C. P. and R. Z. Aliber. Manias, Panics, and Crashes:
A History of Financial Crises. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,
Hoboken, New Jersey, 5 edition, 2005.
[Pel97] D. G. Pelli. The videotoolbox software for visual psy-
chophysics: Transforming numbers into movies. Spatial
Vision, 10:437–442, 1997.
330
Bibliography
[Pet00] R. J. Peterka. Postural control model interpretation of
stabilogram diffusion analysis. Biol. Cybern., 82:335–343,
2000.
[Pet11] L. O. Petram. The world’s first stock exchange: how the
Amsterdam market for Dutch East India Company shares
became a modern securities market, 1602-1700. PhD thesis,
University of Amsterdam, 2011.
[PGA+99] V. Plerou, P. Gopikrishnan, L. A. N. Amaral, M. Meyer,
and H. E. Stanley. Scaling of the distribution of price
fluctuations of individual companies. Phys. Rev. E,
60(6):6519–6529, 1999.
[PP11] F. Patzelt and K. Pawelzik. Criticality of adaptive control
dynamics. Phys. Rev. Lett., 107:238103, Dec 2011.
[PP13] F. Patzelt and K. Pawelzik. An inherent instability of effi-
cient markets. Sci. Rep., 3:2784, 2013.
[Pre78] W. H. Press. Flicker noises in astronomy and elsewhere.
Comment. Mod. Phys., 7(4):103–119, 1978.
[PREP07] F. Patzelt, M. Riegel, U. Ernst, and K. R. Pawelzik. Self-
organized critical noise amplification in human closed loop
control. Front. Comput. Neurosci., 1(4), 2007.
[PS03] D. P. Porter and V. L. Smith. Stock market bubbles in the
laboratory. J. Behav. Finance, 4(1):7–20, 2003.
[PS10] T. Preis and E. H. Standley. Switching phenomena in a
system with no switches. J. Stat. Phys., 138:431–446, 2010.
[PST93] N. Platt, E. A. Spiegel, and C. Tresser. On-off inter-
mittency: A mechanism for bursting. Phys. Rev. Lett.,
70(3):279–282, 1993.
[PV04] L. Pastor and P. Veronesi. Was there a nasdaq bubble in
the late 1990s? National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working paper 10581. http://www.nber.org/
papers/w10581, 2004.
331
Bibliography
[PY09] P. C. B. Phillips and J. Yu. Maximum likelihood and
gaussian estimation of continuous time models in finance.
In T. Anderson, R. Davis, J. P. Kreiß, and T. Mikosch,
editors, Handbook of Financial Time Series. Springer Verlag
Berlin Heidelberg, 2009.
[Rau] G. Rauch. socket.io. http://socket.io.
[RKWS09] A. Resulaj, R. Kiani, D. M. Wolpert, and M. N.
Shadlen. Changes of mind in decision-making. Nature,
461(10):264–266, 2009.
[Rol84] R. Roll. Orange juice and weather. Am. Econ. Rev., 5(861-
880), 1984.
[RP03] R. Rothenstein and K. R. Pawelzik. Evolution and anti-
evolution in a minimal stock market model. Physica A,
326:534–543, 2003.
[Rus13] Russel Investments. Russell U.S. Indexes daily values. Data
source. http://www.russell.com/indexes/data/
us_equity/russell_us_index_values.asp,
Accessed Nov. 26, 2013.
[Sam65] P. A. Samuelson. Proof that properly anticipated prices
fluctuate randomly. Industrial Management Review,,
6(2):41–49, 1965.
[Sam09] P. A. Samuelson. Economics. Mcgraw-Hill Higher Educa-
tion, 19 edition, 2009.
[SBB+09] M. Scheffer, J. Bascompte, W. A. Brock, B. Victor, S. R.
Carpenter, V. Dakos, H. Held, E. H. van Nes, M. Rietk-
erk, and G. Sugihara. Early-warning signals for critical
transitions. Nature, 461(3):53–59, 2009.
[SBM+04] G. Silberberg, M. Bethge, H. Markram, K. Pawelzik, and
M. Tsodyks. Dynamics of population rate codes in ensem-
bles of neocortical neurons. J. Neurophysiol., 91:704–709,
2004.
[Sch01] H. G. Schuster. Complex Adaptive Systems: An Introduction.
Scator Verlag Saarbrücken, 2001.
332
Bibliography
[Sch02] S. Schaal. Arm and hand movement control. In M. Arbib,
editor, The handbook of brain theory and neural networks,
pages 110–113. MIT Press Cambridge, 2002.
[Sch04] F. Schwabl. Statistische Mechanik. Springer Verlag Berlin
Heidelberg, 2004.
[Sch13] J. A. Scheinkman. Speculation, trading and bubbles.
Princeton University Economic Theory Center Working
Paper No. 050-2013. Available at SSRN http://dx.doi.
org/10.2139/ssrn.2227701, March 4 2013.
[SFSE09] J. L. Souman, I. Frissen, M. N. Sreenivasa, and M. O.
Ernst. Walking straight into circles. Current Biology,
19:1538–1542, 2009.
[SFV+09] I. H. Stevenson, H. L. Fernandes, I. Vilares, K. Wei, and
K. P. Körding. Bayesian integration and non-linear feed-
back control in a full-body motor task. Plos Comput. Biol.,
5(12), 2009.
[Shi81] R. J. Shiller. Do stock prices move too much to be justi-
fied by subsequent changes in dividends? Am. Econ. Rev.,
71:421–436, 1981.
[Shi87] R. J. Shiller. Investor behavior in the october 1987 stock
market crash: survey evidence. Technical report, National
Bureau of Economic Research, 1987.
[SL97] D. J. Simons and D. T. Levin. Change blindness. Trends
Cogn Sci, 1(7):261–267, 1997.
[SL98] D. J. Simons and D. t. Levin. Failure to detect changes to
people during a real-world interaction. Psychon. B. Rev.,
5(4):644–649, 1998.
[Smi76] A. Smith. TheWealth of Nations. W. Strahan and T. Cadell,
London, 1776.
[Smi13] L. Smith. The auction method: How nyse stock prices are
set. Investopedia http://www.investopedia.com/
articles/trading/04/111004.asp, September 11
2013.
333
Bibliography
[SN94] M. Shadlen and W. Newsome. Noise, neural codes and
cortical organization. Curr. Opin. Neurobiol., 4:569–579,
1994.
[SOdXXWS12] R. Shadmehr, J. J. Orban de Xivry, M. Xu-Wilson, and
T. Y. Shih. Temporal discounting of reward and the cost
of time in motor control. J. Neurosci., 30:10507–10516,
2012.
[Sor98] D. Sornette. Linear stochastic dynamics with nonlinear
fractal properties. Physica A, 250:295–314, 1998.
[Sor03] D. Sornette. Critical market crashes. Phys. Rep., 378:1–98,
2003.
[Sor04] D. Sornette. Critical phenomena in natural sciences: chaos,
fractals, selforganisation and disorder: concepts and tools.
Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2 edition, 2004.
[SSW88] V. L. Smith, G. L. Suchanek, and A. W. Williams. Bubbles,
crashes, and ednogenous expectations in experimental spot
asset markets. Econometrica, 56(5):1119–1151, 1988.
[Sti02] J. E. Stiglitz. There is no invisible hand. The Gura-
dian, http://www.theguardian.com/education/
2002/dec/20/highereducation.uk1, Dec. 20 2002.
[TBHS03] J. Triesch, D. H. Ballard, M.M.Hayhoe, and B. T. Sullivan.
What you see is what you need. J. Vision, 3(1):86–94, 2003.
[TFG11] S. Thurner, J. D. Farmer, and J. Geanakoplos. Leverage
causes fat tails and clustered volatility. Cowles Founda-
tion Discussion Paper No. 1745, Yale University, http:
//ssrn.com/abstract=1963337, November 22 2011.
[TJ02] E. Todorov and M. I. Jordan. Optimal feedback con-
trol as a theory of motor coordination. Nat. Neurosci.,
5(11):1226–1235, 2002.
[TK95] J. Timmer and M. König. On generating power law noise.
Astron. Astrophys., 300:707–710, 1995.
334
Bibliography
[TML08] J. Trommershäuser, L. T. Maloney, and M. S. Landy. De-
cision making, movement planning and statistical decision
theory. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 12(8):291–297, 2008.
[TV04] P. Temin and H.-J. Voth. Riding the south sea bubble. Am.
Econ. Rev., 95(5):1654–1668, 2004.
[vBHW04] R. J. van Beers, P. Haggard, and D. M. Wolpert. The role
of execution noise in movement variability. J. Neurophysiol.,
91:1050–1063, 2004.
[vdKP11] H. van der Kooij and R. J. Peterka. Non-linear stimulus-
response behavior of the human stance control system is
predicted by optimization of a system with sensory and
motor noise. J. Comput. Neurosci., 30:759–778, 2011.
[VNB+02] R. Y. Vho, L. E. Nystrom, E. T. Brown, A. D. Jones, T. S.
Braver, P. J. Holmes, and J. D. Cohen. Mechanisms un-
derlying dependencies of performance on stimulus history
in a two-alternative forced-choice task. Cogn. Affect. Behav.
Ne., 2(4):283–299, 2002.
[Wal87] M.M.Waldrop. Computers amplify blackmonday. Science,
238(30):602–604, 1987.
[WDF11] D.M.Wolpert, J. Diedrichsen, and R. Flanagan. Principles
of sensorimotor learning. Nat. Rev. Neurosci., 12:739–751,
2011.
[WDM09] S.-W.Wua, M. R. Delgadoc, and L. T. Maloney. Economic
decision-making compared with an equivalent motor task.
PNAS, 106(15):6088–6093, 2009.
[WG00] D.Wolpert and Z. Ghahramani. Computational principles
of movement neuroscience. Nat. Neurosci., 3:1212–1217,
2000.
[Wil13] S. H. Williamson. Annualized growth rate and graphs
of the DJIA, S&P500, and NASDAQ in the United
States between any two dates. Data source. http:www.
measuringworth.com/DJIA_SP_NASDAQ/, Accessed
Nov. 26, 2013.
335
Bibliography
[WK09] K. Wei and K. Körding. Relevance of error: What drives
motor adaptation? J. Neurophysiol., 101:655–664, 2009.
[WL12] D. M. Wolpert and M. S. Lansy. Motor control is decison-
making. Curr. Opin. Neurobiol., 22(6):996–1003, 2012.
[WPP+98] D. Winter, A. E. Patla, F. Prince, M. Ishac, and K. Gielo-
Perczak. Stiffness control of balance in quiet standing. J.
Neurophysiol., 80:1211–1221, 1998.
[WvHR88] M. H. Woollacott, C. von Hosten, and B. Rösblad. Rela-
tion between muscle response onset and body segmental
movements during postural perturbations in humans. Exp.
Brain Res., 72:593–604, 1988.
[YC08] A. J. Yu and J. D. Cohen. Sequential effects: Superstition
or rational behavior? In NIPS, pages 1873–1880, 2008.
336
Acknowledgements
Many thanks to everyone who supported me over the last years and
thereby allowed me to complete this work. My apologies to those I
forgot to name below.
I am particularly grateful for having Klaus Pawelzik as a supervi-
sor. He provided me with the most inspiring starting point for my
research, offered outstanding support as I searched for my own way,
and motivated me to aim higher. Our discussions never failed to open
new avenues, often straying off the beaten path.
I would also like to thank my second referee Stefan Bornholdt
who followed my research and provided great advice since I was an
undergraduate student.
My very great appreciation goes to the proofreaders Julie Comparini,
Philipp Heyken, and Christian Albers (sec. B.4). Andreas Kreiter
greatly helped improving the general understandability of [PP13]
which forms the basis for most of chapter 11.
Furthermore, I want to thank all past and current members of the
Theoretical Neurophysics Lab who made my past years so much more
enjoyable. I could not have wished for better personal and scientific in-
teractions in a more sincere, cordial environment. In particular Agnes
Janssen provided outstanding organisational support. David Roter-
mund kept the electronic infrastructure running, most importantly
the computing cluster. Also Udo Ernst provided substantial advice
and technical support. In addition, I want to mention my collaegues
(in semi-random order, starting with current members of the group)
Maren Westkott, Christian Albers, Daniel Harnack, Nergis Tömen,
Axel Grzymisch, Philipp Heyken, Joscha-Tapani Schmiedt, Orlando
Arevalo Acosta, Ingo Bathmann, Josephine Mielke, Marco Linke,
337
Bibliography
Joana Vieira, Sven Eberhardt, Niels Treiber, Nadja Schinkel-Bielefeld,
Onno Böhler, Markus Riegel, as well as other (current and former)
members of the center for cognitive sciences Cathleen Grimsen, Detlef
Wegener, Dieter Gauck, Marc Schipper, Iris Grothe, Maren Prass, An-
dreas Kreiter, Manfred Fahle, Manfred Herrmann, Helmut Schwegler,
Manuela Jagemann, Sabiene Melchert, Charlotte Herzmann, Mar-
garete Korsch, Torsten Stemmler, and Sirko Straube. I furthermore
thank Sebastian M. Krause, past member of the Complex Systems
Lab, for the discussions over the past months. Many thanks also to
Dennis Bredemeier, Daniel Henrichs, and Katharina Morosov who
tested the experimental setup I had developed (chap. 8) during their
internships.
I thank the Volkswagen foundation for funding significant parts of
the work presented in part III.
Last, not least, I want to thank my family, in particular my parents
for their endless support.
338
Curriculum vitae
Name Felix Patzelt
Date of birth 14.04.1982
Education
2008 - 2014 Ph.D. student at the Theoretical Neurophysics lab
of Prof. Dr. Klaus Pawelzik (University of Bremen)
2008 Diploma in Physics (University of Bremen).
Thesis title: “Self-organised critical control in hu-
man behaviour”.
2002 - 2008 Undergraduate studies in Physics
2001 Abitur (Kippenberg Gymnasium Bremen)
Work
2008 - 2013 Research associate at the the Theoretical Neuro-
physics lab, University of Bremen.
2002 - 2008 Freelance work in the network “nachtlicht-
media.de”: print and screen design, programming
and more.
2005 Internship: MeVis Medical Solutions AG.
2001-2002 Civil Service: Bremer Umweltinstitut für die Anal-
yse und Bewertung von Schadstoffen.
1998 Internship: Kossann Professional Media GmbH.
339

Select publications
F. Patzelt and K. Pawelzik. An inherent instability of efficient markets.
Sci. Rep., 3:2784, 2013.
F. Patzelt and K. Pawelzik. Bubbles, Jumps, and Scaling from Properly
Anticipated Prices. In Axel Pelster (Editor): Self-Organization in
Complex Systems: The Past, Present, and Future of Synergetics. On the
Occasion of the 85th Birthday of Hermann Haken. (in Press, pre- print:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1303.2044), 2013.
F. Patzelt and J.L. Cabrera. Human Balancing Tasks: Power Laws,
Intermittency and Levy Flights. Encyclopedia of Computational
Neuroscience., Article ID 348567. Chapter ID 502. (Available on
http://www.springerreference.com)
F. Patzelt and K. Pawelzik. How criticality of visuo-motor control
behaviour depends on task objective. Computational and Systems
Neuroscience (Cosyne 2012 proceedings).
F. Patzelt and K. Pawelzik. Criticality of adaptive control dynamics.
Phys. Rev. Lett., 107:238103, Dec 2011.
F. Patzelt. Are power-laws in human behaviour caused by critical
adaptive control. Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems
(NIPS 2008 - Workshop)
F. Patzelt, M. Riegel, U. Ernst, and K. R. Pawelzik. Self- organized crit-
ical noise amplification in human closed loop control. Front. Comput.
Neurosci., 1(4), 2007.
341
